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This dissertation falls in the realm of environmental behavior and focuses on the 
role of the built environment in influencing responses to threats to personal security 
associated with terrorism. The research integrates pertinent knowledge from psychology, 
architecture and security/terrorism into a cohesive conceptual framework.   
Based on the conceptual framework, this work examined the effects of levels of 
terrorism threat (high vs. low) on people who face public buildings (city hall or shopping 
mall) that vary in their façade and entrance designs (solid exterior vs. glass façade 
with/without designed vs. temporary access control security measures). The research 
was conducted in two societies that are different in their experience with terrorism 
(Israel and Texas). The effects were measured along four dimensions: how much the 
issue of terrorism threat is on a person’s mind, how safe and how anxious the individual 
feels, and how likely he/she is to use the building.  
The investigation consisted of three quasi-experiments and a pretest survey and 
employed a computer-based web driven platform. A total of 1071 undergraduate 
students from College Station, Texas and Tel Aviv, Israel participated in these studies.  
 iv
The results illustrate the predominance of the levels of threat of terrorism in 
influencing all the examined security-related responses. The characteristics of buildings 
affected those responses to some extent. Differences between the two societies were 
found mainly in relation to the building-uses. Participants of the two societies responded 
similarly to the design elements of buildings. In conditions of low threat of terrorism 
participants from both societies had a higher sense of security when they were exposed 
to a glass façade compared to a solid concrete façade. In high terrorism threat, 
participants from both societies felt safer, and were more inclined to use a building with 
a solid façade. However, when access control security measures were visible to 
participants in the approach to the building (regardless of their design), both façade 
designs elicited a similar sense of security, while the propensity to enter the building was 
higher towards a glass façade.  
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This dissertation investigates the reactions of people to threats of terrorism, and 
how characteristics of the built environment may mediate these reactions. Though, 
before plunging into the topic, it may be useful to employ an interesting analogy that 
helps provide a perspective to the nature of the threat and its effect on people.  
de Becker (2002) describes a study that was conducted in the 1960s that sought 
to determine which single word has the greatest psychological impact on people. Out of 
many words that were presented to the study participants (e.g., spider, snake, death, rape, 
murder, etc.), the word shark elicited the greatest fear response (the survey was 
conducted before the book or movie Jaws). “Why do sharks, which human beings come 
in contact with so rarely, frighten us so profoundly?” de Becker inquires, and replies: 
“The seeming randomness of their strike is part of it, the lack of warning, the fact that 
such a large creature can approach silently and separate body from soul so 
dispassionately. To the shark, we are without identity, we are no more than meat, and for 
human beings the loss of identity is a type of death all by itself.” (de Becker, 2002:49)   
With this in mind, de Becker continues and posits that “[as] with the shark attack, 
seeming randomness and lack of warning are the attributes of terrorist violence we fear 
most.  Like sharks, some terrorists view us without identity;  not as individuals but just as  
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victims. Though there is no single strategy for avoiding terrorism, everything you need to 
know to be safe from sharks can be spoken in five words: Don’t go in the ocean. So 
perfect a precaution, and yet the overwhelming majority of people frolic in the waves, 
having determined the odds of a shark attack are acceptably low and trusting that if they 
receive a signal of danger they’ll heed it. They have chosen to compartmentalize the 
reality of sharks—and to go on with life rather than remain in a state of fear” (de Becker, 
2002: 49). Is that what happens in the case of terrorism? Do people compartmentalize 
their fear and go on with their lives trying to ignore it, or do they adjust their lives to the 
threat, trying to avoid the places that they perceive as prominent targets of terrorism? 
And if they search for signals of danger in the environment—what are they?     
Trying to further clarify how people perceive the threat of terrorism, we find   
that, though it is not a new threat to humanity, the literature considers the collapse of the 
twin towers on September 11, 2001, as a turning point in history, comparing it with the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989: “No one, apart from the few people 
who plotted and carried out these events, could have anticipated that they were going to 
happen. But from the moment they did happen, everyone acknowledged that everything 
had changed.” (Gaddis, 2001:3). Correspondingly, Paul Bracken (2001) describes this 
new age as the era of “think the unthinkable”.  
These statements convey some of the effect that the threat of terrorism has on 
people, despite its relative rarity. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that terrorism is 
one of the most dreaded man-made hazards (Slovic, 2000). And while no single, 
universally accepted definition of terrorism exists, terrorism, according to all, refers to a 
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premeditated act of violence against persons or property, staged to intimidate an 
audience, in furtherance of political or social objectives (US Department of Justice, FBI, 
1999; Combs, 2000; Pillar, 2001).  
In the face of this amplified political threat, that targets the global society, and 
threatens the physical as well as the psychological well-being of people, we must ponder 
the role of architecture and the design profession in general, and particularly with 
relation to terrorism.  
Any serious considerations of the social and psychological aspects, as well as 
issues of security and their relation to the design of the physical environment confront us 
with political and cultural values. Seidel’s article on the importance of the physical 
environment in peace negotiations is one of the first attempts to “gain an understanding 
of how the physical environment can facilitate political objectives” (1978:23). In 
addition, this study presents a good example for testing theoretical hypotheses, which 
stem from a comprehensive review of relevant areas in the social-psychological 
literature, on real events of peace negotiations that have taken place in history.  
So, what are the political objectives that drive the design profession today, in the 
face of the threat of terrorism? While it seems as though security is first on the list of 
priorities, other voices are heard as well. At the symposium “Freedom Without 
Fortresses? Shaping the New Secure Environment” held at the National Building 
Museum in Washington, D.C., on November 27, 2001, architects were called to resume 
their professional responsibilities of building communities, and to not cave to market-
driven objectives, like security (Johnston, 2002). “Architecture is inescapably a political 
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art and it reports faithfully for ages to come what the political values of a particular age 
were. Surely ours must be of openness and fearlessness in the face of those who hide in 
the darkness. A precaution, yes. Sequester, no” (Czarnecki, 2002).  
With the technological advances that we have today, there might be ways for 
architecture to bridge the objectives of security and of a seemingly open society. 
Though, do people need a design that does not look secure from terrorism?  
This brings us to a more basic discussion of the role of architecture. As the 
literature indicates, one of the challenges of architecture is to grant the users of the built 
environment with comfortably usable designs. One dimension of comfort is physical: 
designs should provide conditions adequate for activities, and protect the human body. 
The second dimension of comfort is psycho-emotional, which among other things, 
relates to creating a sensation of feeling safe and protected (Holahan, 1982; Saarinen, 
1976; Stamps, 1997). These studies speak of security as an integral aspect of a design 
that is attuned to human needs. Still, there is research to suggest that prior to September 
11th, the culture of architects and planners around the world has not considered security 
as a required condition that contributes to the creation of a successful design (Seidel, et 
al., 2006).  
Since 2001, the concern for and interest in terrorism has greatly increased. This 
recent trend is manifested in the numerous publications that claim to address how to gear 
the built environment against the threat of terrorism (e.g., AIA, 2001, 2004; FEMA 
2003a, 2003b; GSA, 2003; Nadel, 2004). The efforts to counter terrorism in the built 
environment, on which the literature elaborates, specifically target the provision of 
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physical security from terrorism. The majority of these sources posit a policy in which 
innovation and technology are used “to make security enhancements as transparent to 
the general public as possible”, while at the same time meeting established security 
standards (Nadel, 2001).  
Is this the right answer to what people need? Do people need to see the security 
measures in order to feel more secure? These questions raise the paradox of security, 
especially as we consider the threat of terrorism. A transparency of the security measures 
that educates and informs the public may also inform the potential terrorists that have the 
capability to adapt and change their tactics accordingly, and by that reduce the actual 
level of security. In addition, while the use of extensive security measures may initially 
deter terrorists, it also conveys that there is something important to protect. Hence, it 
might make the facility a more attractive target for terrorism. As a result, the public may 
understand all of this, and consequently become more alert and frightened rather than 
calm. 
To date, no research has directly tested the psychological implications of 
architectural design on people’s perceptions within the context of a terrorism threat. The 
above discussion sets the stage for a needed inquiry: Do characteristics of the built 
environment influence perceptions of security in today’s reality of global terrorism? If 
so, what are these characteristics and how do they affect the users of the environment?  
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1.1  The Research Objective 
 
In the attempt to add new and significant knowledge to the nexus of architecture - 
security - human behavior, this research focuses on the effects of the function and image 
of buildings on how people from different societies respond to threats to personal 
security associated with terrorism. The investigation centers on how current security 
threats, familiarity with such threats, building-uses and the visual elements of a building 
affect how important the issue of a terrorism threat is in the respondent’s mind, how safe 
and how anxious the respondent feels, and how likely the respondent is to use the 
environment.  
 
1.2  Significance of the Research 
 
The main significance of this research is in its contribution to the body of knowledge in 
addressing a question that has not been addressed to-date: what is the role of the built 
environment in influencing people’s perceptions of security from terrorism and their 
consequential responses.  
The review of the extensive literature that connects environment and behavior 
further substantiates the importance of the research question. The literature indicates that 
the paradox of security is directly related to people’s active role in the search for stress 
inducing stimuli (Goffman, 1971; Holahan, 1982). In order to survive, humans have 
always had to assess whether events or circumstances might benefit or threaten their 
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well-being (Nasar, 1997; Kaplan, et al., 1998). The physical environment stimulates the 
human perception (Altman, 1975), and therefore is essential to the way a user of a space 
evaluates its defensible aspect (Barker and Page, 2002; Tijerino, 1998).  
The literature offers an abundance of terms and explanations to the process by 
which a person is influenced by the surrounding environment. This process is commonly 
regarded as consisting of a few basic interlinked stages: direct physiological perception 
of stimuli; cognitive appraisal of the situation which includes potential activation of the 
emotional system (Geva and Skorick, 2002) and associated physiological responses, 
(Ulrich, et al., 1991; Ulrich, 1993); and finally, the resulting behavior (Holahan, 1982; 
Barker and Page, 2002). In addition, the literature links the physiological responses (e.g., 
elevation of blood pressure due to stress) directly to a person’s health and level of well-
being (Ulrich, et al., 1991; Ulrich, 1993).  
With this in mind, this research originated with the desire to find ways by which 
designers can attend to people’s health and well-being on all levels, physically and 
psycho-emotionally. “By isolating the types of potential threats and addressing each as a 
design dilemma, imaginative solutions can produce buildings that enhance our feeling of 
well-being while simultaneously providing protection” (Ivy, 2002:15).   
Still, the same idea brings up questions regarding the ethical implications of this 
research. Facing the danger of terrorism, should designers create environments that make 
people feel better? Is it morally acceptable to design buildings that reduce the fear of 
terrorism and attract people, when such a threat exists? Or, should we strive for designs 
that make people keep away from vulnerable buildings and possible targets? 
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Recognizing this dilemma, and without making a moral judgment on what should be 
done, this research focuses on the basic question that stands behind it: Can the built 
environment alter people’s perception of security from terrorism?  
Along with focusing on a question that had not been addressed to-date, the 
significance of this research is further strengthened by its interdisciplinary nature:  
combining the domain of human perception, the realm of architectural design for 
security, and characteristics of the specific threat of terrorism. The research, based on a 
thorough review of all of these subject areas, proposes a basic, general conceptual model 
that outlines the main factors that play a role in influencing individuals’ perceptions of 
security from terrorism in the built environment. Based on the specific elements of the 
proposed model, this research examines cross-cultural patterns of reactions to the global 
threat of terrorism in general, and specifically as related to conceptual and visual 
characteristics of the built environment.   
Moreover, the research develops and implements a rigorous methodology to 
empirically test and illustrate the conceptual model and its hypotheses. The methodology 
employs experimental and survey designs that were meticulously planned, using the 
latest tools and platforms. The methodology outlined in this study sets the stage for 
additional inquiries regarding various design elements and how they influence people in 
the context of international terrorism. 
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1.3  Structure of the Dissertation  
 
The dissertation is composed of six chapters, including the introduction as the first one. 
Chapter II consists of a comprehensive literature review. As this topic requires a blend of 
knowledge from different domains, the literature review includes three sections: 
(a) Human perception, cognition and consequential behavior in relation to the 
built environment and issues of security. The review in this section concentrates on 
pertinent knowledge regarding existing theories on human perception in general and 
specifically with regards to aspect of security, and discusses the processes of human 
reaction. This section in the literature review illustrates why it is important to consider 
the users’ point of view, especially in the face of the threat of terrorism. It shows the 
types of reactions that should be taken into account. Finally, it indicates what factors 
should be considered as influencing these reactions. The discussion of people’s 
perception of security sets forth important issues that need to be considered as we review 
the nature of the global threat of terrorism and the ways by which architecture responds 
to it.    
(b) Terrorism – Assessing the threat to the built environment and to its end users. 
This second part of the literature review discusses the character of the threat, its 
manifestation in different parts of the world, what the potential targets are, and what 
aspects in the environment can influence the vulnerability to it. The review will define 
the threat and its unique qualities with regards to the built environment and to the users 
of the environment. 
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(c) The built environment as a response to the threat. The third part of the 
literature review, informed by the first two sections, includes a thorough review of the 
history of architecture and security that concludes with an examination of the current 
policies that are specific for dealing with the threat of terrorism. The review extracts key 
concepts and strategies that are pertinent for achieving a secure environment while 
places the significance of this research in the context of history. This analysis helps with 
the specifications of the architectural elements addressed in the study.  
 Following the literature review, Chapter III of the dissertation presents the 
theoretical framework, which extracts from the literature review key factors that account 
for how architecture mediates humans’ reactions to the threats of terrorism. The chapter 
presents a conceptual model and derived hypotheses, as well as a discussion of the 
limitations of the model.  
 Chapter IV of the dissertation details the research methodology. The chapter 
discusses the general ideas behind the method of the investigation and the overall 
research design. It notes advantages as well as limitations. The chapter details the stages 
of the study, and entails each stage’s specific goals, design, material and procedure, and 
lastly—the statistical analyses that are performed.  
Chapter V focuses on the results of the statistical analyses of the data that were 
collected in each stage of the investigation. The analysis of the results is presented in 
five major sections. The first concentrates on the results of a pretest study that was used 
for the appraisal of an instrument that is used in the main investigation. The following 
three sections are focused each on a phase of the main investigation. Due to the relative 
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complexity of the design, the review of each stage of the study presents the objectives of 
the specific examination and the hypotheses that were tested, provides a quick review of 
the design of that stage, elaborates on its results, and presents a discussion of them. The 
last section of this chapter summarizes the findings of the main investigation.   
 The final chapter of the dissertation, Chapter VI, presents a summary of the 
research as well as conclusions. The chapter discusses the research question, the 
formation of the conceptual model, its components and related hypotheses. The chapter 
provides a short review of the methodology and follows with a synopsis of the main 
findings of the research. Furthermore, the chapter discusses possible explanations of the 
results of the study and suggests their potential implications. The discussion expresses 
the limits of the conclusions as well as directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THE THREAT OF TERRORISM,  
THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AND THE END USERS* 
 
This chapter provides a first step towards a better understanding of the interesting 
assay: terrorism threat - physical environment - users of the environment. The link 
between any threat, the design of the environment and people who use it presents a 
challenge to the architecture and planning realm. This challenge is rooted in the general, 
yet important, objective to grant the users of the built environment with comfortably 
usable designs. One dimension of comfort is physical: when design provides conditions 
adequate for activities, and acts as a line of defense for the human body (Saarinen, 
1976). The second dimension of comfort is psycho-emotional (Holahan, 1982; Stamps, 
1997). There are many aspects to this psycho-emotional comfort and they involve issues 
of aesthetics, satisfaction with the effectiveness of the design to comply with personal 
and functional needs, and with feeling safe and protected in the built environment. These 
different aspects of the psycho-emotional comfort are interrelated, and both physical and 




* Part of the data reported in this chapter is reprinted with permission from: (a) “Architecture and terror in 
a historical perspective: The role of impediment and deterrence” by G Zilbershtein. 2006. ARRIS. Volume 
17. 53-63. Copyright 2006 by the Southeast Chapter of the Society of Architectural Historians, SESAH; 
and (b) “Architecture in the era of terror: The security dilemma” by G Zilbershtein. In Safety and security 
engineering, SAFE 2005 proceedings. 805-817. CA Brebbia, T Bucciarelli, F Garzia, and M Guarascio 
(Eds.). 2005. WIT Press. Southampton, UK. Copyright 2005 by WIT Press.  
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While the above studies speak for security as an integral aspect of a design that is 
attuned to human needs, there is research to suggest that until very recently the culture of 
architects and planners around the world has usually ignored security as a factor to be 
addressed in the design of the built environment. Seidel, Holden and Ozdil’s study 
(2006), conducted prior to September 11, 2001, surveyed practicing architects from the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Australasia on “the knowledge areas they report 
are needed for successful design”. This study does not indicate terrorism, nor security in 
general, as aspects architects reported themselves to be involved with in their work. A 
special note needs to be made to the fact that this general pattern was true even for the 
United Kingdom which had a history of terrorism attacks.  
Since 2001, the concern from and interest in terrorism, has greatly increased. 
This recent trend is manifested in the numerous publications that claim to address how to 
gear the built environment against the threat of terrorism (e.g., AIA, 2001, 2004; FEMA 
2003a, 2003b; GSA, 2003; Nadel, 2004).                  
The relevant sources on how to secure the built environment from terrorism take 
upon mostly the points of view of the potential adversary and of the building owner or 
permanent occupants (AIA, 2004; FEMA, 2003a; 2003b). This perspective is reflected 
in discussions of tactics and goal of terrorism, and focusing on issues such as insurance 
premium, life cycle costs, and potential losses. These sources, especially when referring 
to facilities of public nature, comparatively neglect the third side to this problem – the 
main users of the environment, the public for whom we design these buildings.   
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With this in mind, the following review of literature begins with the neglected 
issue: focusing on the users of the environment (section 2.1). Dealing with the users’ 
perspective, the review examines existing theories on human perception in general and 
specifically with regards to aspect of security, and discusses the processes of human 
reaction. This section in the literature review will illustrate why it is important to 
consider the users’ point of view, especially in the face of the threat of terrorism. It will 
show the types of reactions that should be taken into account. And finally, it will indicate 
what factors should be considered as influencing these reactions. 
The discussion of people’s perception of security, in section 2.1, will set forth 
important aspects that need to be considered as we review the nature of the global threat 
of terrorism, detailed in section 2.2. This second part of the review discusses the 
character of the threat, what the potential targets are, and what aspects in the 
environment can influence the vulnerability to it. The review will define the threat and 
its unique qualities with regards to the built environment and to the users of the 
environment. 
The third part of the literature review (section 2.3), informed by the first two 
sections, includes a thorough review of the continuous link between architecture and 
security. The review includes historical strategies of defense against enemies, as well as 
modern theories of crime prevention, and ends with examination of the current policies 
for dealing with threats of terrorism. The discussion extracts key concepts and strategies 
that have proven as pertinent for achieving a secure environment while places the 
research as relevant in the context of history. In addition, this part of the literature review 
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will point to the architectural elements that should and can be addressed in the scope of 
this dissertation. 
 
2.1  Human Perception, Cognition and Consequential Behavior in Relation to the 
Built Environment and Issues of Security  
 
The following review concentrates on the users of the facility, dealing with the processes 
of human perception and reaction. This section covers existing theories on human 
perception in general and specifically with regards to aspect of security and reviews 
empirical evidence illustrating the importance in addressing the point of view of the 
users of the environment. The review indicates the types of reactions that should be 
considered, and what factors play a role in influencing these reactions. The review 
concludes with a theoretical discussion of risk perception and the paradox of security 
and how these concepts relate to the threat of terrorism. This discussion sets the stage for 
the next section which focuses on the characteristics of the threat.  
 
2.1.1  Perceptions of Security: Their Importance and the Involved Processes  
 
Holahan stated that “environmental perception provides the foundation for all of our 
knowledge about the world around us and for all of our activities in the environment” 
(1982:31). More specifically to the issue of security, and as according to evolutionary 
perspectives, evaluation of the surroundings is a principle of survival, vital to humans’ 
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existence (Kaplan, et al., 1998; Nasar, 1997; Nasar and Jones, 1997). The physical 
environment stimulates the human perception (Altman, 1975), and therefore is essential 
to the way a user of a building evaluates its defensible aspect. In fact, Goffman (1971) 
suggested that people search for signals that convey danger in the built surroundings and 
their immediate environment. Herzog (1976) specified that familiarity is an important 
factor in this cue-searching process.  
Literature considers threatening cues as stress-inducing stimuli. Stress, or 
anxiety, as according to Baum, Fleming and Singer (1985) is the process by which an 
individual responds psychologically, physiologically and often with behaviors, to a 
situation that challenges or threatens well-being. It has been proven that certain visual 
stimuli in the environment influence a person’s level of stress and the level of high-order 
cognitive functioning (Ulrich, 1993). Reduction in stress, often regarded as restoration, 
“involves numerous positive changes in psychological state, in levels of activity in 
physiological systems and often in behavior or functioning” (Ulrich, et al., 1991). 
Considering stress and its effect on people, we need to consider that while it may harm a 
person’s levels of functioning and health, when it is associated with detection of 
threatening cues—it may be beneficial in terms of survival.  
With regards to the perception of environmental stimuli and its impact on people 
and their physical and mental well-being, we need to consider Arousal Theory (Berlyne, 
1971). Arousal, in a general sense, denotes the level of psychological and physiological 
activation. In terms of intensity, this level ranges from drowsiness to extreme 
excitement. According to the theory, the general level of arousal relates to the 
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individual’s physical, emotional and psychological well-being. The relation is a 
symmetrical curve shaped with middle range arousal coinciding with a high level of 
well-being. Over time, people seek the middle range arousal by balancing a given 
emotional state and a newly generated arousal. Consequently, when relaxed, most people 
prefer more arousing stimuli, while when tensed, people prefer less arousing stimuli 
(Ulrich, 1979).  
Holahan, in his work in the realm of environmental psychology (1982), 
acknowledges the extensive work that has been carried out by Richard Lazarus and his 
associates on psychological stress. In Holahan’s review of Lazarus’s work, he denotes 
that psychological stress is triggered by the environment as a consequence of three types 
of cognitive appraisals. “Lazarus defines primary appraisal as a mediating psychological 
process that discriminates potentially threatening situations from beneficial or irrelevant 
ones. Secondary appraisal functions to assess the individual’s resources for coping with 
the threatening situation. Finally, reappraisal is a change in the original perception of the 
situation due to either changing environmental conditions or changes within the person 
resulting from cognitive coping efforts” (Holahan, 1982:159).  
In addition, Holahan (1982) accepts Lazarus and his colleagues’ (Folkman and 
Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus, 1980) proposition that there are two ways to cope with stress: 
problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping. “Problem focused coping consists 
of behavioral or cognitive efforts to deal directly with the source of stress, while 
emotion-focused coping involves behavioral or cognitive efforts to reduce or better 
tolerate one’s emotional reaction to stress” (Holahan, 1982:192). Originally, the stressors 
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in Holahan’s explanation were the environmental conditions that affect our body (e.g., 
noise, heat, etc.). However, this conceptualization may also hold for other conditions in 
the physical surroundings that affect a person’s perception of a place and its implications 
for personal security or well-being. 
The perceptual processes, as well as the search for familiar cues and the ways to 
cope implied in the previous literature, resonate with a more updated account of 
information processing that addresses the simultaneous effects of cognitive and 
emotional components (Geva and Skorick, 2006). The researchers posit that two 
interrelated, though distinct, systems are used in the perception and interpretation of the 
environment: emotional system and cognitive system.  
The emotional system consists of clustered and inner-connected structures of 
discrete and basic emotions. The system, which is binary in nature (‘on’ or ‘off’), is 
“hard-wired” to rapid changes in the person’s physiological state. Furthermore, this 
system is marked by behavioral impulses or routines (“fight or flight”) that are 
associated with feeling threatened or safe. The emotional system works in sync with the 
cognitive system. Thus, stimulations of emotions can be caused by external cues or by 
reference to schema or images (cognitive elements) that are associated with experienced 
episodes of similar emotions. Hence, perception and interpretation of threatening cues 
can be triggered directly and immediately via the emotional system or indirectly via 
retrieval and interaction with the cognitive system and can result in influencing behavior 
(Geva and Skorick, 2006). The later notion had been validated in Barker and Page’s 
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study (2002) of visitor safety in Auckland, New Zealand, which concluded that 
perceptions of safety are particularly important as they affect people’s behavior.   
The abundance of terms and explanations to the stages in the process through 
which a person is influenced by the surrounding environment can be summarized into 
several basic interlinked stages: direct physiological perception of stimuli; cognitive 
appraisal of the situation which includes potential activation of the emotional system 
(Geva and Skorick, 2006) and associated physiological responses (Ulrich, et al., 1991; 
Ulrich, 1993). These are linked to a general level of well-being (Ulrich, et al., 1991; 
Ulrich, 1993; Berlyne, 1971) and finally, to a resulting behavior (Holahan, 1982; Barker 
and Page, 2002). The cognitive, emotional, physiological and behavioral responses to the 
stimuli are ways by which people cope with stressful situations, ways by which they try 
to reach a middle-range arousal and a high level of well-being.  
 
2.1.2  Perceptions of Security: The Theories Behind  
 
There are two schools of thought with regards to what stands behind people’s perception 
of security. Some sources identify people’s feelings of security and related responses to 
environmental stimuli as innate reactions, derived from “the most basic and essential 
survival-advantageous behaviors of our early ancestors” (Hildebrand, 1999: xv; 
Appleton, 1975; Orians, 1980, 1986; Ulrich, 1993; Ulrich, et al., 1991). Other sources 
point out a cognitive process, in which learning shapes a person’s conditioning to 
security issues (Barker and Page, 2002).  
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“Evolutionary perspective” refers to the proposition that people today are to 
some extent biologically prepared to deal with circumstances that are similar to 
situations that were beneficial or threatening to the pre-modern humans (Ulrich, et al., 
1991). Ulrich (1993) distinguishes between two types of ‘preparedness’: biophilic 
(positive) and biophobic (negative) responses to certain natural stimuli and their 
configuration. In this scheme, humans’ responses are basically intuitive, even if they 
have a rational explanation.  
Orians’s “savanna phenomenon” provides a good illustration for the concept of 
the pre-modern roots to modern humans’ preferences (Orians, 1980, 1986; Ulrich, 1993). 
It also exemplifies humans’ search for environments that diminish threats. According to 
Orians, savanna environments, compared to other habitats, provided favorable 
combinations of primary necessities to early humans. Savannas offered more abundant 
plant and animal food as well as lower risk. Empirical studies have shown that today, 
people from different origins and ages around the world prefer environments that are 
savanna like in appearance (Ulrich, 1993; Ruiz and Bernaldez, 1982; Yi, 1992). And in 
fact, crime prevention theories in the built environment (addressed in detail in section 
2.3.2), utilize the basic physical attributes of savannas as factors that facilitate deterrence 
of adversaries and provide a sense of security to members of the community (Jacobs, 
1961; Newman, 1972; Poyner and Fawcett, 1995; Fennelly, 1997; Tijerino, 1998). 
The other view proposes an individual-learning case-based scheme. This scheme 
is closely linked to Herzog and Kaplan’s (1976) proposition that familiarity is an 
important factor in the cue-searching-process. According to Herzog, familiarity is the 
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basis for understanding of any situation at hand. With respect to the issue of security, it 
influences the assessment of risk and the evaluation of the environment and its qualities 
as deterring potential offenders or providing opportunity for committing an act. 
Additional studies have shown that the level of familiarity with a threat and with security 
influences the perception of personal security (Barker and Page, 2002).  
Referring to the threat of terrorism, the above theories bring up important 
questions. To what extent do people’s reactions to the threat of terrorism and to means of 
protection against it depend on their first hand experience and familiarity with it? Does 
terrorism have qualities that resemble predatory threats that can elicit innate reactions to 
it? 
 
2.1.3  Perceptions of Security: Factors of Influence  
 
The two schools of thought on the origins of people’s perception of security—the innate 
as well as the learning propositions—suggest a complex combination of factors that 
influence individuals’ security related reactions to a certain physical environment. 
Barker and Page’s study on visitor safety in Auckland, New Zealand (as related 
to crime) supports the case-based-learning proposition (2002). The study indicates that 
demographic characteristics of the individual affect his/her relation towards security 
issues and expectations of security measures. In addition, the study implies that 
perceptions of safety are influenced by two other variables. One variable is the physical 
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image of the facility and the other is the way the media influences perceptions of risk 
pertaining to the general area (context) of the facility. 
Further qualification of the image and the context factors can be found in Nasar 
and Jones’s (1997) analysis of people’s sensitivity to environmental stimuli and the 
process of understanding the security aspect of the situation at hand. The researchers 
posit that situations that evoke fear can be analyzed along two levels: “distal” and 
“proximate” (Nasar and Jones, 1997:292).  
 
2.1.3.1  The Distal Level 
 
The distal level of fear addresses a general worry about the chance of victimization. This 
worry is associated with the symbolic sense of a place, i.e., the type and function of the 
building and the context in which it operates (Lang, 1987; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 
1997).  
 
2.1.3.1.1  Building’s Type and Function   
 
The importance of the function of the facility is illustrated in the report “American 
Society in the Age of Terrorism” (Etzioni, 2002). In this report, sociologist Etzioni 
explains the decrease in air travel after the September 11 attack as a result of fear. This 
fear is linked to the function of airport being associated with the risk of terrorism attacks.  
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 For the purpose of this dissertation, it is therefore important to study which 
building uses are closely associated with incidents of terrorism, and even more essential 
is the question of which building uses the public perceive as associated with high risk of 
terrorism.  
 
2.1.3.1.2  Context   
 
The element of context relates to two things. First is the physical context of a facility – 
the environment surrounding it. The second, which is more relevant to the issue of 
terrorism threat, is the societal-political context. This aspect of context may indicate 
whether a certain area is of higher or lower risk of terrorism. The societal-political 
context has bearings on the level of exposure and experience an individual within the 
society has with the threat of terrorism and with security measures. This in tern may 
influence the person’s expectations regarding security in certain building uses. 
 Studying societies with different exposure to the threat of terrorism may show if 
there is a global innate pattern of reactions to the threat, and to what extent people’s 
reactions to it are based on personal familiarity.  
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2.1.3.2  The Proximate Level 
 
The proximate level of fear is linked to the search of particular cues that may evoke 
specific fears. This level relates to either the formal, structural cues of the surroundings, 
or to social cues that can be detected in a place (Lang, 1987; Nasar and Jones, 1997; 
Nasar, 1997). 
 
2.1.3.2.1  Physical/Structural Cues   
 
The physical/structural cues of the environment, as being influential on a person’s 
security assessment of a place, are discussed in the literature mainly in the context of the 
evolutionary perspective, referring to savanna-like environments (Appleton, 1975; 
Fisher and Nasar, 1992; Holahan, 1982; Kaplan, et al., 1998; Nasar and Jones, 1997; 
Newman, 1972; Tijerino, 1998; Ulrich, 1993). These sources identify and discuss three 
physical attributes of spaces as having direct influence on people’s perception of 
security: prospect (also appears as visual openness), escape and refuge.  
Prospect, or the level of visual openness in the space, refers to two issues. A 
blocked prospect, or a limited visual openness, refers to the physical concealment the 
space might offer for potential threats to hide behind and emerge to attack. The extent of 
visual openness also indicates whether the conditions allow for natural surveillance, 
where other people can detect that there is somebody in need and can come into the 
rescue. The attribute of escape refers to whether conditions allow for a quick exit if 
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needed and what are the chances of entrapment. The element of refuge speaks for the 
level of protection the space appears to provide against an attack. All of these attributes 
have been adopted as strategies of security from crime, and are discussed in further 
extent in section 2.3.  
In addition to the physical qualities of a space, which relate directly to the issue 
of security, literature elaborates on general visual qualities that influence a person’s 
arousal level and consequently the stress level. Berlyne’s Arousal Theory was first tested 
on works of art and later on visuals of urban scenes (Ulrich, 1979). The theory contends 
that the arousal attributes of visual stimuli consist of three properties: complexity, 
novelty and unity (Berlyne, 1971; Holahan, 1982). Complexity refers to the quantity of 
independently perceivable visual elements; novelty is the level of unfamiliar visual 
information, rarely encountered or seen; and unity is the degree of organization, 
patterning and redundancy in the visual information. Berlyne’s theory proposes that 
complexity and novelty increase the arousal level of the perceiver of the visual while 
unity decreases it. Consistent with this perspective, studies using abstract, non-
environmental visual displays have found a decline in the preferred levels of complexity 
when individuals are already stressed and anxious (Berlyne and Lewis, 1963).   
Additional property, suggested later as also affecting arousal, is the level of 
incongruity: how inappropriate is the design in its context (Holahan, 1982; Ulrich, 
1979). This level originally referred to the physical context of the visual stimuli. 
However, it can be contended that with regards to the built environment this level can 
also refer to the conceptual context - the building-use as related to the societal context. 
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In this sense, the level of congruity is what people from a certain society expect a 
building to be, based on their past experiences of buildings of similar use. Such 
expectation can be related to issues of proportions, materials, shapes, operation, as well 
as to the security measures associated with the facility. 
In addition, and with relation to the physical cues (i.e., visual stimuli), it is 
important to remember that perception of architectural forms is based on experiencing a 
three-dimensional space. Thus, an intriguing idea is how the physical relationships 
between the user and the physical environment affect people’s judgments of the qualities 
of a design mentioned above (i.e., prospect, refuge, escape, complexity, novelty, unity 
and incongruity). Along the Kantian theory which posits that the appearance of an object 
depends on the location from which it is seen (Stamps, 1997), the perception of security 
and its consequential responses (feeling and action propensity) depends on what parts of 
the whole building design is actually viewed by the user. Stamp defined this as a 
viewshed: “Public viewsheds consists of the locus of points, accessible by the general 
public from which a project is visible” (Stamps, 1997).  
This dissertation focuses on realistic yet simple viewsheds, those that can attest 
for a person’s first encounter with a facility. In addition, the examination of how 
architectural design influences people in the context of the arousing stress-inducing 
threat of terrorism, will be conducted while keeping the visual elements of complexity 
and novelty at minimum and stressing the element of unity. This will help center the 
investigation on the basic characteristics of the design instead of the details and specific 
configuration of the architectural element that is used in the examination.  
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2.1.3.2.1  Social Cues   
 
The “proximate” level of fear also refers to social cues that can be detected in a place 
(Lang, 1987; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 1997). The proposition that people search 
for social cues that may indicate a threat goes along with profiling the strangers that we 
see around us and evaluating if they impose a danger to us. In addition, another 
important aspect to the social cue is the number of people around us and whether they 
are strangers to us or not. With respect to conventional crime, one stranger can seem 
threatening (pending on its profile), while a few people in the surrounding environment 
may facilitate the natural surveillance premise and therefore can be considered as 
reassuring in terms of personal security (Nasar and Jones, 1997).  
Previous studies, in which there was no threat of terrorism and the only possible 
threat is of ‘conventional’ crime, show that the presence of other people in a scene 
increases the feeling of security (Shaffer and Anderson, 1983; Zilbershtein and Seidel, 
2004). This tendency was only partially supported considering the threat of terrorism in 
Zilbershtein and Seidel’s study (2004). In that study, in the context of the threat of 
terrorism, presence of other people at a certain scene assured Texan participants, who 
present an example of a society that is not used to this threat. Israelis, on the other hand, 
who represent people that are used to live under the threat of terrorism, felt safer when 
no people were visible at the scene.  
While recognizing the importance of social cues in influencing perception and 
feeling of security, it has been a conscious decision not to study this factor in the scope 
 28
of this dissertation research. Nonetheless, the importance of the presence or absence of 
people was taken into consideration in the creation of the material used for the study 
(discussed in Chapter IV).  
In addition, specific to this dissertation research, which focuses on elements and 
characteristics of the built environment and their influence on people’s sense of security 
in the context of the threat of terrorism, the social factor has relevance to the nature of 
the threat and to some general attributes of potential targets. The review of the social-
related qualities of the threat of terrorism as well as the social character of potential 
targets is presented in section 2.2.  
 
2.1.4  Risk Perception, Politics, the Paradox of Security and Terrorism   
 
The importance of the social factor in influencing perception of security had been widely 
supported in the literature. Herzog and Kaplan (1976), making a distinction between 
physical danger and social danger, conclude that individuals fear more social danger 
(e.g., a stranger approaching vs. a dimly lighted street). Correspondingly, other sources 
state that social incivilities are more strongly linked to perceptions of risk than physical 
incivilities (LaGrange, et al., 1992; Tijerino, 1998). de Becker (2002) continues with 
linking a reduction of risk to the sensation of feeling safe. For the latter propositions to 
work we need to consider what risk is. Lindell and Perry define risk as “a condition in 
which there is a possibility that people or property could experience adverse 
consequences” (2004:1). de Becker suggests that feeling safe is being free of 
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“unacceptable risk” (2002:46). The notion of unacceptable risk corresponds with Herzog 
and LaGrange’s observation regarding social dangers. As sources indicate, while people 
knowingly volunteer for some risks (as car accidents, disease from smoking, poor diet 
etc.), they object to those that are imposed on them by others (de Becker, 2002; Starr, 
1969).  
In light of this discussion, the question for this dissertation is how do people 
perceive the threat of terrorism? A similar question and a further comparison of the 
perception of terrorism and the perception of other known-to-man-hazards were 
discussed in Zilbershtein and Seidel (2008). The paper suggests that the proposition that 
social dangers are considered as more influential than environmental ones is illustrated 
in the elevated public concern regarding terrorism even though acts of terrorism have 
produced less damage and casualties than other hazards have, and “the likelihood that 
any individual will become a victim in most places is microscopic” (Mueller, 2004:2).  
In addition, empirical evidence attests that terrorism is one of the most dreaded 
man-made hazards (Slovic, 2000). This tendency corresponds to what Pidgeon, 
Kasperson and Slovic (2003) define as the social amplification of risk, which explains 
the global extensive media coverage given to the subject as well as it’s being a first 
priority on the political agenda all over the world. The low salience of other threats as 
natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes) has been shown even in regions subject to recurrent 
dramatic disasters (Lindell and Prater, 2000; Prater and Lindell, 2000).  
This discussion brings up the political nature of the subject, as political issues 
compete for attention and resources (Prater and Lindell, 2000). Literature about hazard 
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risk mitigation encourages policy entrepreneurship, especially in the aftermath of a 
major event, when a window of opportunity opens for advancement of the subject 
(Prater and Lindell, 2000). Furthermore, it is recommended to develop public awareness 
on the different hazards (Prater and Lindell, 2000). This is what has been done with 
respect to terrorism. However, in the case of terrorism, educating the public about 
security and preparedness measures and procedures are problematic since they can 
benefit the terrorists and by that reduce the actual level of security. In addition, over 
alarming the public of a rare threat such as terrorism can cause a false sense of 
insecurity, which is one of the terrorists’ main goals, and can be economically painful to 
the society (Mueller, 2004).  
The above discussion highlights the paradox bounded in the concept of security 
which is directly related to people’s active role in the search for stress inducing stimuli 
(Goffman, 1971; Holahan, 1982). The paradox of security holds that a complicated 
relation exists between the salience of security in a place and how secure a person 
actually feels in that built environment, “Where security systems assert themselves most 
forcefully…. fear, discomfort, and danger often flourish. Conversely, the absence of 
visible protection can promote the feeling of well-being” (Farson in Ivy, 2002:15). 
According to psychologist Farson, even if security measures may protect people, 
elaborate security measures may induce fear in the users.  
This dissertation investigates the paradox concerning the visual representation of 
security in the design of buildings and they way people respond to them in the global 
context of terrorism threat.  
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Following the above discussion on the elevated public concern for terrorism, the 
subsequent section will provide a more factual review of the threat, its unique 
characteristics and an analysis of its relation to the built environment. The review will 
relate to issues that were pointed out in this section as factors that influence people’s 
sense of security.          
 
2.2  Terrorism: Assessing the Threat to the Built Environment and to the End 
Users  
 
2.2.1  What Are Terrorism and Counterterrorism?   
 
Terrorism is a very old concept. It can be traced back at least to the ancient Greek and 
Roman republics, with the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C (Combs, 2003). The 
term itself was introduced in the French Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror 
(1792-1794). And while then it was an instrument of the new revolutionary state to 
intimidate counter-revolutionists who were considered ‘enemies of the people’, it has 
since became associated with anti-state and anti government activities (Combs, 2003; 
Hoffman, 1998). For comprehensive reviews of the history of terrorism please see the 
noted sources (Coaffee, 2003; Combs, 2003; Hoffman, 1998; Nadel, 2004; Pillar, 2001).  
The literature indicates that there is no single, universally accepted definition of 
terrorism. Different states, different agencies within a state, as well as various scholars 
and the terrorists themselves have their own definition of the term. Yet, whether it is 
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perceived as a righteous fight for a higher cause or viewed as an unlawful horrible act, 
terrorism, according to all, refers to a premeditated act of violence against persons or 
property, staged to intimidate an audience, in furtherance of political or social objectives 
(Combs, 2003; Hoffman, 1998; Pillar, 2001; US Department of Justice, FBI, 1999).  
In the US, the stated objective of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is 
to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (Homeland 
Security Council, 2007:3; Parachini, et al., 2003). In spite of the relative simplicity of 
this declaration, addressing the threat of terrorism encompasses a variety of operations 
on different levels - from active diplomacy to secretive intelligence work, from law 
enforcement to pre-emptive operations and security measures; all of which range from 
the intent of prevention to reduction of vulnerability and proactive response (Pillar, 
2001). In order to deal with the complexity of the matter, the US strategy for countering 
terrorism is based on establishment of priorities (Parachini, et al., 2003).  
In the same light, even only in the realm of the built environment, 
counterterrorism efforts require rational prioritization. Literature indicates that these 
efforts include elements of design, structural hardening, technology and operational 
policies, to help prevent, mitigate and facilitate a desired response in the event of a 
terrorism attack (Coaffee, 2003; FEMA, 2003; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000; Nadel, 
2004). The necessity to prioritize these efforts is further highlighted when we consider 
questions of cost, i.e., the level of investment vs. the probable consequences. A basic 
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step to this prioritization is accomplished through the assessment of the specific security 
needs for a certain place in a certain context.  
 
2.2.2  Assessment of Security Needs 
 
Many sources refer to the analysis by which security needs are defined as a risk 
assessment. Risk assessment examines the consequences of hostile actions for a building 
and its occupants. It consists of: (1) threat analysis which defines the level of threat to a 
facility by evaluating the intent, motivation, and possible tactics of potential offenders; 
(2) asset analysis that identifies and prioritizes the asset to be protected according to its 
nature, value, location and how, when, and by whom it is accessed and used; and (3) 
vulnerability analysis which defines the weaknesses of a facility in its design, 
construction, operation and location (AIA, 2001).  
Over the years, computer applications have been integrated into the risk 
assessment analysis in the case of conventional crime (e.g., CAPIndex). Such 
applications calculate a probability assessment of a criminal event for a specific place as 
related to statistics of categories of crime, based on location and use of the architectural 
item (Linn, 2002). In the case of terrorism, assessment of risk is an intricate matter. 
While it seems that the media covers terror attacks around the globe on a daily basis, the 
actual number of occurrences is quite limited to reach a significant numerical probability 
for a particular location (Linn, 2002). Inevitably, current statistics of terrorism patterns 
are only supporters to theoretical risk assessment endeavors and are focused on the type 
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of attacks, the general regions (on a global scale) in which they occur, and the use of the 
architectural item (function of the places in which attacks take place).  
The following three sections follow the three basic components of risk 
assessment: threat analysis, asset analysis and vulnerability analysis. Yet, instead of 
applying these analyses to a certain building, they are addressed in this review in a 
broader sense with the intention to gain a better understanding of the nature of the threat, 
the potential, most probable targets and of the key components of security. The 
discussion will relate to the global phenomenon, but also, following the review in section 
2.1 on human perception, will look into two more specific political contexts. The two 
contexts are Israel and the U.S., which represent instances of two societies with different 
experience with the threat.       
 
2.2.2.1  Threat Analysis 
 
Many sources present various views on different terrorists groups and their motivation 
(Coaffee, 2003; Combs, 2003; Hoffman, 1998; Nadel, 2004; Pillar, 2001; US 
Department of State, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 2002, 2003). It is 
not for this research to speculate or judge whether terrorism is means to an end, utilized 
for achieving other political, social or religious goals (Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000), or 
whether it has become “the end in itself” (US Department of Justice, FBI, 1999).  
The discussion however, does point out two main issues. First, as recognized by 
many around the world, terrorism is associated with fear or instigation of it. Empirical 
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evidence attests that terrorism is one of the most dreaded man-made hazards 
(Slovic,2000). Second, the lethality of terrorism attacks has grown. Statistics from the 
last twenty years show that while the number of attacks decreased over the years, they 
have become more lethal (Pillar, 2001; US Department of State, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 2002, 2003). In addition, the fact that terrorism is a tool used by 
motivated people elevates the unpredictable aspect of it as it has the ability to change 
and adapt to means of protection.   
With direct relation to the lethality of the threat, another factor to consider is the 
growing number of suicide missions (FEMA, 2003; US Department of State, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 2002, 2003). A specific example to this 
tendency can be found in Israel where during 2001-2006, out of 140 fatal terrorism 
attacks that took place within Israel’s territory, 84 were suicide missions (MIPT 
Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). The trend of suicide attacks may have an impact on 
tactics of defense in the built environment, as the risk of being caught in action may not 
have the desired effect on terrorists that do not fear death. Moreover, even if terrorists 
are prevented from reaching their ultimate target, the space where they are stopped may 
suffer the hit. In addition, suicide missions emphasize the social nature of the threat and 
the fact it is being imposed on the population by other human beings. This, in turn, as 
discussed in section 2.1.4, contributes to the resentment among the population towards 
the threat and the social amplification of risk with regards to terrorism. 
Referring to the possible tactics of potential offenders, we find that terrorism is 
manifested in many different forms: assassination, armed assault, hijacking, hostage-
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taking, bombings, product or air contamination and cyber-terrorism (Kozlow and 
Sullivan, 2000; US Department of State, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 
2002, 2003). In many cases, together with the notion of suicide missions, these different 
types of attacks involve the incursion of armed terrorists into targets. Multiple 






TABLE 2.1. Worldwide terrorist attacks against the Unites States, by type of events, 1994-2003 (US Department of State, 1995:67; 
1996: 73; 1997:74; 1998:86; 1999:96; 2000:106; 2001:88; 2002:176; 2003:166, 2004:181). 
 
Type of event  
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Armed attack 9 8 3 5 5 11 4 1 8 5 
Arson 0 6 7 2 1 6 2 NA NA 2 
Assault 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA 
Bombing 43 65 55 109 96 111 179 207 66 71 
Firebombing 2 0 1 0 5 12 1 1 NA 2 
Hijacking NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1 NA NA 
Kidnapping/hostage 10 11 6 8 4 21 11 6 3 2 
Vandalism 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 3 NA NA 
Other 
 
NA NA NA NA NA 8 3 NA NA NA 
Total 66 99 73 123 111 169 200 219 77 82 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 2.1, which shows the terrorists attack against U.S. 
internationally by type of event, the most common terrorism acts are bombings 
(Craighead, 2003; MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). These include the use of 
explosives that are relatively easy to obtain, or utilize whatever destructive means are 
available as incendiary devices (e.g., using airplanes as missiles in September 11) 
(Craighead, 2003; FEMA, 2003; Nadel, 2004). Another example of the extensive use of 
 37
bombing / explosives can be found in Israel where out of the 140 fatal attacks that took 
place between the years 2001-2006 within Israel’s territory, 107 were accomplished 
using explosives, 26 were performed using firearms, 4 by knives/sharp objects/beating, 
and 2 by fire (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). Besides being destructive, and 
relatively easy to carry through, bombing events also appeal to terrorists due to their 
theatrical nature. The extensive media coverage of events with bleeding casualties and 
severely damaged environments serves two interrelated purposes: demonstrating power 
over authorities and inducing fear in the population (FEMA, 2003; Coaffee, 2003).  
The literature also indicates that the risks of chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear (CBRN) attacks are not to be dismissed (Pillar, 2001; FEMA, 2003; Janus and 
Blewett, 2004). And while past tendencies have been to mostly use conventional 
weapons (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007; US Department of State, 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 2002, 2003), examples as the Aum ShinriKyo attack 
with the release of sarin in Tokyo’s subway system in 1995 that resulted in 12 fatalities 
and 5500 injured, as well as smaller scale attacks using anthrax and ricin in the U.S. (15 
total in 2001-2006, out of which 4 resulted in fatalities), indicate alternative potential 
weapons of terrorism (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). 
 
2.2.2.2  Asset Analysis 
 
It is almost impossible to develop a comprehensive list of potential terrorism targets, as 
in today’s urban environment target selection is nearly unlimited. Yet, the presumed 
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intention of terrorism to maximize destruction suggests traits of possible targets: 
facilities which possess symbolic value, those that if damaged would provoke 
anxiety/fear among the population, would disturb the economy, or infrastructure; and 
those which offer the possibility of a Mass Casualty Incident—MCI (Archibald, et al., 
2002; Combs, 2003; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000).  
Using September 11 terrorist attacks in the US as a case study, we find that the 
target fits most of these traits: devastating damage to the physical environment and to 
human lives in a place of symbolic and economic significance. However, sources 
contend that despite the September 11 attack, fear does not dominate Americans’ lives—
people feel comfortable and safe enough to continue everyday activities without much 
consideration of possible terrorist attacks (de Becker, 2002). The terrorists’ failure in 
that respect may suggest that in the future, terrorist organizations will attempt to hit 
places where every American may happen to be during daily activities. The latter 
assumption is supported by what has been the case in other parts of the world (e.g., in 
Europe, in the Middle East). An example for that is found in Israel, where in the years 
2001-2006 the majority of fatal attacks took place in or near commercial public 
functions, public transportation or busy streets (see Table 2.2 for a comprehensive list of 
the locations of terrorism attacks in Israel).  
Consequently, most probable future targets are places which present opportunity 
of MCI and great destruction and harm, and those that inhabit daily activities, which 
when hit can provoke anxiety/fear all over the country, e.g., sports venues, transportation 
facilities, concert halls, shopping centers, amusement parks.      
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TABLE 2.2. Terrorist attacks that ended with fatalities within Israel’s territory, by location, 2001-2006* (MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base, 2007). 
 
Type of place  
 
Number of  
attacks 
Number of suicide 
missions  
Number of  
fatalities 
Number of  
people injured  
Restaurant 5 3 45 140 
Café  9 7 70 255 
Fast Food Stand 4 4 28 206 
Bar / Nightclub 4 4 44 216 
Shopping Mall 6 5 37 287 
Pedestrian Mall/ Open Air Market 9 7 53 471 
Street 13 6 33 231 
Intersection / Road 14 6 23 66 
Grocery Store 3 3 7 40 
Bus 20 17 231 894 
Bus Station / Hitchhiking Post  13 9 64 431 
Train Station 3 3 8 52 
Seaport  1 1 12 0 
Checkpoint / Border / Road Block 9 2 14 21 
Private Home 14 1 25 59 
Hotel / Banquet  5 2 42 220 
Sports Venues  1 0 2 0 
Army Base 1 1 2 3 
Political Party Headquarters 1 0 8 43 
Hospital 1 1 5 24 
Synagogue  1 1 10 45 
Other 
 
3 1 3 4 
Total 140 84 766 3708 
* Additional 207 fatal attacks were recorded for the years 2001-2006 in Israel’s occupied territories.  
      
  
 
2.2.2.3  Vulnerability Analysis  
 
Different reports elaborate on the estimation of a building’s vulnerabilities to a terror 
attack. Such estimation should include operational, structural and contextual 
considerations (Archibald, et al., 2002; FEMA, 2003). While the latter relates to the 
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general level of alert in a certain area or country, as well as to a facility’s proximity to 
other likely targets, the first two considerations relate to aspects of the physical design of 
a space that can hinder or assist penetration of terrorists, explosives or other hazardous 
materials into the heart of a facility.  
Operational vulnerabilities address the function of a building and operational 
conditions, such as fire drills, emergency response training, building entry procedures 
and practices. In facilities of public nature that provide services to the general public, 
which are probable targets of terrorism (see asset analysis section), all operational 
procedures are problematic, particularly controlling the access. Some facilities offer 
opportunities to develop meticulous check points, as they require a permit to enter (e.g., 
performing/movie theatres, museums, sports venues). Those which do not (e.g., 
government facilities, healthcare facilities, some transportation terminals, 
stores/shopping malls) cannot be hardened easily, since hardening them would be 
against their primary users - the public (Combs, 2003). 
Structural vulnerabilities consist of anything intrinsic to the structure that could 
be exploited by a potential terrorist to produce damage to the building and/or its 
occupants, e.g., limitations of the structure to withstand the blast of bombs placed in 
different locations in and around the building, fire suppression capabilities based on 
hardware and practices (e.g., fire doors, movement restrictions), and air ducts design 
(Archibald, et al., 2002). 
Literature suggests a security survey based on all aspects of vulnerability 
analysis: the facility’s physical features, operating policies/procedures, and the context 
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in which it is located. This type of a survey should result in a realistic assessment of a 
facility’s present security status; identification of existing security deficiencies; and 
suggestions for improvements (Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). Various risk reduction 
matrixes offer to help building owners/managers evaluate what measures can diminish 
the risk for an existing facility or at the design stages of a new building. These matrixes 
are based on compilation of two scales: facility’s level of vulnerability and probable 
severity level of consequences (Archibald, et al., 2002; FEMA, 2003).   
 
2.3  The Built Environment as a Response to the Threat  
 
To better understand the role of the built environment and architectural design in current 
counterterrorism efforts, it is essential to place the relation between terrorist threats and 
the design of secure spaces in a historical context. The analysis of the threat, detailed in 
section 2.2, points to two pertinent lines of research that can inform the review of 
architectural design for security from terrorism.  
First is the examination of how architecture of the past dealt with protection from 
enemies who sought ultimate destruction and harm. This approach is congruent with the 
premeditated lethality of the threat of terrorism and the frequent political labeling of it as 
the new war of our era (Pillar, 2001; US Department of State, 2003) as it indeed offers 
the dangers of battle (US department of Justice, 1999).  
Second is the review of established theories of crime prevention in the built 
environment. This line of research is based on the fact that terrorism, as criminal 
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activity, happens in the microenvironment of a community, and is even regarded in 
legislations as an unlawful criminal activity (Pillar, 2001; Combs, 2003).  
 Following this notion, this section, presenting a comprehensive review of the 
connection of architecture to security, is based on three parts. The first concentrates on a 
historical review of the architecture of war. A separate examination of theories to design 
out crime is introduced in the second part. Finally, the last part concludes with the 
current design recommendations that relate directly to the threat of terrorism.   
 
2.3.1  Architecture of War   
 
Using concrete examples from the past, the following review of the history of the 
architecture of war identifies two major strategies that have stood the test of time in 
securing the built environment against human adversaries: impediment and deterrence. 
Though the examples of specific architectural measures for security are extracted from 
existing literature, reviewing these with relevance to the overall strategies, offers a 
refreshing and insightful perspective. By exploring the expressions of the design 
strategies across time we gain better insights into contemporary issues of offense and 
defense, image and perception, technology and design in today’s architectural response 
to terrorism.  
In pursuing this course of analysis, an explanation of the two strategies is in 
order.  Impediment is defined by the physical control over a space through a combination 
of design elements that slow down or hold back attacks. The sum of these elements 
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should provide clear borders definition between controlled and uncontrolled spaces, 
harden controlled zones (fortification), and secure the access to the controlled areas 
(Healy, 1983; Gibson, 2001). Deterrence deals with the projection of an image that 
would discourage potential offenders from committing their acts.  
With this in mind, the historical review of architecture of war is structured 
according to the basic components of the impediment strategy: (a) defining controlled 
zones; (b) fortifying controlled zones; and (c) securing access. In addition, the 
implications of the architectural solutions are explored in terms of their contribution to 
generating a deterring image. The analysis of the generated image will refer not only to 
deterrence of adversaries as a goal, but also to possible implications of the image on the 
residing population, which adversely may have been affected (Holahan, 1982; Johnston, 
2002).  
 
2.3.1.1  Defining Controlled Zones 
 
Across the centuries, defined areas of control—those protected from outside enemies—
varied in scale, ranging from wide areas of land such as entire provinces or countries, to 
settlements, to specific structures within a community, to zones within a structure. 
As early as the Neolithic Revolution (c. 9000-8000 B.C.E.), as settlements were 
established, battles over fertile land and raids by predatory nomads became genuine 
threats. For their protection, settlements were developed as closed, controlled territories 
(Gibson, 2001; Healy, 1983). A prominent example is Jericho (c. 5000 B.C.E.), which is 
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considered the first walled city in the world. Other early evidence from central Europe 
(c. 4000 B.C.E.) shows large dwellings fit to house hundreds of people, which were built 
on stilts in the middle of lakes (e.g., Lake Geneva, Switzerland) (Healy, 1983; van 
Creveld, 1989). 
Layering of walls was a technique used to achieve better controlled segmented 
areas of larger settlements; for example, meticulous definition of zones as means of 
impediment may be found at Hattusas, the capital of the Hittites, who dominated 
Anatolia in Asia (1650 B.C.E.), and in the orthogonal complex system of double-layered 
walls and canals that created different layers and spaces in Babylon, a megalopolis in 
Mesopotamia (600 B.C.E.) (Bourbon, 2001; Contenau, 1954; Gibson, 2001). It is 
plausible to infer that the physical image, as well as the common wisdom regarding such 
complex and layered systems of defense, must have been deterrents to potential 
adversaries. 
Within the settlements, specific areas were further defined and controlled. 
David’s Citadel within fortified Jerusalem or the design of the most sacred space in 
Egyptian temples are appropriate examples for such secure sections. 
During the Roman Empire, defense was concentrated on core cities, such as the 
city of Rome, whose fortifications were constructed by Aurelius, 270-275, although 
attention was also directed at defining the borders of the empire. Hadrian’s Wall (124) 
and the Limes provide examples of strategic defenses meant to deny avenues of attack 
and deter enemies across a wide front (Gibson, 2001; Keegan, 1993; van Creveld, 1989). 
The existence of such vast fortifications is a mark of the wealth and advanced political 
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development of the people who built them. Presumably, they bolstered the confidence 
and feeling of security among the empire’s residents but may also have raised doubt 
about the strength of an empire that needed such measures.  
When the Roman Empire split into its eastern and western parts, both sides of the 
empire were subjected to constant attacks. The eastern Byzantine Empire, with its strong 
capital at Constantinople, positioned at the straits between the Mediterranean and the 
Black seas, withstood centuries of attacks. As the borders of the empire suffered major 
incursions, the Byzantines adopted a strategic in-depth defense. Approximately 700 
small-scale fortifications were rebuilt or constructed during the sixth-century in the reign 
of Justinian. These controlled zones not only obstructed raiders’ movements and blocked 
their way into the empire but also provided places of refuge for the area’s inhabitants 
and defenders and served as supply depots for the Roman mobile field army. In addition, 
forces that bypassed these strong points faced the threat of rear attacks (Jones, 1987; 
Gibson, 2001). 
The western Roman Empire, on the other hand, caved to the barbarians, until it 
officially ceased to exist in the middle of the fifth-century and was fragmented into small 
kingdoms, which were in need of protection from attacks from the north. Settlements 
were fortified utilizing a layering concept, which divided the controlled area into smaller 
zones. This type of architecture continued to develop into the Middle Ages. The city of 
Carcassonne, exemplifies the complexity of Medieval fortifications. It encompassed 
layers of fortifications, from across-land farmers’ fields working inward towards the 
center of town, where a castle and a church were located as the most controlled spaces in 
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the city. Small-scale architectural elements that were developed as controlled zones, 
such as towers (known as keeps or donjons), became part of a city complex, as well as 
residences (Altet, 2001; Gibson, 2001; Gympel, 1996). For example, seventy-two private 
dwellings were built as fortified towers within one city, San Gimignano, Italy. Such 
dwellings impeded and deterred outside attackers, as well as local rivals in town, and 
made their residents feel secure. 
The invention of gunpowder by Grey Friar Berthold in 1313 and the weakening 
of the church and the feudal system after the Black Plague in the mid-fourteenth-century 
were factors in the decline of knighthood, castles, and layering within cities as fortifying 
measures (Gymple, 1996). Because firearms had limited range, protective structures 
employed to define and secure controlled zones, remained in proximity to the assets they 
were to protect. The great masters of the Renaissance, “Leonardo da Vinci, Albert Durer, 
Michelangelo, Brunelleschi, Bramante and Cellini did not distinguish between the 
planning of fortifications and the planning of cities: it was all of a piece” (Hansen, et al., 
2003:2.4.). Thus, defining controlled zones was part of the master plan. Palmanova, 
Italy, founded by the Venetian Republic at the end of the sixteen-century, provides a 
typical example of fortifications meant to impede and deter intertwined with the design 
of a city.  
As the range of cannons increased and protective structures were cited farther 
away from cities, strategic defenses over wide areas of land reappeared. For example, in 
the United States, control and protection of land and borders was first and foremost 
expressed by coastal fortifications, beginning in 1794. At the approach of the nineteenth-
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century, field fortifications could be found in Europe in the form of layers or belts of 
entrenchments around major cities and across open land (van Creveld, 1989). 
In the twentieth-century, there was a boom in the military-hardware industry. The 
introduction of airborne missiles and advances in mechanical, electronic, and atomic 
capabilities changed the rules of war dramatically, as the “distinction between front and 
rear, combatants and noncombatants” was eradicated (van Creveld, 1989:196). While 
securing a country’s borders remained a priority, efforts were also put into 
accommodating the growing need for security within the community, with the design of 
local shelters as small-scale controlled zones. 
 
2.3.1.2  Fortifying Controlled Zones 
 
Impediment has always relied on physical features that harden the defined area of 
control. Borders were often marked by natural impediments fortified by imposing 
manmade structures, such as systems of walls, ditches, and towers. In early civilizations, 
walls were very high and thick enough “to resist battering and to provide a fighting 
platform for the defenders on top” (Jones, 1987:10). Double walls of masonry, filled 
with stones or earth excavated from a supplemental outer ditch “deprived the attackers of 
a platform from which to approach the walls’ foundations, while it also formed a 
prepared killing-ground” (Keegan, 1993:141). Towers were soon added at intervals. An 
example of these impediments is found as early as in Jericho. According to records from 
3000 B.C.E., the city walls were over three times the height of a man, 80 to 110 feet 
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thick at their bases, and included a tower and a dry moat surrounding the wall (Gibson, 
2001; Keegan, 1993). Other examples of extreme impeding and deterring fortifications 
can be found in cities such as Athens and Rome (Connolly and Dodge, 1998; Cooke, et 
al., 1981; Keegan, 1993). In certain places, the wall adapted to the topography, as in the 
case of Hattusas, Mycenae, and Masada. Masada, constructed by Herod in 30 B.C.E., 
west of the Dead Sea in the Holy Land, presented an elevated level of impediment from 
its position on a high cliff with an additional massive stone curtain wall 18 feet high and 
12 feet thick surrounding the flat terrain on top of the rock (Bourbon, 2001; Gibson, 
2001). The perception of Masada as the most secure refuge in the region prompted the 
Jewish Zealots to flee there after the Romans destroyed Jerusalem in 70 C.E. However, 
the same image is what provoked the Romans to charge the city with full strength to 
prove their resolve and superior military skills.  
After the western Roman Empire ceased to exist, the fragmented small kingdoms 
were vulnerable to attacks. However, the decline in education and the inability to retain 
the technical expertise of past generations resulted in relatively simple and weaker 
fortifications. Within the bailey, the protected zone enclosed within a wooden fence and 
an outside ditch, we find the motte, an artificial mound of earth with flat top and steep 
sides surrounded by another ditch. In a fortified settlement, the church stood at the center 
of the flat top, enclosed by an additional wooden fence; this portion could also be 
occupied by the castle of the lord and his family (Brown, et al., 1980; Gibson, 2001). 
In the eleventh- and twelfth-centuries, as technological expertise grew and 
crusaders returned home from their travels to the east having seen the fortified cities of 
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Constantinople and Jerusalem, wooden fences and structures were replaced with stone 
walls. The tops of towers and walls were strengthened by an outer layer of construction, 
which included machicolations or openings between the two layers that were used to 
pour down Greek fire (pitch and boiling water) on intruders. Windows were intentionally 
placed high in any wall facing a likely enemy. Many arrow slits were included in the 
design. Square and rectangular towers were common, as they were easy to construct and 
divide up internally; later, these towers were replaced by the more resilient circular 
shapes (Gibson, 2001; Gymple, 1996; Jones, 1987) 
Well-fortified structures and cities offering protection and refuge served as 
deterrents to enemies. Powerful images of fortification systems, often painted white and 
located at a higher ground, dominated the surrounding countrysides. These fortifications 
also served to control the locals and were frequently used by Medieval conquerors to 
attack the natives (Gibson, 2001; Jones, 1987; van Creveld, 1989).  The deterring power 
of fortification systems is best illustrated by the Great Wall of China, which included 
“25,000 watchtowers, gates, fortresses, castles, guardhouses and even temples and 
shrines” (National Geographic Society, 1992:186). These physically impeding elements 
were encircled by an enormous deterring wall: 20 or 30 feet high, 25 feet thick at the 
base, and 15 feet across the top (Gibson, 2001). 
In the fifteenth-century, the use of artillery and firearms dictated changes in the 
design of fortifications. The need for greater resiliency required construction of lower 
and thicker walls, often achieved by backing walls with massive earthen ramps. Ditches 
were widened and deepened, and banks were reinforced with masonry. The towers of the 
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past became unsuitable for artillery defense forces and were replaced by low and broad 
bastions in star-like shapes which protected the bastions as well as the walls (Dupuy and 
Dupuy, 1993; Jones, 1987; van Creveld, 1989). Despite these changes, fortifications of 
this period remained imposing structures, as “the new fortifications conserved every 
element of strength of a castle” (Jones, 1987:195). Deterrence, therefore, was still based 
on the projection of a powerful image. Imposing, resilient fortifications designed to 
accommodate cannons can be found in the Rumeli (European) Castle, which was built 
by the Ottoman Turks in just three months in 1452, opposite the earlier Anatolian 
(Asian) Castle (1393), to block the entrance of the Bosphorus during the siege of 
Constantinople, May 1453. 
As the range of cannons increased, protective structures were located farther 
away from the cities they were to defend, as in the development of coastal fortifications 
in the United States. Reflecting their European heritage, these fortifications were large 
and noticeable from a distance with the intention to project power, deter enemies, and 
provide a sense of security to the population. Coastal fortifications were made of 
common brick and constructed to the same scale as other large buildings. This connected 
them to the cities and to civil architecture in general and made them familiar to the 
public (Hansen, et al., 2003).  
Closer to the turn of the nineteenth-century, improvement in cannon range and 
increase in their projectiles weight made the utilization of upper levels of tall 
fortifications obsolete. The need for greater resilience triggered the search for flexible, 
strong construction materials, which resulted in the use of redeveloped concrete and its 
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appropriate structural systems (Hansen, et al., 2003). New coastal fortifications, as 
exhibited in San Francisco, featured flat one-story dispersed buildings better suited to the 
changing weaponry. Cannons could now spread out along the shore making them less 
vulnerable to attack. The new philosophy endorsed the notion that “low was safe and tall 
was dead” and was compatible with the growing popularity of entrenchments as in-land 
fortifications against firepower (van Creveld, 1989:172). 
The change from imposing visible fortifications to undetectable “modest” 
structures reflected a new built image in the game of war. This concept goes along with 
camouflage as the new tactic of the time, as also expressed in the uniform and firearms 
design (van Creveld, 1989). Deterrence was based on the uncertainties and risk involved 
in approaching a target—the supposition that a defense might exist but the inability to 
detect and attack it. These new fortifications were unfamiliar to residents and less 
noticeable than previous designs but distinct from other civil architecture in shape and 
material. 
In the twentieth-century, the construction of reinforced concrete shelters and 
safe-rooms was regulated in contemporary building codes. Shelters within cities had no 
part in deterring an attacker; on the contrary, with the growing ability for acquiring 
information though satellites and advances in air power, a fortified shelter has the 
potential to induce a direct attack on a structure by suggesting something important to 
protect (Johnston, 2002). As in the case of Masada, a highly secure built environment 
with elaborated protection measures could attract potential attackers rather than deter 
them.  
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2.3.1.3  Securing Access 
 
Defenders throughout the ages faced additional challenges in their attempts to control 
and fortify the weakest points of the fortifications, i.e., the openings. Special attention 
was devoted to the reinforcement of gates, as can be seen in the design of enclosed 
transition zones between uncontrolled areas and a protected controlled zone (such as a 
city), which could be commanded by guards (Contenau, 1954; Gibson, 2001; Healy, 
1983). In certain places, additional protection was provided by the symbolic powerful 
elements associated with the local gods or rulers that were positioned as icons at the 
entrances. These psychological deterrents appeared in many forms, from wall 
ornamentation to full structures. 
An early example to this can be found in the case of Babylon. The transition zone 
of Babylon was a passage through the heavy gates, which opened at intervals to the sky. 
The gates of Babylon were strengthened by a core of rubble mud, reinforced on both 
sides with a wall of sun-dried bricks and covered with glazed bricks. The glazed bricks 
depicted figures associated with gods who were protectors of the gates, for example, a 
lion figure on Babylon’s most famous gate dedicated to Ishtar, the god of war (Bourbon, 
2001; Contenau, 1954). In ancient Egypt, obelisks were full-size symbolic protecting 
structures erected to guard the entrances to temples. The great height of the obelisk and 
the perfection of its form and material made it an imposing, deterring structure. 
Moreover, the holy inscriptions on these monolithic towers reinforced the idea that gods 
shielded the entrance to the temples.  
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The Porta Nigra gate of the city of Trier, on the Rhine, is an example of an 
efficient gate design from the Roman Empire. Two layers of gates—external and 
internal—with space between the layers open to the sky created the enclosed transition 
zone. The opening above the gate allowed the Romans to attack entering assailants and 
secure the entrance. The two layers of gates were connected to semicircular towers, 
which strengthened the gates and facilitated attacks on potential assailants.  
In the Middle Ages, as in previous eras, enormous efforts were devoted to 
securing the gates. Manmade mounds, ditches, and drawbridges that were employed to 
protect the wide entrances (required by the use of chariots) proved to be insufficient. 
This led to the development of gatehouses. A typical late Medieval gatehouse consisted 
of a rectangular three-story building, well-fortified with a tower at each corner. The 
wooden doors were reinforced with iron strapping and secured with heavy beams that 
led into the wall at either side. In many cases iron yetts, heavy gates formed as grills that 
were rolled down, were deployed (Gibson, 2001; Gympel, 1996). The space within the 
gatehouse became one of the safest locations in cities and castles and provided a double 
layer of protection from outside intruders, as well as protection from traitors.  
With the almost total elimination of walls as measures of fortification, the new 
gates of the modern age appear as checkpoints along a security fence. In addition, 
consistent with changes in warfare, airborne fire, whether conventional, chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear, became a security issue. Shielding a community from 
this threat requires sheltering small-scale elements and reinforcing the everyday built 
environment, its systems and infrastructure. Furthermore, defense against such attacks is 
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largely dependent on offensive interception through appropriate technical, information, 
and operations systems. Deterrence is also achieved by fear of counterattacks.  
 
2.3.2  Designing-Out Crime   
 
As in the case of architecture of war, many civilizations have a history of manipulating 
the natural and built environment to meet public safety needs within communities 
(Kelly, 2004; Newman, 1972). In the twentieth century, with problems resulting from 
Modern designs and the disappointment in the social systems for crime prevention, the 
long-standing concepts for designing safe communities were revisited. These have been 
formulated to well established and meticulously elaborated approaches of how to design 
out crime.  
This development began in the 1920s with early studies about crime patterns in 
Chicago as related to land use and the city’s historical development (Kelly, 2004). Later, 
after World War II, riots swept many cities in the U.S. and problems sprang around the 
Modern high rise blocks, which were perceived as breeding grounds for criminal activity 
(Coaffee, 2003; Jacobs, 1961; Newman, 1972, 1973). The overall disappointment in 
what was the common methods for crime prevention, e.g., those that focused on 
“changing the criminal” or using police patrolling (Poyner, 1983:5), resulted in a general 
trend in which many individuals were taking measures to “safeguard themselves, their 
families and their properties” (Gold, 1970:153; Poyner, 1983). With the concern that the 
new wave of urban fortifications would be socially and economically destructive to a 
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city, urban planners and designers, as well as sociologists and criminologists in America 
and Europe (Coaffee, 2003; Kelly, 2004; Poyner, 1983), were looking for other 
strategies that would reduce the opportunity for urban crime.  
The concept of changing the “crime situation” (Poyner, 1983:5), based on the 
idea that the physical environment can be designed or altered so that crime is less likely 
to occur, and not necessarily through fortification, was the foundation to the modern 
crime prevention theories. Starting with the works of Elizabeth Wood and Jane Jacobs in 
the early 1960s, this notion had developed to the well known theories of Defensible 
Space, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and Situational 
Crime Prevention, a decayed later, with the works of Ray Jeffry, Oscar Newman, Ronald 
Clarke and others. Since then, the underlying principles of these theories have been 
implemented, further researched and even critiqued by many around the world.   
One major criticism that has been made regarding any of the crime prevention 
theories, and should be noted here is the problem of crime displacement. Literature 
suggests three types of displacement: target displacement when choosing an easier 
target; tactical displacement when selecting a different method; and temporal 
displacement that relates to finding a different time to operate. According to the 
displacement premise, while the crime shifts (in location, method or timeframe), the 
overall rate of crime is not reduced (Tijerino, 1998).  
While bearing this critique in mind and the repercussion of crime displacement 
on the community as a whole, the following presents an overview of the theoretical 
concepts and the basic practical principles of Defensible Space, Crime prevention 
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Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention. Along with the 
general survey of these crime prevention theories, the review examines whether these 
conform to the two strategies that were identified in section 2.3.1 as fundamental for the 
design of a secure environment in the case of war: impediment (i.e., defining and 
fortifying controlled zones, and securing access) and deterrence.  
 
2.3.2.1  Defensible Space   
 
Defensible Space was first introduced as a “model for residential environments”. The 
idea was to “inhibit crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that 
defends itself” (Newman, 1972:3), which “could arguably be achieved by the 
manipulation of architectural and design elements” (Newman, 1972; Coaffee, 2003:18). 
The model, as defined in Newman’s book, Defensible Space (1972), has four basic 
elements of physical design which act individually, or in combination, to contribute to 
the creation of secure environments: territoriality, natural surveillance, image and milieu 
(Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972; Poyner, 1983; Tijerino, 1998). And although many 
sources criticize Newman’s work for too much generalization and lack of statistical 
support, they recognize its huge impact in the study of environmental behavior and in the 
design of projects in the U.S. and many other places around the world (Coaffee, 2003; 




2.3.2.1.1  Territoriality 
 
According to Newman, territoriality is “the capacity of the physical environment to 
create perceived zones of territorial influences” (1972:51). This means that with the use 
of real or symbolic barriers, the built environment should be subdivided into clearly 
distinct zones, from the most private to the most public (Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 
1972; Tijerino, 1998).  
While this principle seems similar to the two basic elements of impediment to 
define the controlled and the uncontrolled zones, and fortify the controlled zones, it 
actually broadens them. The review of architecture of war illustrates that in defense from 
war – there are only two kinds of spaces: controlled and uncontrolled. In designing out 
crime, the element of territoriality identifies not only the two extremes, but several layers 
of different kind of control, represented in what is defined as: private spaces, semi-
private (i.e., communal spaces) and the public zone, which through certain design 
elements should also be controlled to some extent (Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972; 
Poyner, 1983).  
In addition, according to the Defensible Space paradigm, the control over the 
semi-private spaces and public spaces does not rely entirely on fortifications as physical 
impediment, but depends heavily on the residents who share the spaces (in the case of 
the semi-private spaces) and other members of the community (regarding public spaces) 
and their sense of community. This is illustrated by the notion that the barriers which 
physically define the different zones can be either real or symbolic. As such, while the 
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use of walls, fences and gates, which are forms of fortifications, are sometimes 
inevitable, other, less restrictive elements, as changes of levels, greenery, steps, 
gateways, portals etc., are encouraged (Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972).  
To promote the shared responsibility towards the semi-private and public spaces, 
the design of these spaces should encourage a general sense of community among the 
residents, and a feeling of ‘stewardship’ (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). Accordingly, 
these spaces should be located centrally to the private units and should include elements 
and functions that would promote their usability by the different members of the 
community. The design should also aspire to make the semi-private zones belong to a 
relatively small community, by serving small number of private units, so that residents 
of the private units can recognize each other, and more importantly, recognize intruders 
(Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972). 
As in the impediment strategy, the control over the access to the controlled 
zones—the private and semi-private spaces—is a crucial element. This control is 
achieved through designing the semi-private space as a barrier between the private zones 
and the public domain. The access points to the private zones should be from the 
centrally located semi-private space, and the access to that space from the public domain 
is advised to be distinct and limited (Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972).  
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2.3.2.1.2  Natural Surveillance  
 
The natural surveillance element of defensible Space stands for “the capacity of the 
physical design to provide surveillance opportunities for residents and their agents” 
(Newman, 1972:78). This principle indicates that the design of the public spaces and 
semi-private spaces should allow for “the watchful eye of the public” to always be 
present (Tijerino, 1998:325). 
 In order to accommodate this element, common areas in a building, and 
especially front entrances, should be designed to be visible from the street so that 
passing pedestrians and motorists can notice anything strange happening. It is also 
preferable that these common areas are designed to be visible from private units within 
the building. In addition, the positioning of windows in the design of the private units 
should not just fit the internal plan of the house but also provide residents the ability to 
survey what is happening in and around public spaces, inside and outside the buildings 
(Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972). 
The element of surveillance in the Defensible Space model supports the notion 
that the control over the spaces, as illustrated in the analysis of the element of 
territoriality, does not rely entirely on fortifications as physical impediment, but also 
depends heavily on the residents who share the spaces and their sense of community.  
In turn, this element profoundly relate to the issue of deterrence. A space that 
accommodates the natural surveillance element not only physically impedes potential 
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criminals if they are caught in action, but has the potential to deter them from 
committing the crime because they can be caught in action.     
 
2.3.2.1.3  Image  
 
“The capacity of the design to influence the perception of a project’s uniqueness, 
isolation, and stigma” is what influences how vulnerable a design is to crime as 
according to Newman (1972:103).  
 The Defensible Space model proclaims that to achieve a “physical expression” of 
a space that defends itself a design of residential units should use buildings forms, 
idioms and materials to avoid the stigma of public housing (Coaffee, 2003; Colquhoun, 
2004; Newman, 1972; Poyner, 1983). The model recommends avoiding building shapes, 
layouts, and materials that stand out as completely different, since they draw specific 
attention to the project, and avoid high-rise / high-density housing blocks to low income 
as they are particularly vulnerable to crime. In addition, the design should make sure that 
finishes and furnishing in interior spaces are robust, yet attractive to residents 
(Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 1972).   
 The concept of image relates directly to the deterrence strategy as it deals with 
people’s perceptions and preconceptions. As according to the guiding principles outlined 
above, an exceptional design or a design associated with preconceptions of crime and 
criminal activities would influence the way potential criminals perceive the place – its 
vulnerability, its attractiveness (i.e., is it a rewarding risk) and how secure it appears to 
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be. It should be noted that the latter – how secure a place is perceived to be - can be 
influenced by the elements that are used to achieve physical impediment, as in the 
examples of historical architecture of war, even though it is not the strategy that by 
definition underlies the concept of image.     
 
2.3.2.1.4  Milieu  
 
In the Defensible Space model, an important factor to forming a perception of a place is 
the setting, i.e., the context, in which a building is located (Newman, 1972; Tijerino, 
1998). Newman recommended that housing should be merged with areas of the city that 
are considered safe, such as institutional and commercial areas, and should face social 
functions as these or heavily-trafficked streets (Coaffee, 2003; Colquhoun, 2004; 
Newman, 1972; Poyner, 1983).  
 This element in the Defensible Space model not only is tied to the element of 
image as it influences the perception of a place, but also creates opportunities for natural 
surveillance. As influencing both the image and natural surveillance factors, it relates 




2.3.2.2  Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime 
Prevention  
 
The term Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) was first used by 
the American criminologist, C. Ray Jeffrey, in his book that carries this title (1971). 
Jeffrey’s argument was that “In order to change criminal behavior, we must change the 
environment (not rehabilitate the criminal)”, and part of this can be done by “increasing 
the risk involved in criminal acts” (1971:178). Since then, the interest in CPTED has 
continued to grow till present day and has been reflected in the establishment of federal 
research programs in the U.S. and other countries, and different international and 
national associations around the world, e.g., the International Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design Association (ICA), the European Designing Out Crime 
Association (DOCA), etc. (Colquhoun, 2004).  
Existing literature presents different views and various ways to articulate the 
basic elements of CPTED. Tijerino describes CPTED as “a mirror image of the 
Defensible Space concepts”, and as such “is based on the same four basic principles” 
(1998:326). Other sources claim that the CPTED model broadens the strategies outlined 
by the Defensible Space paradigm, as it tries to deal not only with housing designs, but 
with a variety of different settings (Colquhoun, 2004; Kelly, 2004; Poyner, 1983; 
Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). This point is illustrated by the range of different 
programs, studies and working projects that have been done over the years in 
developments such as commercial settings, schools and overall city planning, in addition 
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to projects that focused on residential neighborhoods (Colquhoun, 2004; Kelly, 2004; 
Poyner, 1983; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002).  
The variety in the types of projects associated with the CPTED illustrates the 
breadth of the approach. It is considered an interdisciplinary approach which involves all 
the different stakeholders and members in the community—from planners, designers, 
city agencies and law enforcement officials, to—residents, businesses, educational 
facilities and others (Colquhoun, 2004; Kelly, 2004; Poyner, 1983). With the 
encouragement of entire communities to be proactive in fighting crime (Kelly, 2004), the 
model had extended to what is referred in the literature as Situational Crime Prevention 
or 2nd Generation CPTED (Colquhoun, 2004; Poyner, 1983). The extended approach 
considers “both management and design interventions that reduce the opportunities for 
crime” (Colquhoun, 2004:38) and address social, economic, and space scheduling issues 
along with the specific functional and physical attributes of a place (Colquhoun, 2004; 
Schneider and Kitchen, 2002).  
Many of the sources who identify CPTED as an enhancement of the Defensible 
Space model divide the guiding principle for a space that is designed and managed to 
reduce crime opportunities into three basic principles: boundary definition or territorial 
reinforcement, surveillance, and access control (Kelly, 2004; Schneider and Kitchen, 
2002). Additional issues, highlighted in the literature as critically relevant to crime rates 
are land use and activity locations (Kelly, 2004; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). The issue 
of maintenance, as identified by Schneider and Kitchen (2002) based on Alice 
Coleman’s work (1985, 1990), is another key element to the 2nd Generation CPTED. 
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The following review of the basics of CPTED and 2nd Generation CPTED is 
organized according to these principles. The review draws comparisons to the 
Defensible Space model and, as in the review of the principles of the Defensible Space 
paradigm, offers evaluation to the relationship of each principle to the strategies of 
impediment and deterrence.  
 
2.3.2.2.1  Boundary Definition / Territorial Reinforcement 
 
The basic idea of boundary definition is derived from the Defensible Space concept of 
territoriality. It focuses on the way “territoriality is facilitated by boundary markings and 
clear, although often subtle, definition of spaces” (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002:97). It 
relies on the assumption that “most people understand where public, semi-public and 
private space begin and end” and “behave differently in different spaces” (Schneider and 
Kitchen, 2002:97).  
As in the concept of territoriality in Defensible Space, boundary definition can be 
accomplished through numerous design techniques. These range from symbolic 
elements, as changes in paving, paint, landscape and signage, to more obvious barriers 
which reinforce the territory, like fencing, gating and barricades. The latter type of 
elements, i.e., the territorial reinforcement kind, creates an actual barrier, and hence 
physically impedes the movement of offenders (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). The 
territorial reinforcement elements can also psychologically deter possible offenders as 
they portray obstacles that are relatively hard to overcome. The subtle elements for 
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boundary definition work mainly as deterrents, as they portray signs of ownership, and 
mark from where a certain behavior can be interpreted by the owners as offensive. Such 
an act can potentially provoke a response by the owners of the territory, whether it is a 
communal territory or a private one.      
 
2.3.2.2.2  Surveillance 
 
Surveillance in CPTED refers to the visibility of property/building/users of the 
environment. Crowe (1991, 2000) identifies three elements that play a part in CPTED’s 
principle of surveillance: natural surveillance, organized surveillance and mechanical 
surveillance (Schneider and Kitchen, 2002).  
The natural surveillance element is based on Newman’s fundamental conception 
in the Defensible Space paradigm, where surveillance is facilitated by design. The 
strategic location of windows, doors, corridors, paths, gates, lighting, and landscaping is 
utilized to increase visibility of the property/building/users. The proper placement of 
these design elements “increases the likelihood individuals will observe intruders and 
regular users, challenge inappropriate behavior, or call the police or property owner” 
(Kelly, 2004:3.4).  
Organized surveillance, the second element of surveillance according to Crow, 
refers to people that their task is to observe the space and look for inappropriate 
behavior, such as guards or police. Once an inappropriate behavior is detected, these 
persons respond accordingly.  
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The third element of surveillance is the mechanical surveillance which is 
facilitated by electronic or mechanical devices. Different measures of 
mechanical/electronic surveillance are based on different concepts: break of an electric 
circuit, interruption of a light beam, variation in electrical or magnetic field, detection of 
sound, of vibration, of motion or heat, and observation/recording of pictures with 
cameras or closed circuit television (Craighead, 2003; Healy, 1983). 
 Surveillance is fundamentally connected to both impediment as well as 
deterrence as tactics of security. It is based on the fact that once an offensive act is 
detected, it may trigger a response that could physically impede the criminal activity, 
and could even result in the criminal being captured and punished. In turn, the risk of 
being detected and ultimately even getting punished may deter a potential offender from 
committing a crime altogether.  
    
2.3.2.2.3  Access Control 
 
The goal of access control, as articulated by Kelly (2004:3.3), is “to deny admission to a 
crime target and create a perception among offenders there is a risk in selecting the 
target”. As such, and similar to surveillance, access control corresponds directly to both 
impediment as well as deterrence strategies of security. 
 In detailing access control measures, some sources bring examples of what has 
been described here as territorial reinforcement elements, such as fences, shrubs, and 
walls, as they “deny free access to certain areas” (Kelly, 2004:3.3; Nadel, 2001; 
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Fennelly, 1997). In addition, sources specify measures which refer directly to securing 
the openings in the territorial reinforcement that provide access points to the controlled 
zones. These include elements such as doors and gates, and mechanical equipment as 
locks, as well as special screening equipment to detect weapons and other hazardous 
elements (GSA, 2003; Honey, 2000).  
Schneider and Kitchen (2002) also identify surveillance as a measure for 
securing access. As such, they elaborate on the three elements of surveillance that were 
identified by Crowe detailed in section 2.3.2.2.2 (1991, 2000). According to them, 
natural surveillance for access control proposes a design that provides as much visibility 
to entry paths and doorways, organized surveillance refers to using security guards or 
doormen, and mechanical surveillance includes CCTV and alarm systems.  
The measures of access control and surveillance form a greater security system 
industry that extends from intrusion detection, surveillance by CCTV, to lighting and 
fire extinguisher systems. Outputs can be taken from one system to activate another, e.g., 
intrusion detection can ultimately activate systems as vehicle barriers, gates, electronic 
locked doors or electromagnetic holding devices (GSA, 2003; Honey, 2000; Schneider 
and Kitchen, 2002). The measures used for access control and surveillance collectively 




2.3.2.2.4  Land Use and Activity Locations 
  
The issues of land use and activity locations are rooted in the two concepts of milieu and 
image of the Defensible Space theory, and relate indirectly to the natural surveillance 
principle. With the broadening of the crime prevention theory from housing design to a 
wide-ranging design approach, the principle of land use and activity locations speak of 
generally placing safe activities in unsafe areas, and placing unsafe activities in what are 
considered as safe locations (Crowe, 1997; Schneider and Kitchen, 2002). This tactic, 
using the influence of the surrounding context, not only makes functions that are 
considered unsafe to be perceived as safer, but also exposes a potential offender to a 
greater risk as it should create opportunities for natural surveillance. And while this 
mostly corresponds with deterrence in influencing the image of a place and the perceived 
risk for offenders, the objective elevation in the risk for potential criminals due to the 
natural surveillance conditions can be considered as an impeding factor as well. 
 
2.3.2.2.5  Maintenance  
 
The extended approach of CPTED speaks of “supplementing design with regularly 
scheduled staff or activities, routine inspections and maintenance” (Kelly, 2004:3.4). All 
these techniques are meant to provide conditions which reflect signs of ownership and 
also allow for a sense of ownership to develop among users of a space. This in turn 
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should act as a deterrent, “sending a ‘hands off’ message to would-be offenders” (Kelly, 
2004:3.4).  
The concept of maintenance which relates directly to the Defensible Space 
principle of image, and hence to the general deterrence strategy, has become important 
following empirical studies on the ‘broken windows’ theory and Alice Coleman’s work 
regarding the importance of signs of incivility (i.e., graffiti, trashed entrances, 
vandalism) as factors conducive to criminal acts (Coleman, 1985, 1990; Schneider and 
Kitchen, 2002).  
While the concept of maintenance is concerned with the physical appearance of a 
place, the scheduling of staff and routine inspections are non-spatial supplementary 
strategies. These management-based strategies have no Defensible Space analogues 
(Schneider and Kitchen, 2002), though they do influence the image of a place with how 
controlled it is perceived to be, and also create opportunities for natural surveillance.   
 
2.3.3  Current Policies for Counterterrorism Design    
 
The historical review of integration of security measures into the design of the built 
environment in the case of war as well as for crime prevention purposes exemplifies how 
architecture has always been a practical response to the practical concerns of the time. It 
involves addressing issues of offense and defense, image and perception, by applying 
available technology through design. The material offers a new look into the importance 
and meaning of patterns and tactics recurring across generations. These tactics, above 
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all, refer to gaining the control over a space through defining its territory; fortifying it 
(physically and through surveillance); securing the access to it; and creating an image 
that would discourage potential offenders from acting against the place or the people 
who inhibit it. These tactics and patterns combine what has been regarded as the two 
major interrelated overall strategies: impediment and deterrence.   
Over the years, different aspects of these strategies of security as well as other 
recommendations on how to create reliable, safe, and convenient structures have been 
incorporated into building standards and codes. The most crucial ones appear in 
nationally and internationally adopted documents, such as the International Building 
Code, A117 for Accessibility, NFPA 80, Fire Doors and Windows, and NFPA 101, Life 
Safety Code (Tierney, 2002). Other recommendations, which are specific to a certain 
place pending on the cultural context, have been integrated into local codes (e.g., 
regulation concerning building safe rooms in Israel).   
Facing the threat of terrorism, literature specifies the current goals of 
incorporating security into design: Protection of people and prevention of attacks, and in 
the case of such - prevention of building collapse; limiting injuries caused by flying 
debris or by a direct effect of air blast; and facilitating building evacuation/rescue efforts 
through effective building design (FEMA, 2003a).  
With the recent redefined goals of security, different aspects of building codes 
have been reconsidered, especially with regards to big commercial facilities, those that 
present an opportunity for Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) – the most probable targets, as 
indicated in the review of the terrorism threat, section 2.2. As evident in a document by a 
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US advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving 
weapons of mass destruction, “tougher building safety codes offer another avenue of 
protection, especially in new commercial buildings. These should focus on structural 
integrity, minimizing the probability of collapse even after an explosive attack, and 
making the building more resistant to fire….Given the costs associated with ‘hardening’ 
new buildings and the trade-off between risk and cost, any such ‘anti-terrorism’ building 
codes should probably apply only to the largest new structures, those that would hold 
thousands of people” (Brookings Institution Report, 2002).  
Prior to focusing on the counter-terrorism measures in the realm of the built 
environment, it is important to reflect on the general relevance of the impediment and 
deterrence strategies, which as pointed out, have proven throughout history to be 
consistently applied in the design of secure spaces. This deliberation is imperative as the 
effectiveness of these strategies may be questionable in face of the unique qualities of 
the threat of terrorism (reviewed in section 2.2).  
With regards to the impediment strategy, one issue immediately comes to mind 
considering the threat of terrorism. Even if terrorists are physically prevented from 
reaching their ultimate target, the space where they are stopped may suffer the hit. This 
means that impeding terrorists through design might result in a different location or scale 
of attack than contemplated, but does not necessarily mean a prevention of attack from 
occurring altogether.  
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Referring to the deterrence strategy, we find three predicaments in using it as a 
strategy against the threat of terrorism. First is the concern for a displacement of the act. 
This concern is based on what was raised as a criticism of crime prevention theories 
according to which while the crime shifts, the overall rate of crime is not reduced 
(Tijerino, 1998). In terrorism terms, this means that terrorists are likely to come up with 
a different tactic or look for a softer target to hit, but they will not be discouraged 
entirely. The terrorism attack, therefore, is likely to happen sometime and somewhere. 
The second point of concern relates to the questionable effectiveness of deterrence on 
terrorists. Based on the review of the threat, it seems that the chances of being captured 
or killed presumably do not deter terrorists, as many of them are martyrs. In addition, the 
last issue in regards to deterrence is the questionable effect of a certain image on 
terrorists. This means that excessive security measures may attract acts of terror instead 
of discourage them, because they may not be afraid to get caught or killed and since a 
secure/fortified image may indicate that there is something important to protect 
(Johnston, 2000).  
With this in mind, the review of the recommended measures for security in the 
design against terrorism is structured according to the basics of the impediment strategy: 
defining and fortifying controlled zones, and securing access. Realizing the questionable 
effectiveness of deterrence in the face of terrorism, the review includes a discussion of 
how the design elements may influence the image of a place (in terms of more or less 
secure) without passing judgment on whether such image reduces the risk of terrorism or 
not.  
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The following surveyed material consists of regulated standards established by 
the General Services Administration (GSA) for the Public Buildings Service (PBS) 
(2003), recently published Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) manuals 
(2003a, 2003b), other institutional recommendations (e.g., Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000; 
AIA, 2001, 2004; Poyner and Fawcett, 1995), and available private publications (e.g., 
Anti-Defamation League, 2004; Bershad and Parker Phifer, 2004; Craighead, 2003; 
Gunning and Josal, 2004; Healy, 1983; Fennelly, 1997; Honey, 2000).  
 
2.3.3.1  Provision of Clear Borders Definition and Hardening of Controlled Zones 
 
Sources recommend a clear differentiation between the structure, its perimeter and the 
outer, uncontrolled zone (Craighead, 2003; GSA, 2003; Healy, 1983; Kozlow and 
Sullivan, 2000). Once this distinction is made, further steps, which are intended to 
prevent, delay and mitigate the effects of an attack, can be taken (FEMA, 2003a). These 
steps should follow a “layering” concept, similar to what was demonstrated in the 
architecture of war or in the crime prevention theories. Such concentric design begins 
with the outer periphery, working inward, where each ring should have a uniform level 
of security provided along its entire length (AIA, 2001, 2004; FEMA, 2003a, 2003b). 
This includes providing and reinforcing external borders; defining and securing the 
structure’s entire exterior - sides, top and bottom; and structurally increasing its 
resistance to explosives (GSA, 2003; Healy, 1983). Intrusion detection and surveillance 
devices support the control over the structure and over its periphery.  
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2.3.3.1.1  Site and Perimeter Considerations  
 
Counter-terrorism recommendations regarding site development focus on two issues: 
positioning of the building on the site as means of protection and using design elements 
for securing the territory. The first issue speaks of placing the building as far away from 
property lines as possible - from streets as well as from adjacent facilities. 
Implementation of this recommendation would create a “stand-off distance” that would 
minimizes the risk to which the facility is exposed (FEMA, 2003a, 2003b). The design 
solutions for securing the territory refer to bordering the site or providing any other 
outdoor ring of security. Literature specifies that these should be chosen, located and 
designed to stop or delay an intruder (especially large scale carrier of weapon), not 
provide any concealing cover for surprise attacks or possible bombs, and be impossible 
to use as a natural ladder to gain entry to upper levels of the structure (Craighead, 2003; 
FEMA, 2003a; Fennelly, 1997; GSA, 2003; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000).  
Within the spectrum of design solutions for bordering a site or providing any 
other outdoor ring of security, security fencing (Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000) is the 
bluntest measure for convening to the general public the efforts put into securing the 
enclosed territory. Other architectural solutions, i.e., decorative fences, walls, various 
types and designs of buffers and barriers (FEMA, 2003a, 2003b; Honey, 2000), are less 
obvious but still associate closely with intentional enclosure for security. For creation of 
what sources define as more welcoming environments, it is recommended to use less 
apparent measures of enclosure when possible. These include, for example, changes of 
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topography, trenches, ponds and water basins, plantings, trees, sculptures, and street 
furniture (FEMA, 2003a, 2003b; GSA, 2003). 
 
2.3.3.1.2  Building Design  
 
Recommendations on how to define and harden spaces within buildings to achieve 
counter-terrorism goals refer to three main aspects of building design: general layout and 
design, building structure, and exterior design.  
Literature indicates that for counter terrorism purposes, a building’s layout 
should allow the correct operational procedures (e.g., entry procedures, evacuation 
procedures, etc.), conform to the concentric layering proposition and assist in creating 
structural strength. For the purpose of creating structural strength, sources advise to use 
building shapes that better resist blast shock waves (AIA, 2001, 2004). Specifically, it 
implies the use of simple geometries layouts (circular and cubic) and avoidance of re-
entrant corners that may trap and accentuate the effect of possible air blasts (FEMA, 
2003a, 2003b). In addition, to minimize opportunities for forced entries through exterior 
facades while creating humanitarian environments within the building for its users, it is 
advised to include internal atriums in the design, and have most of the windows of a 
facility face inward, towards these atriums (FEMA, 2003a). 
With regards to a building’s structure, in order to achieve air blast resistance it is 
recommended to use massive constructive elements which provide flexure capacity that 
would help avoid brittle shear failure and raise the capacity for reversing loads (upward 
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pressure) (FEMA, 2003a). To reduce the risk of progressive collapse, some sources 
recommend the use of a broad foundation to lessen the stress and strain on the load 
bearing soil and the use of right-angled connections of load bearing walls (FEMA, 
2003a; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). In addition, it is advised to introduce structural 
redundancy to the design of a building and limit the spacing between columns (AIA, 
2001; Craighead, 2003; FEMA, 2003a).  
Focusing on the design of the envelope of a building, sources specify that this 
element should be of sufficient strength to stand in an attempt of forced entry 
(Craighead, 2003; GSA, 2003). To lessen the destructive effect of potential air blasts, the 
use of heavyweight ornamentation in the façade design as well as over-hangs should be 
reduced to minimum (FEMA, 2003a, 2003b). For the same reason, it is also 
recommended to “avoid exposed structural elements (e.g. columns) on the exterior of the 
facility” (FEMA, 2003b:3-5). Supplemental to the recommendation for creating internal 
atriums, FEMA's manual (2003a, 2003b) advises to limit the number and sizes of 
windows on lower floors of exterior facades and to use clearstory windows if possible 
(above human height). Recommendations regarding the design of the exterior of 
buildings also relate to material selection. Resistant materials and supporting systems are 
in constant development. Blast-resistant exterior windows systems provide a good 
example for that (Bush, et al., 2004; GSA, 2003).  
The influence of the above recommendations on the image of a building is not an 
obvious one. Some of the recommendations, especially those regarding general 
geometric layout and exterior design, bear an effect on the final appearance of a 
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building. Yet, the development of resistant materials and supporting systems allow for 
some freedom of design, especially with regards to glazing. The question that results 
from this predicament is how the relative proportion of mass vs. glazing influences the 
perception of a building. Does the public view, whether they are terrorists or users of the 
environment, conform to the general guideline, and perceive a building of fewer 
windows as more secure than a building with a lot of glazing?  
 
2.3.3.1.3  Surveillance  
 
Surveillance is a supporting factor to the physical design in counter-terrorism efforts 
which helps gain and upkeep the control over a space. As in the crime prevention 
theories, surveillance has three facets: natural, organized and mechanical/electrical. 
Natural surveillance, while being related to conditions formulated by the design of a 
space (e.g., visual openness), relies mostly on the users of the environment. It depends 
heavily on the public’s awareness of the threat and their attentiveness to cues that may 
indicate a possible terrorism incident (e.g., abandoned package of some sort, suspicious 
strangers or activity, etc.). Organized surveillance, as the natural surveillance, relates to 
the physical conditions of a space, and dependent on personnel that is trained to spot 
terrorist activity. Mechanical/electrical surveillance helps trained personnel monitor 
many areas at the same time, from outside areas (i.e., the perimeter) to defined volumes 
(i.e., interior spaces), and even specific objects or points in a space (Fennelly, 1997; 
Healy, 1983).  
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Mechanical/electrical surveillance devices have various designs, some more 
distinct and others that blend in the surroundings. In addition, other devices that are 
recommended to help control a secured space and facilitate emergency response are 
emergency response measures. These also may be hidden (e.g., duress alarm buttons) or 
conspicuous (e.g., brightly marked emergency intercoms or assistance stations on 
columns, fences, and other posts) (GSA, 2003). Evident use of mechanical/electronic 
measures indicates a deliberate investment in the security of a space. It signifies that a 
“watchful protective eye” is always present at the location.  
 
2.3.3.2  Securing Access 
 
The risk of an undesired intrusion to a facility, whether it is a walking terrorist, a 
suspicious car, a thrown explosive, or some kind of a CBRN weapon, mandates the need 
to secure all possible openings in the layers of security (e.g., perimeter border, building 
envelope, private or mechanical areas within buildings, etc.) (FEMA, 2003a, 2003b; 
GSA, 2003).  
The frequent use of car bombs as an effective terrorist tactic highlights the 
importance to control all vehicle access (i.e., parking garage, lobby entrance, loading 
docks, shipping and receiving areas). For prevention of vehicle ramping, it is 
recommended to place the ground floor elevation of a building at 4 feet above grade 
(FEMA, 2003b). Other ways of control are first initiated by periphery bordering. Then, 
site circulation should be designed to prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles. In 
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order to force a reduction in speed, vehicle entrance is recommended to be a diversion of 
the road from which the vehicles approach the site (FEMA, 2003a; GSA, 2003). Other 
sources contend that vehicles should not be allowed into the inner perimeter of the 
building (Healy, 1983). Accordingly, it is recommended to maximize the distance 
between parking and buildings (AIA, 2001, 2004; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). In most 
parking garages, parking should be restricted only for tenants and known visitors. In 
under-building-garages or subterranean garages, visitor vehicles should not be permitted 
to park (Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). In some cases, perimeter vehicle inspection should 
be implemented and the design should provide space to facilitate this procedure. The 
area needs to include design features that stop vehicles, prevent them from leaving the 
vehicular inspection area, and prevent tailgating (FEMA, 2003a; GSA, 2003).  
With regards to walk-in traffic, as according to the GSA standards (2003), 
entrances to public facilities need to balance aesthetics, security, risk, and operational 
considerations. The standards suggest that entrances should be designed to avoid 
significant queuing. If queuing does occur within the building footprint, the area should 
be enclosed in blast resistant construction. In such design, interior and exterior doors 
should be offset to limit the effect of a blast through the structure (FEMA, 2003b). If 
queuing is expected outside the building, a rain cover should be provided (historic 
buildings generally require alternative design schemes that do not alter the exterior or 
lobby configuration). To reduce the potential for concealment of explosive devices next 
to the entrance, it is suggested to avoid installing features as trash receptacles and 
mailboxes (GSA, 2003).  
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The actual control over the access through entrances can be facilitated through a 
range of different systems and entry procedures. Access control for office buildings may 
consist solely of a lock/key system or of a security staff member trained to observe both 
incoming and outgoing pedestrian traffic (Craighead , 2003). Other, public facilities may 
require x-ray machines to screen incoming parcels and packages, as well as walk-
through metal detectors (Craighead, 2003; GSA, 2003).  
The apparent level of security in an entrance depends on what systems are used 
and what are the entry procedures. With the designs that exist in the industry today, 
which are obvious and blunt, the more measures are taken and the more complicated is 
the procedure, the more obvious the security is. It should be noted that there is a 
potential of reaching high control of access through unobtrusive security measures. An 
example to this proposition is using revolving doors, and further developing the systems 
that operate and control such doors. Literature already identifies such doors as a 
relatively safe mechanism which regulates the flow of pedestrians without exposing the 
building to out-side elements (Craighead, 2003; FEMA, 2003a). 
The importance of access control to security from terrorism is exemplified in the 
security measures and entry procedures that are added to existing facilities, which were 
not necessarily planned for countering terrorism, when there is an increase in the level of 
alert. This phenomenon also exemplifies the relative flexibility of these measures to be 
adjusted according to current security needs, compare to other design elements which are 
impossible to change (e.g., location on site, layout, structure), or can be changed only 
with a significant investment (e.g., exterior materials). The downside to this is that many 
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times, when such measures are added post-construction and were not taken into account 
in the initial design of the facility, they appear as improvised temporary machinery. 
While the mere existence of access control security measures elevates the appeared level 
of security in a building, it is unclear how the level of the design of these measures 
influences the building’s appearance and security image.  
A final comment on the issue of access control needs to be made regarding the 
efforts made for protection from CBRN threats. It should be noted that all of the design 
recommendations regarding protection from CBRN do not influence the appearance of a 
building. These are focused on strengthening the control over utility pipes and restricting 
access to them; investing in HVAC/ventilation systems, and controlling pressure 
differentials (Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). In the case of released hazardous airborne 
substances, e.g., industrial chemicals, toxic fumes or biochemical warfare agents, 
strategies for protection depend on whether a release occurs outside or inside the 
building (AIA, 2001, 2004). The location of the building air intakes need to be 
considered as well as securing the access to them. Analogous to fire doors system, 
dividing the facility into different zones operated by different HVAC systems could be 
helpful in isolating incidents (AIA, 2001, 2004). In large commercial spaces where it is 
impossible to isolate different zones, negative zone pressurization and smoke evacuation 
methods are critically important (FEMA, 2003a).  
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2.4  Summary 
 
Architecture has always been a form of response to the practical concerns of the time, 
addressing, among other matters, the issues of offense and defense, image and 
perception, by applying available technology through design. 
Current security threats are dominated by the proliferation of terrorism. While, in 
probabilistic terms, terrorism is not a highly frequent phenomenon, the growing public 
concern has made it a salient issue. The “social amplification” of the risk of terrorism 
can be attributed to several qualities of the threat. Terrorism is a political matter, one 
which presents a mortal risk, forced on the population by other people. Described as “the 
unthinkable”, it is characterized by an abundance of potential targets and forms of attack 
and the ability to adapt to protective means.  
Literature indicates that efforts to counter terrorism in the realm of the built 
environment include elements of design, structural hardening, technology and 
operational policies, to help prevent, mitigate and facilitate a desired response in the 
event of a terrorism attack. These efforts are prioritized through assessing the specific 
security needs for a certain place in a certain context. The review of relevant sources 
presented a general analysis of security needs as related to the threat of terrorism using 
the basics of a risk assessment. The analysis was based on existing information about 
past attacks and on sources’ discussions of potential terrorists, their goals, incentives, 
and technological capabilities. The review implies that potential targets are those that if 
damaged would help terrorists demonstrate power over authorities and induce fear in the 
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population. Such targets include places of symbolic value, places that present 
opportunities for great destruction and harm to the infrastructure, and those that present 
opportunities for mass casualty incidents (MCIs), e.g., places which serve daily activities 
used by the majority of the population. The review also indicates that while the risk of 
CBRN attacks should be taken into account when planning for this threat, statistics show 
that terrorism attacks usually employ explosives, which are relatively easy to obtain, can 
be very destructive with a strong visual impact on the surroundings. Beyond the global 
general analysis, a closer look at different societies, as the U.S. and Israel, reveal 
differences and nuances to target selection as well as to the over-all over-time exposure 
to the threat in different political contexts.  
The discussion of the nature of the threat, as well as the review of the current 
design recommendations and security measures link the struggle against terrorism with 
former historical strategies of defense against enemies, as well as with modern theories 
of crime prevention. Whereas terrorism seems to present the dangers of the battlefield, 
with massive casualties and destruction, it occurs within a community and usually 
involves penetration of hostile forces into local surroundings.  
The historical basics for impeding potential offenders or criminals through 
physical controls have proven extremely relevant to the current defense efforts against 
terrorism threats. Consistent with the impediment strategy, the architectural measures set 
to protect a population from terrorism deal with the fortification of the 
microenvironment. These measures, consistent with the concept of territoriality, provide 
controlled zones and clear border definitions for single elements within the community. 
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Literature recommends a concentric design that follows a layering concept, similar to 
what was demonstrated across time, from the outer periphery working inward. 
Furthermore, “target hardening” includes aspects of geometric layout, structural 
elements and materials which increase the resiliency to explosives, as well as intrusion 
detection devices and surveillance systems (natural, mechanical and organized) as 
supportive factors to the control over the protected zones. The review indicates the 
importance of access control as an element in the impediment strategy which is 
extremely relevant to securing buildings from terrorism as well as intricate, as the most 
probable targets of this threat are buildings of public nature.  
The concept of deterrence, another historical strategy for defense and a main 
crime preventing strategy, takes a new turn. Society is faced with attackers who are not 
conventional criminals or official military forces that are bound by international law. In 
many cases, these are martyrs who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their 
idiosyncratic goals. They may ignore conditions that are ordinarily considered deterrents 
and may be primed to attack the civilian population, as well as places which are 
perceived to be secured. Thus, excessive security measures may induce an attack. 
Moreover, the paradox of security becomes multifaceted as the public may comprehend 
this situation and seek security conditions that signal a less prominent target.  
The later notion brings up the importance of the users’ perception of security as 
affected by the built environment. Studies show that visual cues in the environment 
influence people’s levels of stress, well-being, as well as their high-order cognitive 
functioning, and can link to a resulting behavior. Literature links high level of well-being 
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with a middle range arousal. The cognitive, emotional, physiological and behavioral 
responses to the stimuli are ways by which people cope with stressful situations, ways by 
which they try to reach a middle-range arousal and a high level of well-being. In the case 
of design for terrorism, the importance of catering for the psychological and emotional 
needs of security is extenuated in light of this threat being directly associated with 
instigation of fear, its saliency in the public agenda, and the fact that it targets public 
places. Despite its importance, this issue has been comparatively neglected in the 
literature on the reduction of risk of terrorism in the built environment.  
The review on how people are influenced by the environment suggests a complex 
combination of factors that influence individuals’ sense of security in a place. Some 
sources identify people’s feelings of security and related responses to the physical 
environment as inborn reactions while others point out a cognitive process in which 
learning and familiarity shape a person’s understanding and responses to security issues. 
Studying societies with different exposure to the threat of terrorism may show if there is 
a global innate pattern of reactions to the threat, and to what extent people’s reactions to 
it are based on personal familiarity with it. Statistics on past incidents of terrorism 
illustrate that the U.S. and Israel can be considered as instances of societies of different 
experience with the threat. An even greater difference in the exposure to the threat of 
terrorism can be found when focusing on a specific location in the U.S. which does not 
have any direct experience with terrorism, as in the case of Texas.  
Beyond the general question of what stands behind people’s reactions to security 
threats, the review points out several elements that are considered in the literature as 
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influential on perception of security. These elements are divided into two levels. One 
level relates to the conceptual qualities of a certain place that may create a general worry 
about the chance of being victimized. These qualities are identified as the function of the 
building and the context in which it operates. With regards to the threat of terrorism, as 
evident in the cases of the U.S. and Israel, the two issues of context and function are 
interrelated. The review exemplifies differences in target selection as associated with 
each society. The other level of influential elements on people’s sense of security speaks 
for the tangible qualities of a place that may elicit specific fears. These are indicated in 
the literature as the physical/structural and social cues of the environment. The review 
also points to the importance of focusing on realistic yet simple viewsheds, those that 
can attest for a person’s first encounter with a facility.  
Based on this analysis, the dissertation attempts to look at the impact of both the 
idea of a certain facility in a specific political context (i.s., society) as well as some 
specific physical attributes of a building that are visually evident as a person approaches 
a building for the first time. The latter notion points to the envelope of a building and the 
entrance to it. Two elements whose design is imperative to secure a building from a 
terrorism attack.   
In conclusion, facing the global threat of terrorism, the review clearly illustrates 
the importance of addressing the public’s psychological and emotional needs in the 
design of our communities. This research, therefore, constitutes a first examination of 
how people perceive this threat in the context of the built environment and their sense of 
security as related to conceptual and tangible elements of the built environment.  
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The following chapter discusses the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
The chapter extracts from the literature review key factors that account for how 
architecture mediates humans’ reactions to the threat of terrorism. More specifically, the 
chapter outlines the conceptual model of this research and details the related hypotheses. 






This chapter consolidates the ideas that were covered in the literature review into 
a workable theoretical framework. The literature review suggests several levels of 
factors that link the built environment to individuals’ experience of security. The first 
level relates to the conceptual meaning of the specific built environment (Lang, 1987; 
Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 1997). This level includes the function of that building, 
i.e., the building-use, and how this building-use is associated with specific risks (AIA, 
2001; Archibald, et al., 2002; Combs, 2003; Etzioni, 2002; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000; 
Lang, 1987; Linn, 2002; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 1997). The second level of 
factors concerns the more concrete visual cues that emanate from the built environment 
and trigger associations to risk. This level includes the formal, structural cues of the 
surroundings (Appleton, 1975; Berlyne, 1971; Fisher and Nasar, 1992; Goffman, 1971; 
Holahan, 1982; Kaplan, et al., 1998; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Newman, 1972; Tijerino, 
1998; Ulrich, 1993) and the social cues that can be detected in a place (LaGrange, et al., 
1992; Lang, 1987; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 1997; Shaffer and Anderson, 1983; 
Tijerino, 1998; Zilbershtein and Seidel, 2004).  
Focusing on the characteristics of buildings, whether conceptual (building-use) 
or physical (visual cues), the literature suggests that they influence perceptions of safety 
and other facets of people’s reactions as a function of the context in which the building 
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operates (Lang, 1987; Linn, 2002; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 1997; Ulrich, 1979; 
Holahan, 1982).  
In dealing with terrorism, the element of context relates to two main issues: the 
current threats for such events and the experiences/history of terrorism within a given 
society. The latter expresses the level of familiarity an individual within a society would 
have with the threat of terrorism and with security measures (Barker and Page, 2002). 
Both facets of context may taint the individual’s awareness of such threats, the perceived 
risk, and the connotations of the architectural design as related to security. As a result, 
these factors moderate emotive and behavioral reactions to the function of certain public 
buildings with certain design features.  
Section 3.1 introduces a conceptual model outlining people’s security-related 
reactions and the factors that play a role in influencing those. Alongside the general 
components of the model, the scheme introduces the specific foci of this dissertation. 
The section continues with a through explanation of each of the variables in the model. 
Following the explanation of the model and its components, section 3.2 presents the 
basic hypotheses of the research. These hypotheses are derived from the conceptual 
model, the elements that comprise it, and their particular specifications for this research. 
Section 3.3 discusses the limitations of the conceptual model. 
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FIGURE 3.1. The conceptual model. 
* The research does not include examination of social cues and their possible influence on people’s security-related-reactions to the 





The conceptual model, illustrated in Fig. 3.1, indicates four major independent variables 
(i.e., current threat, social-political-context, physical/structural cues, and social cues) that 
play a part in influencing people’s security-related reactions. The model presents 
building-use as the fifth variable which is directly linked to the factor of social-political-
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context. The four dependent variables in this model resonate with the range of people’s 
responses: cognitive processes, emotive reaction, and behavioral disposition. The 
following sections detail all the variables and explain the specific foci of this research as 
related to each variable.     
 
3.1.1  Independent Variables 
 
The model, focusing on how users of public buildings are affected by factors of the built 
environment in the context of terrorism threat, identifies five independent variables. The 
first three variables relate to the conceptual, “distal” level (Nasar and Jones, 1997). 
These address the use of the building, its level of association to the risk of terrorism in a 
certain political context, and the current threats for such events (Etzioni, 2002; Lang, 
1987; Nasar, 1997; Nasar and Jones, 1997). The other two factors refer to what was 
identified in the literature as the tangible, “proximate” level: the visible elements in the 
built environment (Nasar and Jones, 1997). One addresses physical/structural cues (i.e., 
design elements) of the environment (Appleton, 1975; Berlyne, 1971; Fisher and Nasar, 
1992; Holahan, 1982; Kaplan, Kaplan and Ryan, 1998; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Newman, 
1972; Tijerino, 1998; Ulrich, 1993) and the other points to the social cues that can be 
detected in a place.1  
The model posits that the interface of architecture of buildings and the 
individual’s security-related-reactions are moderated by the general context of societal 
history and the specific threats that given building-uses face. In concrete terms, different 
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building-uses have different risks associated with them in given societies. Societal 
history with a certain threat generates those differential risk levels per building-use. In 
addition, a person’s expectations of security and attitude towards the risk (i.e., what the 
individual considers as acceptable risk) are also affected by the societal affiliation. 
Hence, sensitivity to the influence of architecture on feelings of security and associated 
responses are context dependent. The explanations of the model’s independent variables 
and their specific foci in this dissertation are detailed below. 
    
3.1.1.1  Current Threat: Current Level of Threat of Terrorist Bombings 
 
At different times, different threats and or levels of- may dominate a certain 
geographical area. This variable refers to the type and level of threat that exists in the 
area of the facility and endangers it at present time. In this research, this element refers 
to a current threat of terrorism attack.  
Specifically, the research concentrates on the threat of explosives being used by 
terrorists. As indicated in the literature review, bombings are currently the most common 
type of terrorism attacks (Craighead, 2003; MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). 
This form of terrorism relates to several different aspects of architectural design, such as 
design for resiliency, as well as control of access. Moreover, the use of explosives can be 
very destructive with a strong visual impact on the surroundings (FEMA, 2003; Coaffee, 
2003).  
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An existing threat of terrorism poses several challenges to architects. One major 
challenge, which has been relatively neglected in the literature, is how to design 
relatively secure buildings that would also foster the emotional wellbeing of their users. 
An even greater question is how to do it with a vision for the future, realizing that during 
the span of a building’s lifetime the level of threat might change as it relates to political 
and social circumstances. With these questions in mind, this research focuses on 
variations in the level of current terrorism threat of explosives. Two levels of current 
threat of terrorism are examined—whether bombing attacks are currently considered as a 
major threat in the area of the facility (state/country) or are not a threat at all.  
 
3.1.1.2  Context: Societal-Security-Context 
 
Usually, in the field of architecture, the term “context of a building” implies two aspects.  
One aspect of the term refers to the immediate physical environment surrounding the 
building. The second aspect of context—on which this study concentrates – refers to the 
cultural, or the social-political setting of the facility (Holahan, 1982; Lang, 1987; Linn, 
2002; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Nasar, 1997; Ulrich, 1979).    
As indicated in the literature review, in a society that is threatened by terrorism 
attacks, single facilities become probable targets, mostly because of their own 
characteristics and less due to the buildings that surround them (Archibald, et al., 2002; 
Combs, 2003; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). This issue makes the physical context less 
relevant to the threat of terrorism. The other level of context, regarded in this dissertation 
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as the societal-security-context, relates to the history of the political/security milieu of a 
place, which, according to the literature review, may condition a member of that society 
to security issues (Barker and Page, 2002; Herzog and Kaplan, 1976; Pidgeon, et al., 
2003).2 As this dissertation focuses on the users' perspective as related to threats of 
terrorism, this level of context becomes the most viable one for the research.  
Specifically to this research, the societal-security-context relates to the level of 
exposure and experience an individual of a society has with the threat of terrorism of 
explosives and with counter security measures. Familiarity with the threat of terrorism, 
or lack of -, may influence the perception of risk as related to certain building-uses and 
the level of understanding of the threat and what environmental conditions may hinder or 
facilitate it. Consequently, this factor relates to a person’s expectations of security 
measures, and may affect a person’s emotional comfort and influence his/her level of 
stress. In addition, the level of familiarity with the threat and with ‘living in its shadow’ 
may taint the individual’s emotional endurance to variations in risk, and ultimately affect 
decisions on whether to avoid or use the environment.  
Studying societies with different exposure to the threat of terrorism may show if 
there is a global innate pattern of reactions to the threat, and to what extent people’s 
reactions to it are based on personal familiarity. In this dissertation research, College 
Station, Texas, and Tel Aviv, Israel, were chosen as two societies of different security 
contexts: a society with a very low exposure (almost none) to the threat of terrorism vs. a 
society which has been experiencing for many years high exposure to the threat of 
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explosives (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007; US Department of State, 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 2002, 2003).  
 
3.1.1.3  Building-use: Facilities of Public Nature 
 
This variable refers to the relation between certain building-uses (i.e., functions) and 
incidents of terrorism of explosives. In general, and according to the literature review, 
this research focuses on the most probable targets of terrorism - buildings of public 
nature. As indicated, these facilities possess symbolic values. Damage to these buildings 
has the potential to provoke anxiety/fear among the population, could disturb the 
economy, or infrastructure, and facilitate the possibility of a Mass Casualty Incident 
(MCI) (Archibald, et al., 2002; Combs, 2003; Kozlow and Sullivan, 2000). 
Concentrating on buildings of public nature also highlights the importance of 
accessibility to them and their projected image––both key factors in the 
phenomenological identity of these buildings as well as factors that can be influenced by 
measures of security (AIA, 2001; Craighead, 2003; FEMA, 2003a, 2003b; GSA, 2003). 
In addition, as indicated, this dissertation focuses on the users’ security-related 
perceptions and reactions. As such, the research looks into which building-uses, within 
the general group of buildings of public nature, the public perceive to be associated with 
terrorism of explosives.  
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Examining two societies of different experience with the threat would show if 
people of different societal-security-contexts may attribute different levels of risk to 
different building-uses. This again would help to understand the extent to which 
reactions to the threat of terrorism can be considered a global common human 
phenomenon (i.e., long-term evolutionary based), or as case-based occurrences derived 
from familiarity based on experiences and learning.3
  
3.1.1.4  Physical/Structural Cues: Architectural Elements at the Approach / Entrance to a 
Building 
 
This factor refers to the visible design elements that are observed by the users of the 
building. The research focuses on the first impression a person has of a building. This 
impression influences the comfort and anxiety level while being in the environment 
(Berlyne, 1971; rich, et al., 1991; Ulrich, 1993). Furthermore, it can influence the 
decision of whether to use the facility (Barker and Page, 2002; Geva and Skorick, 2006; 
Holahan, 1982). Consequently, the design elements that are tested in this dissertation are 
of façades and entrances, two general design components that compose a sequence of a 
real-life experience of approaching and entering a building (Stamps, 1997).  
In addition, as illustrated throughout the literature review, along history, façades 
and entrances had a major security function. They presented physical impediment 
through reinforcement to the borders of the interior space and provided control over the 
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access to it. In addition, they generated deterrence through the projection of a certain 
image (Zilbershtein, 2006).  
Within the general concept of façade and entrance design, the specific foci of this 
dissertation are on elements that, as indicated in the literature review, are extremely 
relevant to the issue of security from terrorism as well as to the question of human 
perception: the level of fortification vs. openness as represented in the façade design, and 
the conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the overall architectural 
design of the entrance. 
 
3.1.1.4.1  The Level of Fortification vs. Openness as Represented in the Façade Design  
  
Sources specify the importance of the design of the shell of a building for achieving 
resiliency from potential blasts (AIA, 2001; Craighead, 2003; FEMA, 2003a, 2003b; 
GSA, 2003). In the past, resilient, secure structures were characterized with very few and 
very small openings. These days, in design for terrorism, it is still recommended to have 
fewer windows (especially on lower floors) (FEMA 2003a, 2003b). Though, the 
development of better and more resistant materials and supporting systems allows a 
great deal of flexibility in the design and permits the use of large spans of glazing (Bush, 
et al., 2004; GSA, 2003).  
While both design alternatives (few windows or many windows) are able to be 
resilient enough for explosives, the question that arises then, is how the relative 
proportion of mass vs. glazing influences the way a building is perceived by potential 
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users. Does the public perceive a building of fewer windows as more secure in the 
context of terrorism threat than a building with a lot of glazing? How does the relative 
proportion of window area vs. solid area in the building’s façade affect people’s 
emotional comfort and finally, their desire to use the building?  
  With these questions in mind, the dissertation addresses people’s security-related 
reactions to buildings with solid façades in comparison to people’s security-related 
reactions to buildings with all-glass facades.  
 
 3.1.1.4.2  The Conspicuousness of the Access Control Security Measures in the Overall 
Architectural Design of the Entrance 
 
In the history of architecture of war, as well as in crime prevention theories, access 
control has always been an essential security element (Colquhoun, 2004; Newman, 
1972; Contenau, 1954; Gibson, 2001; Gympel, 1996 Healy, 1983; Honey, 2000; 
Schneider and Kitchen, 2002; Kelly, 2004; Nadel, 2001). In modern times, facing the 
threat of terrorism, control of access translates to the use of mechanical and electrical 
systems and entry procedures operated by security personnel. The visible 
physical/architectural elements entail a layout of x-ray machines for screening incoming 
parcels and packages, walk-through metal detectors, and barriers of some sort that help 
direct / restrict the pedestrian traffic (Craighead, 2003; FEMA, 2003b; GSA, 2003).  
The importance of access control to security from terrorism is exemplified in the 
addition of such measures to many facilities when the level of alert of terrorism is 
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elevated. This trend, as indicated in the literature review, also shows the flexibility of 
these measures to be adjusted according to current security needs.4 The downside to this 
phenomenon is that many times, when such measures are added post-construction and 
were not taken into account in the initial design of the facility, they appear as improvised 
temporary machinery. While the mere existence of access control security measures 
elevates the appeared level of security in a building, it is unclear how the level of the 
design of these measures influences the building’s appearance and security image. This 
research, therefore, focuses on the perceptual effects of access control security measures 
that appear as part of the overall design vs. those that appear as temporary stationed 
machines.  
 
3.1.2  Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables of the study represent a range of humans’ reactions to 
potentially threatening situations. The specific variables correspond to: (a) cognitive 
processes, i.e., thought and resulted feeling (Geva and Skorick, 2006; Holahan, 1982); 
(b) level of well-being, i.e., stress level (Ulrich, et al., 1991; Ulrich, 1993), and (c) 
behavioral disposition, i.e., action propensity (Barker and Page, 2002; Geva and Skorick, 
2006; Holahan, 1982).  
These levels of reactions are quite interdependent, that is, the stress level and 
action propensity to avoid a building may be related to a perceived danger and elevated 
feeling of fear. However, it is plausible to postulate that these interrelationships are not 
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mandatory and may be differentially related to the independent variables. Explanations 
to the precise dependent variables in the model and their specifications as related to this 
dissertation are brought below.   
 
3.1.2.1  Awareness of Security from Terrorism  
 
This variable relates to how important the issue of security is in the person’s mind. 
Specifically, this research concentrates on the level of awareness of security from the 
threat of terrorism. A personal experience with a building of specific use and design may 
trigger different thoughts on different dimensions in the mind of a user (e.g., aesthetic, 
way-finding, monumentality). Hence, this variable reflects the user’s perception of the 
relative importance of security from terrorism in the phenomenology of the building. 
This variable looks at the level of awareness to the subject, without placing judgment on 
how secure a person considers the environment to be.    
 
3.1.2.2  Sense of Security  
 
The conceptual model suggests two intertwined appraisals of a situation that can inform 
about a person’s overall sense of security. One appraisal is more general, and the other 
more personal.  
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3.1.2.2.1  Perception of Risk 
 
The perception of risk is the more general appraisal. It refers to the perceived probability 
of an incident occurring at a specific location. In other words, this is an assessment of 
the level of danger in that environment. In this research, the perception of risk refers to 
how people from different societal-security-contexts perceive the probability of a 
terrorist attack happening in a specific building-use and with specific design features.  
 
3.1.2.2.2  Perception of Personal Safety 
    
This variable refers to the more personal appraisal of security. It relates directly to how 
safe the individual feels in that environment. In this research, the perception of personal 
safety refers to how secure people from different societal-security-contexts feel 
approaching a specific building-use with specific design features. 
 
3.1.2.3  Stress Level; i.e., the State of Anxiety  
 
Literature suggests that a person’s reaction to a situation that potentially challenges or 
threatens the well-being translates to an increase in the level of stress. More specifically, 
in this research, the level of stress, indicated by a person’s state of anxiety, is expected to 
be affected by the independent variables. Examination of this factor may show what 
instances of the independent variables, can be considered as stress inducing stimuli and 
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what may facilitate a reduction in the stress level, particularly as we examine different 
design alternatives.   
 
3.1.2.4  Approach / Avoid: The Propensity to Enter the Building    
 
This variable refers to a person’s behavioral disposition as a reaction to the independent 
variables. As indicated in the literature, actions, categorized in the literature in the 
dichotomous verbs of flight or fight, reflect the ways by which people deal with stressful 
situations. In this research, this variable is translated into the person’s level of motivation 
and likelihood to enter the facility and use the building. It should be interesting to find 
out the differences in the tendencies to flight or fight between the different societies that 
have different experiences with the threat of terrorism and as related to different 
building-uses. Another point of interest would be to see the connection between the 
action propensities to the other dependent variables.   
 
3.2  Research Hypotheses  
 
The outline of the hypotheses is organized as follows. First, the effects of the distal 
factors (i.e., the current level of terrorism threat and the societal-security-context) on 
individuals’ security-related responses are presented (section 3.2.1). Then, the 
hypotheses that link the architectural variables (proximate level) to the distal variables 
are detailed. Note, that the underlying model assumes that the effects of the architectural 
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variables on individuals are moderated by these distal variables. The hypotheses on the 
two architectural variables that are tested in this research are grouped per variable 
(sections 3.2.2, 3.2.3). Within these, the assumed effects of the glass-solid ratio in the 
façade design on people’s reactions are more deductible from previous knowledge, and 
hence more detailed, while the hypothesized effects of the design of access control 
devices are rather intuitive and less detailed.  
 
3.2.1  Hypotheses that Relate to Variables of the “Distal” Level   
 
The first set of hypotheses, relating to the independent variables that combine the 
“distal” level, assumes interdependency among the dependent variables. In other words, 
variations in the variables that influence characteristics of a place on a conceptual level 
(i.e., the current level of threat, the societal-security-context and the building-use) 
influence the different individual’s security-related reactions in a corresponding way. 
This interdependency links a rise in the awareness of the issue of security to a reduction 
in the sense of security (elevation in perceived risk and in feeling of insecurity), and to 
an increased level of anxiety and a propensity to avoid going to the building.  
(H-1.a)  Variation in the level of current terrorism threat influences a person’s 
awareness of security issue, his/her sense of security, the stress level (i.e., state of 
anxiety) and the propensity to use the building (de Becker, 2002; Slovic, et al., 2000). 
The greater the current threat from terrorism is - the more the issue of security from 
terrorism occupies the person’s mind, and the lower his/her sense of security is (i.e., the 
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higher the perceived risk and danger, and the less secure the person feels). Subsequently, 
people in this situation are more anxious and tend to want to avoid entering the building.   
(H-1.b) The societal-security-context influences a person’s awareness of security 
from terrorism, his/her sense of security, the stress level (i.e., state of anxiety) and the 
propensity to use the building (Barker and Page, 2002; Herzog and Kaplan, 1976). 
People from a society that is usually under a high level of terrorism threat (e.g., Israel) 
have security of terrorism more on their minds, have a lower sense of security (i.e., 
perceive such attacks to be of higher probability of occurring and feel less secure), and 
are more anxious than people from a society which is not accustomed to living under 
such threat (e.g., Texas). In addition, people from a society that is usually under a high 
level of terrorism threat (e.g., Israel) would more likely keep away from any buildings of 
public nature. This is a tendency that should not exist in a society that does not have 
much experience with the threat of terrorist bombings (e.g., Texas).   
(H-1.c)  The extent to which the current level of terrorism threat influences all 
aspects of people’s reactions (awareness, sense of security, anxiety level and action 
propensity) is moderated by how used the person is to such a reality (i.e., his/her 
societal-security-context) (Barker and Page, 2002; Herzog and Kaplan, 1976). Variations 
in the current level of terrorism threat has greater influence on how much security from 
terrorism is on a person’s mind in a society that is not accustomed to live under high 
level of security threat (e.g., Texas), than in a society that usually lives under high level 
of threat (e.g., Israel). In other words, people who are used to live with the threat of 
terrorism, have it on their minds regardless of the current threat level. People who are 
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not used to the threat are more affected by the current threat level. Accordingly, the 
fluctuations in a person’s sense security, his/her anxiety level and willingness to enter a 
building as affected by the current security threat is greater in a society that is not 
accustomed to live under high level of terrorism threat (e.g., Texas), than in a society 
that usually lives with high level of threat (e.g., Israel).  
(H-1.d) The effects of building-use on people’s scope of reactions (awareness of 
security from terrorism, sense of security, level of anxiety and action propensity) is 
interlinked to the societal-security-context (Barker and Page, 2002; Etzioni, 2002; 
Herzog and Kaplan, 1976; Lang, 1987; Nasar, 1997; Nasar and Jones, 1997). The 
societal-security-context, i.e., the experience a society has with the threat of terrorism, 
varies around the world (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007; US Department of 
State, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 200, 2001, 2002, 2003). This experience 
influences the extent by which the building-use is considered in that society as a 
probable target of terrorism. The more a building-use is considered as a probable target 
of terrorism, the more the issue of security from terrorism is on a person’s mind, the 
lower the sense of security, the higher is the anxiety level, and the greater is the 
inclination to avoid the building.  
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3.2.2  Hypotheses Regarding the Level of Fortification Vs. Openness as Represented in 
the Façade Design  
 
The following hypotheses regarding the effects of the glass-solid ratio in the façade 
design on people’s security-related-reactions present a more complex relationship 
between the dependent variables. For example, this means that an elevated level of 
awareness of security from terrorism due to an architectural solution does not necessarily 
corresponds with a reduction in the sense of security. In addition, while in some cases 
the behavioral disposition corresponds with the individual’s sense of security, in other 
cases, it may not.   
 (H-2.a) While a building that has a mostly solid façade increases people’s 
awareness of security from terrorism it also increases their sense of security. In other 
words, when confronted with a building of little window area, people tend to have 
security from terrorism more on their minds at the same time that they associate less risk 
and feel safer than when confronted with a building of extensive window area. 
(H-2.b) The effects of glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s 
awareness of security from terrorism and a person’s sense of security (perceived risk and 
feeling of security) are moderated by the current level of terrorism threat. When there is 
a terrorism threat, the effects are accentuated, and when there is no terrorism threat the 
effect is attenuated. 
 (H-2.c) The effects of glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s 
awareness of security from terrorism and a person’s sense of security are moderated by 
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the societal-security-context. In a society that is not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., 
Texas), the variations in a person’s awareness of security and sense of security as 
affected by the design of the façade would be greater than in a society that is accustomed 
to living under the threat (e.g., Israel).  
(H-2.d) The effect of glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s 
stress/anxiety level is influenced by the current level of terrorism threat. When there is a 
terrorism threat, a person would be more anxious when confronted with a building of 
extensive window area (congruent with low sense of security). When there is no 
terrorism threat, a person would be more anxious when the building’s façade is solid (as 
this design elevates the awareness to the issue of security). 
(H-2.e)  People that are not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to 
follow their sense of security (as affected by the glass-solid ratio in the façade design, 
the building-use and the current level of threat) with actions, while people who are 
accustomed to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Israelis) tend to use buildings regardless of 
their feeling of security.     
 
3.2.3  Hypotheses That Relate to the Conspicuousness of the Access Control Security 
Measures in the Overall Architectural Design of the Entrance 
 
The following hypotheses regarding the effects of the design of access control devices 
on people’s security-related reactions are more intuitive and less detailed than the 
previous group of hypotheses. And while the presented assumptions discuss the main 
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effects that this variable has on the different reactions, it is expected that these effects are 
moderated by the distal variables. The examination of the conceptual framework, 
detailed in the next sections (sections 4, 5), looks to see what these interactions are. 
(H-3.a)  Having access control security measures at the entrance to a building 
(whether designed or as temporary stationed machines) increases people’s awareness of 
the issue of security from terrorism.  
(H-3.b) When confronted with conspicuous security measures that appear as 
temporary stationed machines people’s overall sense of security is reduced and their 
anxiety level is increased. Well-designed measures, which seem as part of the entrance, 
enhance the sense of security (i.e., reduce perceived risk and increase perception of 
personal safety) and reduce the level of anxiety.   
(H-3.c)  People that are not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to 
follow their sense of security (as affected by the design of access control security 
measures and the building-use) with actions, while people who are accustomed to the 
threat of terrorism (e.g., Israelis) tend to use buildings regardless of their sense of 
security.     
 
3.3  The Model’s Limitations 
 
The model presented in this dissertation concentrates on how the use and image of 
public buildings moderate perceived threats to personal security associated with 
terrorism. While the model addresses a host of cultural/political variables as well as 
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architectural elements, it is not exhaustive. One can add additional variables that may 
influence individual’s perception of safety (e.g., demographic characteristics that relate 
to specific knowledge regarding security issues, to age, or to personal family status that 
may indicate a certain sense of responsibility). In addition, though the model tries to 
cover all the spectrum of people’s reactions to threatening situations, other and more 
detailed nuances may be found.    
 With regards to the factor of physical/structural cues, this dissertation focuses on 
very specific design elements in the façade and entrance of buildings. Other architectural 
elements can be considered under the general model (e.g., proportions of facades, or of 
windows or entrances, colors, materials, etc.). In addition, with the intent to simulate a 
first experience with a building, the focus on façade and the entry in that façade, are not 
necessarily representative to all the possible “viewsheds” for a first encounter with a 
building. Other scenarios of first encounter with buildings may include different 
architectural elements (e.g., some public buildings have garages underneath or may be 
accessed directly through a public transportation compound). 
 Finally, the element of the social cues, represented in the scheme of the 
conceptual model (Fig. 3.1) as a factor of possible influence on people’s security-
related-reactions, was not developed in the specific model of this research or addressed 
in the hypotheses. Though, this factor was taken into account in the creation of the 
material used in this study, presented in section 4.    
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 While recognizing the above limitations, this conceptual model serves as a first 
step in exploring how buildings, in their specific use and design, influence humans’ 
reaction to terrorism in our era.  
 
 




1.  While acknowledging the significance of the social cues and including them as a factor of influence 
on people’s security-related-reactions in the basic conceptual model, the research detailed in this 
dissertation does not include this factor in the investigation. The importance of social cues was taken into 
account in the creation of the material used in this study (see Chapter 4). 
 
2.  Other demographic characteristics may also affect the individual's conditioning to safety, e.g., gender, 
age, marital status and professional skills. 
 
3.  A first step in the empirical stage of this research is to identify building-uses that are associated with 
terrorism threat for each of the examined societies (Texas, Israel).    
 
4.  Other design elements are harder or impossible to change (e.g., location on site, layout, structure), or 





This dissertation examines how the function and image of buildings impact the 
way people from different societies respond to threats to personal security associated 
with terrorism. The investigation focuses on how security threats, societal background, 
building-uses and the visual elements of a building affect how important the issue of a 
terrorism threat is in the respondent’s mind, how safe and how anxious the respondent 
feels, and how likely the respondent is to use the environment.  
To test empirically the complex conceptual framework, this dissertation entails a 
cross-national investigation, and is composed of three main studies and a pretest survey. 
The three studies constitute a sequence of progressive phases where each study 
replicates and extends the previous one, putting another variable to the test.  
 While different terms are used in the classification of research designs in 
interdisciplinary endeavors, the empirical thrust of this dissertation, on which the three 
main studies are based, can be characterized as a quasi-experimental methodology. The 
use of this term implies several main features of the research procedure.  
 First, as defined by numerous scholars in multiple disciplines, the experimental 
element in the term suggests that the researcher introduces (manipulates) the variations 
in the independent variables (i.e., treatments or conditions) within a relatively controlled 
research environment (Aronson, et al., 1998; Douglas and Holt, 1992; McDermott, 
2002). It should be noted that early literature specified the existence of a non- treatment, 
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control group, to achieve a true experiment (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Yet, some 
sources suggest that in factorial designs, which consist of more than one independent 
variable, the comparisons are performed between the treatment conditions (Aronson, et 
al., 1998; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000; Groat and Wang, 2002; Schutt, 
2001).  
  Second, with one exception in this project, participants are randomly assigned to 
the experimental conditions. This randomization is expected to “equate” the “pre” 
treatment differences among the groups. Campbell and Stanley (1963) argue that 
randomization is the “assurance of lack of initial biases between groups” and therefore 
eliminates the need for Pretest in the experimental research designs. They, as well as 
other scholars, acknowledge the “Post-test only” as part of “true” or classical 
experimental research designs (ibid:25-26; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000; 
Schutt, 2001).  
 Third, the “quasi” term is employed to suggest that one of the independent 
variables of the study cannot comply with the randomization requirement (Groat and 
Wang, 2002; Schutt, 2001). “Although the goal for both experimental and quasi-
experimental research is to achieve comparability among the units in each treatment 
group, such comparability is more precisely established in experimental research through 
random assignment. In contrast, the quasi-experimental research design is often 
employed in field setting where people or groups cannot be randomly assigned for either 
ethical or practical reasons“ (Groat and Wang, 2002:255). In this project, the non-
manipulated variable relates to the societal origin of the groups, since participants could 
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not have been randomly assigned to be a Texan or an Israeli. The use of this variable 
decreases the experimental control, as the participants of the two groups are different 
from each other not only with exposure to terrorism threats – but along a multitude of 
other features that may contaminate the results (internal validity). 
 We could use other research design terms such as “contrasted groups” 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2000) to define the research methodology of this 
project. Though such a terminology would highlight the differences along one particular 
independent variable (society) – but that would mask the controlled nature of the 
research design and the fact that other treatments in the study were introduced by the 
researcher. 
Following the above discussion, this chapter carries on with a more thorough 
examination of the basic concepts behind the use of experimental procedure, its strengths 
and limitations and how they were addressed in this project. The chapter then continues 
with the cross-national aspect of the investigation, followed by a review of the different 
stages of the investigation: the pretest and the three main studies. The review of the 
stages of the investigation, entail the specific goals of each study, its research design, 
material and procedure, and lastly—the statistical analyses that were performed.    
 
4.1  Using Experimental Procedure: Strengths and Limitations  
 
Valid knowledge is the central concern of any scientific research. The three components 
of validity are: measurement validity, external validity (i.e., generalizability) and internal 
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(causal) validity (Groat and Wang, 2002; Schutt, 2001). Measurement validity exists 
when a measure measures what we intend it to measure. “Generalizability exists when a 
conclusion holds true for the population, group, setting, or event … given the conditions 
that we specify. Causal validity exists when a conclusion that A leads to or results in B is 
correct” (Schutt, 2001:20).        
  In one of the earliest works on experimental research design, Sir Ronald Fisher’s 
The Design of Experiments (1935), “experimentation was described as “experience 
carefully planned in advance.” Although experiments as a class are a remarkably diverse 
lot, what they have in common that distinguishes them from other types of scientific 
inquiry is that the researcher creates the conditions necessary for observation rather than 
passively observing naturally occurring situations” (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994:4). In 
this explanation lie the strengths and limitations of the experimental methodology. The 
following sections discus both while detailing elements of the methodology and how 
they relate to this research.  
  
4.1.1  Strengths of Experimentation   
 
The above explanation to experimental methodology indicates the researcher’s control as 
the first and foremost basis for this type of scientific examination. This control is over 
various aspects of the examination (Groat and Wang, 2002; McGraw and Hoekstra, 
1994; Schutt, 2001).  
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The first form of control is over the subject matter, i.e., the critical variables of 
the theory (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994). An experimental procedure enables to control 
fully the variations in the independent variables as well as measure the specific 
dependent variables of interest. Furthermore, experiments, according to Mook (1983), 
help explore whether a certain reaction/event can happen, especially in counterfactual 
contexts when the "tested” reality did not occur yet. The fact that a certain terror attack 
did not happen in a given environment still leaves the question open of what, if, and how 
the design profession should deal with it. In this dissertation, the use of experimental 
methodology allows to examine certain forms of reaction of people to the specific 
architectural variations as associated with particular building-uses, in two possible levels 
of terrorism threat. 
Another form of control is over extraneous variables that may influence both the 
independent and the dependent variables of interest (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994). This 
control is achieved through the experimental methodology’s basic principle to randomly 
assign participants to treatments. Random assignment refers to the use of chance 
procedures to ensure that each participant has the same opportunity to be assigned to any 
given group. This procedure ensures the nonspuriousness, i.e., it guarantees that any 
differences observed between treatment groups are due to the difference in treatment and 
not due to a third variable (Groat and Wang, 2002; Schutt, 2001). In this dissertation, 
participants in each country were randomly assigned to treatments by the web-based 
computer application.  
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The third form of the researcher’s control is over the setting or the situation in 
which the research is conducted (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994). In social sciences, this 
means that all participants are exposed to a similar procedure while participating in the 
experiments. As this dissertation deals with a cross-national investigation, the 
experimental methodology facilitated the need to expose participants of both countries to 
the same variations in treatments as well as to the same procedure. The uniformity of 
procedure is achieved in this research through the utilization of a web-based 
computerized platform.     
All aspects of control in experimental methodology enable the identification and 
testing of cause and effect relationship among the theory’s variables (Groat and Wang, 
2002; McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994; Schutt, 2001). The ability to identify and test causal 
relationship between variables is strengthened by the fact that this methodology enables 
“to isolate and decompose complex phenomena in order to pinpoint their effects with 
precision” (Kinder and Palfrey, 1992; McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994:6). In addition, the 
analysis of experimental data is considered as relatively simple and straightforward since 
there is no ambiguity, as to what constitutes a cause and what constitutes an effect 
(McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994). These elements and attributes of the experimental 
methodology go along with the level of development of the conceptual model presented 
in this dissertation and its related hypotheses.   
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4.1.2  Limitations of Experimentation   
 
The researcher’s ability to control all aspects of experimental research design enables 
attribution of causality, and hence strengthens the internal validity of the research. 
Nonetheless, the same control is the reason for the main criticism of this methodology, 
especially when it is implemented in social sciences. Critics claim that “most real-life 
settings and socio-cultural phenomena are far too complex to reduce to a small set of 
treatment and outcome variables” (Groat and Wang, 2002:270). In addition, “the 
experimental setting and implementation of the independent variables may be artificial 
in comparison to their manifestation in the real world” (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994:7).  
Recognizing the above limitations, this dissertation research attempts to 
minimize them. This was done through the development of a comprehensive model, 
while detailing its components and narrowing the specific investigation to certain 
controllable variables. In addition, using a phased research design (three main studies 
and a pretest) allows the investigation of the different components of the complex 
model.  
Furthermore, the material used in the studies was developed to account for as 
realistic variations as possible of the independent variables. The material was developed 
utilizing techniques that have been recognized as effective in previous research done in 
social sciences; political science and architecture research (please see section 4.3.2.3.1).  
In addition, the questionnaire was carefully developed using scales and type of 
questions that are considered reliable and valid for self-reported responses in social 
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research (please see section 4.3.2.3.2 for details). The reliability of measurement was 
further strengthened using multiple questions to test each of the dependent variables. 
Statistical examinations were performed to confirm the level of reliability or association 
between indicators of the same variable (please see section 4.3.2.4 for details).  
As a rule, any research that is conducted with “samples of convenience” is 
limited in its generalizability. This is due to the fact that samples of convenience might 
not be representative to the general population of interest. More specifically, the 
literature warns against relying on a narrow database collected in the academic 
laboratory using college students (Sears, 1986). Other sources contend that while 
generalizing from the sample to a larger audience is a great concern in survey studies, it 
may not always be the main concern of an experimental study. Instead, many 
experiments in the behavioral sciences are focused on testing the merit of a broad theory. 
In a specific case, the starting point is a theoretical proposition. If the examined sample 
is a part of the population to which the theoretical propositions relate, then these 
propositions should work on that sample (Aronson et al., 1995; Kruglanski and Kroy, 
1976; McDermott, 2002; Mook, 1983). Using this logic, this research uses the 
convenience samples of college students (undergraduate students from College Station, 
Texas, and from Tel Aviv, Israel) to test and illustrate the conceptual model, and not as 
representatives of the entire population. If the model is correct for the general 
population, and the students are part of that bigger group than it should work for the 
sample of students.       
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Another limitation to the generalizability of experimental research as well as to 
its measurement validity relates to the participants’ awareness of being in a study that 
may alter their responses (McGraw and Hoekstra, 1994; Schutt, 2001). The research 
detailed in this dissertation divides the examination into three separate studies, each with 
a between-groups research design. This overall research design facilitates the exposure 
of each participant to only one treatment. Hence, it reduces the risk of demand 
characteristics, which is when participants change their responses to conform to what 
they think the researcher’s expectations are (Orne, 1962). 
 
4.2  A Cross-National Investigation   
 
The cross-national aspect of the study pertains to the exploration of the effects of the 
societal-security-context on the individual’s sense of security as related to threats of 
terrorism and architectural variables. As indicated in the conceptual framework chapter, 
two locations were chosen for the study: Texas and Israel.  
Texas and Israel represent two societies of extremely different security contexts. 
Texas has a very low first-hand exposure to the threat of international terrorism. Israel, 
on the other hand, is a society that has been experiencing for many years a relatively 
high exposure to the threat. As indicated in the literature review, in the years 2001-2006, 
Israel experienced 139 significant terrorism attacks (i.e., those that resulted in fatalities) 
within its territory alone (out of a total of 346 that includes Israeli settlements in the 
occupied territories as well) (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). At the same 
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time-frame, there were no attacks within Texas. Only 9 fatal incidents were recorded 
within the general US, including the three events in September 11 and 4 cases of deaths 
due to Anthrax poisoning (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base).  
As noted earlier, the cross-national aspect of the research design introduces the 
“quasi” term to the experimental methodology. This is due to the fact that the researcher 
is not able to randomly assign participants to the variations of the societal-security-
context (Texas or Israel). The fact that two societies are different from each other not 
only with exposure to terrorism threats – but along a multitude of other features, may 
contaminate the results and create problems to the internal validity. In addition, this also 
questions the generalizability of the results of this research to other places around the 
world. 
The participants in all the stages of the investigation were convenience samples 
of undergraduate students from College Station, Texas, and Tel Aviv, Israel. In each 
location, participants were randomly assigned to treatments. A total of 601 Texans and 
470 Israelis participated in all stages of the research. The participating students were not 
in architecture or mathematics majors. The exclusion of architects and mathematicians 
was done purposely, to achieve greater samples generalizability. Students of architecture 
may express higher sensitivity to architectural features than other groups. Mathematic 
majors were excluded as many of the questions in the study pertain to a perceived 
probability or risk, and mathematicians might have answered such questions less 
intuitively than the general public.     
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4.3  Stages of the Investigation 
 
4.3.1  Pretest: Selection of Building-uses in Texas and Israel 
 
4.3.1.1  Objective 
 
The first step of the empirical examination of the conceptual model was to identify 
building-uses that are perceived to be associated with a terrorism threat of explosives in 
Texas and in Israel.  
Based on the literature review, the examined building-uses were buildings of 
public nature as they are the most probable targets of terrorism. Damage to public 
buildings has the potential to provoke anxiety/fear among the population, could disturb 
the economy, or infrastructure, and facilitate the possibility of an MCI (Mass Casualty 
Incident). Consequently, the issue of security from terrorism as well as their image and 
accessibility are all extremely relevant and important to buildings of public nature.  
The results of this stage guided the selection of two building-uses which were 
used as the manipulation of the variable of building-use in the subsequent studies.     
 
4.3.1.2  Research Design and Participants 
 
A survey was conducted to assess people’s risk perception associated with the threat of 
terrorism in relation to 20 different public building-uses in Texas and in Israel. A total of 
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135 individuals participated in the survey. This included convenience samples of 84 
undergraduate students from Texas and 51 undergraduate students from Israel. 
 
4.3.1.3  Research Procedure and Material 
 
The study was conducted using a paper-pencil questionnaire. The cover page introduced 
the subject of the survey and participants were asked to fill demographic information 
about their sex and age. The second page instructed participants to rate the probability of 
occurrence of a terrorism bombing attack in each of 20 given building-uses, using a 0% 
to 100% scale.  
The 0-100 has been used in previous research for self-reported perception of 
danger (Blanchard, et al., 1994) and belongs to the class of magnitude estimation 
methods (Lodge, 1981; van Doorn, et al., 1983). The use of this rating scale in this 
survey seemed appropriate for the terminology used in the question, as participants were 
asked to rate a probability of occurrence.  
The list of building-uses included: City hall, courthouse, municipal library, post 
office, bank, hospital, stadium, amusement park, movie theater, restaurant, café, 
shopping mall, department store, airport terminal, central bus station or terminal, railroad 
or subway station, sea port terminal, church / synagogue (pending on society), university 
dormitories, and general office building. The building-uses were ordered randomly to 
create a mix of functions (see Appendix A for the complete survey material). 
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Prior to participating, participants signed a consent form that included a 
description of the general goals of the study, its scope, the procedure, the option to quit 
at any time during participation, their guaranteed anonymity, and relevant contact 
information (see the consent form in Appendix A). The entire material and procedure of 
the study was approved by the Institutional Review Board-Human Subjects in Research, 
Texas A&M University, and the appropriate authority at the Tel Aviv University. 
 
4.3.1.4  Analysis 
 
After the collection of all responses, descriptive statistics were calculated and additional 
three main analyses were conducted on the perceived risk of terrorism associated with 20 
public building-uses in the two examined societies, Texas and Israel. Two of the 
examinations utilized Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests, and one was based on a 
Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient test.  
 The purpose of analysis of variance (ANOVA) is to test for statistically 
significant differences among means associated with different treatments. Every 
ANOVA test examines the assumption that the tested means are equal (null hypothesis). 
A significant result in an ANOVA test means that we reject the null hypothesis of no 
differences between means, and accept the alternative hypothesis that the means (in the 
population) are different from each other. The term “significance” in statistics does not 
refer to the level of importance of the result, rather to the level of confidence that the 
results are not spurious. For example, a 95% confidence means that that the finding has a 
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five percent (.05) likelihood of being due to chance. The later value is the significant 
level, α.  
The first ANOVA test concentrated on the overall ratings of probability of 
occurrence of a terrorism act and examined the main-effect of the societal context 
(Texas, US / Israel) on this general perception. For this examination, for every 
participant, a mean score was calculated, taking into account his/her ratings of all 20 
buildings.  
The second examination utilizing ANOVA tests were performed to assess the 
difference between the societies in their perceived risk associated with each of the 20 
building-uses.  
For all ANOVA tests, before performing any of the tests, statistical assumptions 
for a fixed effect design were examined. Independence within and between groups was 
assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) was used to assess homogeneity of 
variance. The α used in all ANOVA tests was set to .05, the common significant level in 
social sciences.  
The third examination entailed a comparison between the two societies of the 
general patterns of the extent to which different building-uses are associated with risks 
of terrorism. Since it was expected that the perceived risks (across all buildings) will be 
higher in one society (Israel) than the other (Texas), it is of importance to assess whether 
in the two societies the ranking of the different building-uses in terms of the extent to 
which they are perceived as potential targets of terrorism is similar or not. For the 
purpose of this examination, a mean score was calculated per building-use, per society. 
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For each society, the twenty scores were rank ordered from 1 to 20. In this scale, the 
building that received the highest mean (i.e., rated as of the highest probability to be hit 
by terrorist bombings) was ranked as number 1, and the building that received the lowest 
mean score (i.e., rated as of the lowest probability to be hit by terrorist bombings) was 
ranked number 20. Then, Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (Rho) was 
administered to the level of association between those patterns. The Rho statistic can 
indicate whether in both societies, certain building-uses are considered as more target 
prone than others, regardless to possible differences between societies in the scores of 
the individual building-uses.  
 Based on the analysis of the data, two building-uses were selected for the 
manipulation of the variable of building-use in the subsequent studies: Shopping mall 
and city hall (see discussion in section 5.1.4). 
 
4.3.2  Main Investigation: Reactions to Architectural Design Elements and Building-
uses as Affected by Levels of Terrorism Threat, in Two Societies  
 
4.3.2.1  Objectives 
 
In the sequence of the three studies, each one introduced and tested a new main 
independent variable (level of terrorism threat; level of fortification vs. openness as 
represented in the façade design; and the conspicuousness of the access control security 
measures in the overall architectural design of the entrance). Each study expanded on the 
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previous one, creating a basis for comparison between the studies. The two independent 
variables of building-use and the societal-security-context played a role in all three 
studies, thus, enabling a conceptual replication of the findings. 
In the sequence of the three studies, the first explored how the specific 
function/use of the building moderates the effects of variations in threats of terrorism on 
people’s perceptions and reactions to safety and security. This examination allowed to 
test the validity of the experimental treatments that define the level of terrorism threat. It 
also provided the opportunity to observe reactions to the two different building-uses 
before architectural solutions are introduced.  
The second study added to the test the influence of the conceptual model’s first 
architectural variable: the apparent level of fortification/openness of the façade of the 
building (represented in the façade’s glass-solid ratio).  
The third study added the second architectural variable: The conspicuousness of 
the security measures from the overall design of the entrance.  
 
4.3.2.2  Research Design and Participants 
 
4.3.2.2.1  Study 1 
 
The first study was of a 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups research design, as illustrated in Table 
4.1. The study tested the effects of the two building-uses (city hall and shopping mall), 
which were chosen based on the pretest, and two levels of terrorism threat (almost no 
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threat vs. the highest level of security alert) on people of two different societies with 
different societal-security-contexts (Texas and Israel).  
A total of 175 undergraduate students participated in this examination (89 from 
Texas and 86 from Israel). The participants’ reactions were measured along three of the 
four dimensions outlined in the conceptual model: how much the issue of a terrorism 
threat is on the respondent’s mind (i.e., security awareness), the respondent’s overall 
sense of security, and his/her level of anxiety. The model’s fourth dimension of people’s 
reactions, i.e., the inclination to use the building, was not tested in this study. This was 
due to the fact that there were no visual representations of the building in this study, only 





TABLE 4.1. Study 1: Between-groups research design of the study of reactions to current level of threat as affected by building-use, 
in two societies (n per cell). 
 
Texas (89 undergraduate students) 
 
Israel (86 undergraduate students) 
 
Variation in the 
level of terrorism 
threat 
 City hall Shopping mall City hall Shopping mall 
High 21 22 21 23 
Low 22 24 21 21 
     
 
 
4.3.2.2.2  Study 2 
 
The second study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups research design. The study 
tested the effects of the apparent level of fortification/openness of the façade of the 
building (all glass façade vs. solid façade) in two building-uses (city hall and shopping 
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mall) and two levels of terrorism threat (almost no threat vs. the highest level of security 
alert) on people of two different societies with different societal-security-contexts (Texas 
and Israel).  
A total of 362 undergraduate students participated in this examination (200 from 
Texas and 162 from Israel). The participants’ reactions were measured along the four 
dimensions outlined in the conceptual model: how much the issue of a terrorism threat is 
on the respondent’s mind (i.e., security awareness), the respondent’s overall sense of 
security, his/her level of anxiety and the inclination to use the building. Table 4.2 
presents the research design of this study, indicating the tested independent variables and 






TABLE 4.2. Study 2: Between-groups research design of the study of reactions to façade design as affected by current level of threat 
and building-use, in two societies (n per cell). 
 
Texas (200 undergraduate students) 
 
Israel (162 undergraduate students) Variation 




in the level of 








Glass High 21 25 18 20 
 Low 24 23 19 21 
      
Solid  High 27 26 21 21 
 Low 28 26 22 20 
      
 
 
4.3.2.2.3  Study 3 
 
The third study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups research design, as did the 
second study. The study tested the effects of the level of conspicuousness of the access 
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control security measures in the overall architectural design of the entrance (designed vs. 
temporary stationed machines) combined with the effects of the apparent level of 
fortification/openness of the façade of the building (all glass façade vs. solid façade) in 
two building-uses (city hall and shopping mall) on people of two different societies with 
different societal-security-contexts (Texas and Israel).  
In this study, in order to limit the accumulated complexity of the research design 
with the addition of the second architectural variable, the examination was focused only 
on high level of terrorism threat.  
As in the second study, participants’ reactions were measured along the four 
dimensions outlined in the conceptual model: how much the issue of a terrorism threat is 
on the respondent’s mind (i.e., security awareness), the respondent’s overall sense of 
security, his/her level of anxiety and their inclination to use the building. A total of 399 
undergraduate students participated in this examination (228 from Texas and 171 from 
Israel). Table 4.3 presents the research design of this study, indicating the tested 
independent variables and the number of participants in each treatment. 
 
 
TABLE 4.3. Study 3: Between-groups research design of the study of reactions to entrance design as affected by façade design and 
building-use, in two societies, in a high level of terrorism threat (n per cell). 
 
Texas (228 undergraduate students) 
 




in the design of 








Designed Glass  25 23 20 23 
 Solid 27 31 19 19 
      
Temporary Glass  30 34 20 24 
 Solid 23 35 26 20 
      
 
 130
4.3.2.3  Research Procedure and Material 
 
The three studies, which were administered in Texas and Israel, utilized a web-based 
computerized system. Participants were recruited from classes and did not get any 
compensation. In each study, the computer program randomly assigned participants to 
the different scenarios. For each location the material was presented in the native 
language (English in Texas and Hebrew in Israel).  
Participants began with reading a general instruction page and answering a few 
demographic questions. Then, each participant was exposed to his/her assigned scenario, 
and was asked to respond to several questions. After answering each question, the 
participant would hit a “next” button and a new screen appeared with the next question, 
until completion of the questionnaire.  
Prior to participating, all the participants signed a consent form that included a 
description of the general goals of the study, its scope, the procedure, the option to quit 
at any time during participation, their guaranteed anonymity, and relevant contact 
information (see the consent form in Appendix A).  
The entire material and procedure of the study was approved by the Institutional 
Review Board-Human Subjects in Research, Texas A&M University (see approval 
notification in Appendix A), and the appropriate authority at Tel Aviv University. 
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4.3.2.3.1  Manipulated Scenarios 
 
The manipulated scenarios described a reality of high or low level of terrorism threat in 
the country and a certain building-use to which the respondent was about to enter and 
meet a friend (a shopping mall or a city hall). The scenario in the first study was based 
on a written description only. The second and third studies included one or two images 
of the building as well (of the main façade and a close-up image of the entrance of the 
building), depicting the manipulated architectural variables.  
In the first study, prior to exposing each participant to a scenario, the participant 
was asked to think of a building he/she knows of the same function that was included in 
the scenario, and enter to the computer its specific location/name. The building which 
the participant recorded to the system was then automatically included in the scenario as 
the location for the meeting with the friend. This specification of the building was done 
to help participants place themselves in the scenario, imagine a certain building, and 
make the physical reality more tangible (as no image was included in this study).  
In the second and third studies, which included images, the images appeared after 
the written description, during the questionnaire session at the top of every screen (see 
Appendix A for example of screenshots). Below are the exact manipulations that were 
used in the studies.  
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4.3.2.3.1.1  Written descriptions 
 
Many studies in social science, and especially in psychology, economics, sociology and 
political science, involve written descriptions of scenarios as the experimental treatments 
(Boettcher, 1995; Hermann, et al., 1999; Kemmelmeier and Winter, 2000). 
In this research, written scenarios manipulated the level of current terrorism 
threat. These were adapted to the specific political and organizational circumstances of 
the society/country that participated in the study (Texas/Israel). For that reason, for 
creation of a low-level of current terrorism threat in Texas, the threat of terrorism was 
not mentioned at all due to the reason that this is the prevailing reality in Texas.  
Below are the descriptions that were used for manipulation of high or low current 
level of terrorism threat in Texas and in Israel (excluding the low level in Texas – where, 
as indicated, no description was used). For the Hebrew version of the written 
descriptions that were used in Israel, please see Appendix A.   
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Scenario: High level of current terrorism threat, in Texas 
Urgent Newsbreak: 
A t t e n t i o n !!! 
The Secretary of Homeland Security has put the nation in the highest, most critical, RED 
ALERT warning, because of the recent number of acts of terror that were committed in 
many public buildings, all over the country (including several cases in Texas).  
The terrorist bombings, reported daily in the media, have become a major concern in 
every state of the nation!!!  
 
 
Scenario: High level of current terrorism threat, in Israel (English translation) 
Urgent Newsbreak: 
A t t e n t i o n !!! 
The National Security Agencies headed by the Minister of Defense announced the 
highest terrorism alerts ever to exist in Israel until today. That is due to the recent 
numerous terrorism attacks taking place in public buildings throughout the country. The 
Minister of Defense warns that the entire state is under a severe security alert!!!  
The repeating terrorist bombings, reported daily in the media, have become a major 
concern all over the state. 
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Scenario: Low level of current terrorism threat, in Israel (English translation) 
Urgent Newsbreak: 
End to Terrorism!!! 
At the end of a peaceful year, which followed the peace agreements that had been signed 
between Israel and all its neighboring countries and the prosperous commercial and 
tourism ties that have developed among Israel and the entire Middle East region, the 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense announced today the end to the threat of 
terrorism in Israel!  
Reports that were submitted to the Foreign and Security Council at the Kneset (House of 
Representatives), by the IDF’s (Israeli Defense Force) Commander-in-Chief and the 
heads of the Shabach (Israel's internal general security service) and the Mossad 
(Israel’s foreign intelligence service) validated this statement. 
 
All of the written scenarios ended with a statement that presented the general 
building-use (i.e., a city hall or a shopping mall) which the participant is about to go to 
and meet a friend. In the first study, instead of the specific building-use, the 
computerized system included the name of the specific facility that the participant had 
entered in the previous screen. 
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4.3.2.3.1.2  Manipulated images 
 
In the second and third studies, images were used to represent and test the two 
architectural variables of the conceptual model. These images were based on visual 
simulations, combining computer graphics and artistic enhancements. 
The literature provides examples to the use of photographs in studies of people’s 
reactions to different spatial environments. Shafer and Richards in their paper, “A 
comparison of Viewer Reactions to Outdoor Scenes and Photographs of Those Scenes,” 
concluded that “when color-slide or picture presentations adequately depict most of the 
variation of natural and man-made environments, the adjective-pair measurement of 
response to the picture presentations agrees favorably with similarly measured on-site 
responses to the same scenes” (1974:26). Since then, many studies have used pictorial 
representations of scenes to test people’s reactions to those scenes (e.g., Schroeder and 
Anderson, 1984; Shaffer and Anderson, 1983; Stamps, 1997; Ulrich, 1979). 
Furthermore, other studies have used computer-generated simulations and collage 
techniques to systematically vary the architectural treatment while the general scene 
remains unchanged (e.g., Bishop, et al., 1985; Stamp, 1988). 
In this dissertation research, for every architectural variable, two manipulations 
were made to the same basic image. This means that only the specific variable was 
manipulated, while everything else was kept identical in the two images – from the 
vieweshed (angle of view) to the geometry of the built environment, the lighting, the 
landscape elements and the people that appeared in the images. Using this technique 
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increases the control over the independent variables, reduces the risk of extraneous 
variables, and hence enhances the research’s internal validity.   
It should be noted that the inclusion of people in the images was deliberate. It 
created livable and believable images. However, only several people were included in 
those images, since a big crowd may be associated with higher concern for terrorism 
attack (as it posses opportunity for Mass Casualty Incident), and may draw the attention 
away from the objects of examination.  
More specifically, in this dissertation, the first study did not include any image as 
it did not test any of the architectural variables.  
The manipulated scenarios in the second study included one image of the main 
façade, showing a facade that is mostly glass or a façade that is mostly concrete.  
In the third study, every manipulated scenario included two images – one of the 
main façade, made of glass or concrete, and a close-up image of the entrance of the 
building, portraying access control measures that are either designed as part of the 
entrance or that appear as add-ons temporary stationed machines. In this study, for 
consistency in the visual information given in the sequence of images (full façade view 
and then a close-up of the entrance), the type of access control security measures that 
was shown in the close-up view of the entrance was added to the image of the full 
façade.  
In the second and third studies, participants were asked to look at the image/s as 






FIGURE 4.1. Study 2: Distant view of the building, depicting a solid façade. 


















FIGURE 4.4. Study 3: A close-up of the entrance, depicting access-control security measures that appear as part of the overall design 





FIGURE 4.5. Study 3: Distant view of the building, depicting an all-glass façade and access-control security measures that appear as 






FIGURE 4.6. Study 3: Distant view of the building, depicting an all-glass façade and access-control security measures that appear as 




FIGURE 4.7. Study 3: Distant view of the building, depicting a solid façade and access-control security measures that appear as 






FIGURE 4.8. Study 3: Distant view of the building, depicting solid façade and access-control security measures that appear as part of 
the overall architectural design of the entrance. 
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4.3.2.3.2  Questionnaire 
 
After reviewing a scenario, each participant was asked to answer several questions. The 
complete questionnaire, used in studies 2 and 3, included seven questions pertaining to 
the four dependent variables of the conceptual model. These questions were devised to 
test how important the issue of a terrorism threat is in the respondent’s mind, the 
respondent’s sense of security, his/her state of anxiety, and the respondent’s tendency to 
use the environment in light of the given situation. The first study included the same 
questions except for the questions regarding the tendency to enter the building, since no 
visual manipulations were included at that stage of the examination. The second and 
third studies included three additional questions (on top of the seven questions pertaining 
to the four dependent variables) at the end of the questionnaire to clarify the 
respondent’s basic impression of the building’s security as affected by the visual 
manipulation.  
The following sections elaborate on each of the dependent variables and their 
representation in the questionnaire. The exact format and text used in all of the 
questionnaire’s items (the English version and the Hebrew version) appear in the 
example screen shots in Appendix A.  
 It should be noted that the answers to all questions were along a Likert scale with 
explicit anchors for each point on the scale (Likert, 1932; Rainer, et al., 2007). This 
technique is very common in measuring attitudes and other factors, especially in surveys 
and experimental research designs. As indicated in the literature, accurate and explicit 
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labeling of all the points on the scale—the two extreme endpoints as well as the other 
points along the scale—help the participants to select the option that best represents their 
attitude. The majority of the questions in this research used a 5-point scale, as commonly 
accepted in social science studies. The only measure that differed was of the state of 
anxiety, which utilized the State Anxiety Inventory questionnaire (Spielberger, et al., 
1970), in which items are based on a 4 point scale.     
 
4.3.2.3.2.1  Question on the awareness of security from terrorism (administered in 
studies 1, 2, 3) 
 
To find out about the level of awareness of security from terrorism, or in other words—
how much security from terrorism was on the respondent’s mind, participants were 
asked to rate how much various issues occupy their mind, each issue along a 5-point 
scale, 1 being “not at all” to 5 “very much”. Five different issues were included: (1) The 
looks (aesthetics) of the building; (2) the orientation in the building (finding the way 
around the building); (3) the security from criminal activity; (4) the monumentality of 
the building (whether it is imposing in size and shape); and (5) the security from 
terrorism (for the exact wording of the questions see Appendix A, question 1 in the 
screen-shots example).  
The idea behind the design of this question was to ask the question without 
sensitizing the issue of security from terrorism. The fact that this issue was embedded in 
four additional dimensions contributed to the validity of the measurement.    
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4.3.2.3.2.2  Questions on the sense of security (administered in studies 1, 2, 3) 
 
Information on the respondents’ sense of security was collected through two questions. 
One question pertained to a more general appraisal of the situation, and the other to a 
more personal appraisal.  
The first question (question 2 in the questionnaire) pertained to the perception of 
risk, i.e., the perceived probability of an incident occurring at the specific location. This 
question rated how dangerous the respondent perceives his/her visit to the specific 
building considering the described scenario, on a 5-point scale, when 1 being “not at all 
dangerous”, and 5 “very dangerous”. 
The second question (question 3 in the questionnaire) addressed the perception of 
personal safety. This question, in contrast to the previous question, was posed on a 
positive note, asking how safe the participant feels. The 5-point scale ranged from 1, 
“very unsafe” to 5, “very safe”. 
  The answers to the second question (question 3 in the questionnaire) about the 
perception of personal safety were recoded into a reverse scale. These scores, together 
with the answers to the first question (question 2 in the questionnaire) were used in a 
calculation of an average score per participant. This average score indicated the 
respondent’s general sense of security: 1 being the highest sense of security, and 5 
indicating the highest sense of insecurity.   
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The exact wording of both questions, the labels of their optional answers and the 
format in which they appeared can be found in Appendix A, questions 2 and 3 in the 
screen-shots example.  
 
4.3.2.3.2.3  Questions on the state of anxiety, i.e., stress level (administered in studies 1, 
2, 3) 
 
The participants’ anxiety level at the time of the study was recorded using Spielberger, 
Gorsuch and Lushene (1970) State Anxiety Inventory, and its Hebrew translation (by 
Teichman and Melineck, 1979). This instrument has been well established as a self-
reporting tool for measuring anxiety level in general, and in cross-cultural studies in 
particular (Spielberger and Diaz-Guerrero, 1976, 1986).  
The inventory is based on twenty different statements about a possible state of 
mind; some reflect positive affect (e.g., “I feel calm”) and some negative affect (e.g., “I 
am worried”). Ratings for each statement is on a 4-point scale (1 “not at all” to 4 “very 
much so”). In this dissertation, each participant was asked to rate each statement in a 
way that would reflect his/her state of mind at that moment in time. The exact wording 
of this item can be found in Appendix A, question 7 in the screen-shots example. 
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4.3.2.3.2.4  Questions on the tendency to enter the building (administered in studies 2, 3) 
 
A pool of three questions was formed to assess the participant’s action propensity. The 
first question (question 4 in the questionnaire) inquired if the participant has any 
reservations about going to the facility. The 5-point scale ranged from 1, “not at all” to 5, 
“very much so”. The second question (question 5 in the questionnaire) directly asked 
about the likelihood of the participant to enter the building. The answers ranged from 1, 
“not at all likely” to 5, “very likely”. The third question (question 6 in the questionnaire) 
asked whether the participant prefers to meet his/her friend at a different location. 
Answers to the latter question ranged from 1, “not at all” to 5, “very much”.     
 The answers to the second question about the likelihood to enter the building 
were recoded into a reverse scale. These scores, together with the answers to the first and 
third questions were used in a calculation of an average score per participant. This 
average score indicated the respondent’s general propensity to use the building: 1 being 
the highest tendency to use the environment, and 5 indicating the highest tendency to 
avoid entering the building.   
The exact wording of the three questions, the labels of their optional answers and 




4.3.2.3.2.5  Additional questions about the security in the building (administered in 
studies 2, 3) 
 
Three more questions pertained to the effect of the visual architectural manipulations on 
the perception of the level of security in the building. These were additional indicators 
that were designed to help clarify any of the results of the four dependent variables.  
 The first question (question 8 in the questionnaire) asked about the level of 
sophistication of the security in the building. Answers ranged from 1, “very 
sophisticated”, to 5, “very unsophisticated”. 
 The second question (question 9 in the questionnaire) asked whether the design 
triggers thoughts about threats of terrorism. Scores ranged from 1, “not at all”, to 5, 
“very much”. 
 The last question (question 10 in the questionnaire) inquired about the 
effectiveness of the design in deterring terrorists. Answers ranged from 1, “very 
effective”, to 5, “very ineffective”. 
      The exact wording of these questions, the labels of their optional answers and the 




4.3.2.4  Statistical Analyses 
 
The statistical analysis of the data collected in the three studies was conducted in a few 
stages. The first stage of statistical analysis for each study was conducted per dependent 
variable: how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the respondent’s mind, the 
respondent’s sense of security, his/her state of anxiety, and the tendency to use the 
building. The second stage of analysis looked for connections among the dependent 
variables within each study. In the second and third studies, additional analysis was 
made on the additional questions that were intended to clarify the effect of the visual 
architectural manipulations on the perception of the level of security in the building. The 
following sections detail each stage of the analysis. 
 
4.3.2.4.1  Analysis per Dependent Variable in Each Study 
 
4.3.2.4.1.1  Analysis of the level of awareness of security from terrorism (performed in 
studies 1, 2, 3) 
 
An ANOVA test of between-groups effects was conducted for the recorded responses to 
how much the issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind, i.e., to the level of 
awareness of the subject (Question 1.5 in the questionnaire; see screenshots in Appendix 
A for exact wording). Effect size was calculated using Partial η2. 1 In certain cases, 
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pending on the interactions that were found, additional ANOVA tests were conducted to 
further assess the statistical significance of specific differences.  
Before performing the any of the Analysis of Variance tests, descriptive statistics 
were reviewed and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research design were 
examined. Independence within and between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 
Type 1 error rate) was used to assess homogeneity of variance. The α used in all 
ANOVA tests was set to .05, the common significance level in social sciences.  
In the analysis of study 3, additional ANOVA test was done comparing the 
results of study 3 with the results in study 2 for the scenario of high level of terrorism 
threat. This examination was conducted in order to evaluate the effect of having access 
control security measures (study 3) vs. not having them at all (study 2). This 
examination was designed to test the assumption in H-3.a that any access control 
security measures at the entrance to a building (whether designed or temporary stationed 
machines) increase people’s awareness of the issue of security from terrorism.  
 
4.3.2.4.1.2  Analysis of the sense of security (performed in studies 1, 2, 3) 
 
A correlation coefficient test was conducted to measure the linear association between 
the responses to question 2 in the questionnaire on how dangerous participants perceive 
the situation to be, to responses to question 3 regarding how safe the participants would 
feel entering the building (for exact wording of questions, see Appendix A: screenshots). 
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This analysis was done to assess if the answers to both questions can collectively inform 
about the overall personal sense of security.  
In general, the correlation coefficient, i.e., Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r), 
indicates the linear association between two quantitative variables for pairs of 
observations. The value ranges between 1, for a strong positive linear association 
between the two variables, to -1, a strong negative linear association between the two 
variables, when the value of 0 indicates no linear correlation (Rasmussen, 1991). In this 
case, the two questions addressed what can be considered as opposite ideas: the level of 
perceived danger (when a score of 5 means “very dangerous”) and the feeling of safety 
(when a score of 1 means “very unsafe”). Therefore, the expected linear association was 
a negative one.  
In each of the three studies, the correlation coefficient tests yielded significant 
negative correlations between the answers to the two questions. Following these 
findings, in each study, responses to the two questions were recoded into one variable. 
The new value to indicate a participant’s sense of security equaled the average score of 
the answers to the two questions (calculated with the reverse value to the answers for the 
question of how safe they feel). Consequently, this value ranged between 1 and 5 — a 
score of 1 indicating a secure feeling and 5 corresponding with a high sense of 
insecurity. 
An ANOVA test of between-groups effects was performed on the new calculated 
value of the sense of security/insecurity. Effect size was calculated using Partial η2. In 
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certain cases, pending on the interactions that were found, additional ANOVA tests were 
conducted to further assess the statistical significance of specific differences.  
Before performing any of the ANOVA tests, descriptive statistics were reviewed 
and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. 
Independence within and between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 
error rate) was used to assess homogeneity of variance. The α used in all ANOVA test 
was set to .05, the common significance level in social sciences.       
 
4.3.2.4.1.3  Analysis of the state of anxiety (performed in studies 1, 2, 3) 
     
The handling of the responses to the twenty statements followed the established 
procedure for evaluating the State Anxiety Inventory. As indicated in the material and 
procedure section, every statement was rated on a 4 point scale (1 “not at all” to 4 “very 
much so”). Responses to the statements that portrayed a positive state of mind were 
recoded into a reversed scale. The sum of all the answers to the twenty statements was 
the final score to portray the participant’s state of anxiety. Thus, these final scores 
ranged from 20 to 80; 80 being the highest level of anxiety.  
Prior to calculating the total score of anxiety state for each participant, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient test was conducted, one for each society, to 
assess the reliability of the twenty items to which responses to all combine the total score 
for the anxiety state. The Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient is an analysis used to 
evaluate the internal consistency reliability of Likert-Type summated scales, which are 
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an assembly of interrelated items designed to measure underlying constructs. Scores of 
the Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient range from 0 to 1. The closer the value is 
to 1, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem and Gliem, 
2003).  
An ANOVA test of between-groups effects was performed on the new calculated 
value of the level of anxiety. Effect size was calculated using Partial η2. In certain cases, 
pending on the interactions that were found, additional ANOVA tests were conducted to 
further assess the statistical significance of specific differences.  
Before performing any of the ANOVA tests, descriptive statistics were reviewed 
and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. 
Independence within and between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 
error rate) was used to assess homogeneity of variance. The α used in all ANOVA test 
was set to .05, the common significance level in social sciences.       
 
4.3.2.4.1.4  Analysis of the tendency to enter the building (performed in studies 2, 3) 
 
Correlation coefficient tests were conducted to measure the association between the 
responses to the three questions that were used as indicators of the propensity to use the 
building. As Pearson’s correlation coefficient test indicates the linear association 
between two quantitative variables, three tests were performed altogether. The 
correlation coefficient tests were as follows: (1) for the rated reservations about going to 
the facility and the rated likelihood to enter the building, (2) the rated reservations about 
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going to the facility and whether they prefers to meet the friend at a different location, 
and (3) the rated likelihood to enter the building and whether they prefers to meet the 
friend at a different location.  
In each of the two studies, the three correlation coefficient tests yielded 
significant correlations between the answers. Following these findings, in each study, 
responses to the three questions were recoded into one variable. The new value to 
indicate a participant’s propensity to use the building equaled the average score of the 
answers to the three questions (calculated with the reverse value to the answers for the 
question of how likely they are to enter the building). Consequently, this value ranged 
between 1 and 5 — a score of 1 indicating an inclination to use the building and 5 
corresponding with a propensity to avoid the building. 
An ANOVA test was performed on the new calculated value of the propensity to 
enter the building. Effect size was calculated using Partial η2. Before performing the 
Analysis of Variance test, descriptive statistics were reviewed and statistical assumptions 
for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and between 
groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) was used to assess 
homogeneity of variance. The α used in all ANOVA test was set to .05, the common 
significance level in social sciences. In certain cases, pending on the interactions that 
were found, additional ANOVA tests were conducted to further assess the statistical 
significance of specific differences.  
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4.3.2.4.2  Examinations of Linkages among the Dependent Variables in Each Study 
 
The analyses described so far have been univariates in which the examination 
concentrated on one dependent variable at a time, looking at how the independent 
variables in each study influenced it.  
 Some of the dissertation’s hypotheses speak for cases in which the four 
dependent variables are influenced in the same manner by the dependent variables. 
However, the conceptual framework of this dissertation also outlines several hypotheses 
that propose a more complex relationship between the dependent variables, particularly 
when visual architectural variables are introduced.  
In order to further examine the connections between the dependent variables of 
the conceptual model, bi-variate Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted 
for each sample separately. 
In studies 2 and 3, further examination of the specific linkage between the 
propensity to avoid/enter a building and the sense of security was done using a repeated-
measures ANOVA.  In these tests, the two dependent variables—the sense of insecurity 
and the propensity to avoid the building—where recorded as the within subject factor. 
This test, allowed to examine hypotheses H-2.e and H-3.c by comparing the mean 
ratings for these dependent variables and to find potentially different tendencies in which 
of the independent variables affect them and how. Effect size was calculated using 
Partial η2. 
   
 154
4.3.2.4.3 Analysis of the Additional Questions about the Security in the Building 
(performed in studies 2, 3) 
 
ANOVA tests were performed on each of the three additional questions regarding: The 
level of sophistication of security in the building; whether the design triggers thoughts 
about terrorism; and the appraisal of the design’s effectiveness in deterring terrorists.  
 For each ANOVA test, descriptive statistics were reviewed and statistical 
assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and 
between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) was used to 
assess homogeneity of variance. The α used in all ANOVA test was set to .05, the 
common significance level in social sciences.  
 A note should be made that this part of the examination was directed towards 
achieving a better understanding of how the visual architectural variables affect the 
participants’ perception of the security of buildings. With this in mind, the review of the 
results of this part of the examination focuses only on the statistically significant 
findings that relate to the architectural variables of the study: façade design (glass façade 
vs. solid façade), and the design of the access control security measures at the entrance 
to the building (appear as part of the overall design vs. add-ons temporary stationed 
machines).         
Following this methodology chapter, the next chapter elaborates on the results of 
the statistical analyses that were performed in every stage of the investigation and 
presents a discussion of them. 
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1.  Though there are other estimates of effects size (omega squared, epsilon squared, eta squared), Cohen 
argues that the partial eta squared (partial η2) may prove more comparable across studies in which 
additional manipulated variables are added to a basic similar research design (Cohen, 1973). 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
This dissertation examines the effects of the function and image of public 
buildings on how people respond to threats to personal security associated with 
terrorism. The research entails a conceptual framework that takes into account the 
different factors that play a role in influencing potential users of the environment. These 
independent variables are: The current level of threat of terrorist bombings; the societal-
security-context that defines the individual’s experience with this threat; the building-
use; and design elements that influence the first impression of a building and of its level 
of security. The conceptual framework provides hypotheses that connect these 
independent variables to several levels of people’s reactions, which are the dependent 
variables. The range of reactions represents cognitive processes, emotive reaction, and 
behavioral disposition. Specifically, the dependent variables of the study are: How much 
the issue of a terrorism threat is in the respondent’s mind; the respondent’s sense of 
security; his/her level of anxiety; and the respondent’s inclination to use the building.  
The empirical investigation in this research was designed to illustrate and test the 
conceptual model and its related hypotheses. As detailed in the methodology chapter, the 
investigation entailed a pretest survey and three main studies. In the sequence of the 
three studies, each one introduced and tested a new main independent variable (level of 
terrorism threat, level of fortification vs. openness as represented in the façade design, 
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and the conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the overall 
architectural design of the entrance).     
This chapter focuses on the results of the statistical analyses that were performed 
on the data that was collected in every stage of the investigation. The following sections 
elaborate on each of the four stages of the dissertation research. Due to the relative 
complexity of the research design, the review of each stage of the investigation presents 
the objectives of the specific examination and the hypotheses that were tested, provides a 
quick review of the research design of that stage, elaborates on its results, and presents a 
discussion of them. For each of the three main studies, the review of the results is 
organized according to the dependent variables. Following the analyses per dependent 
variable, the review covers the results of the statistical examinations of connections 
among the dependent variables. The last section summarizes the findings of all the 
stages of the investigation. 
 
5.1  Pretest: Selection of Building-uses in Texas and Israel  
 
5.1.1  Objective and Hypotheses   
 
The objective of this stage of the study was to identify building-uses that are perceived 
to be associated with a respective terrorism threat in Texas and in Israel. The results of 
this stage guided the selection of two building-uses which helped in testing the main 
hypotheses of the research, and were included as the manipulation of the variable of 
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building-use in the subsequent studies. Two hypotheses were formed for this preliminary 
stage of the investigation: 
(H-BU.1)  The general perception of risk of terrorism depends on the societal 
exposure to the threat. People from a society that is used to live under the threat of 
terrorism, e.g., Israel, perceive such attacks to be of higher probability of occurring than 
people that are not used to this threat, i.e., Texans.  
(H-BU.2)  People from societies of different exposure to the threat of terrorism 
associate the threat of terrorism attacks with different building-uses. For a specific 
society, the association of a building-use to the threat of terrorism is related to the actual 
occurrence of attacks of buildings of this function in that society. More specifically, 
based on the analysis of the threat in the literature review, in Texas, high threat of 
terrorism would be associated with transportation terminals, especially airports, and with 
government facilities. In Israel, high threat of terrorism would be associated with 
commercial buildings as shopping malls, dining facilities as restaurants and cafés, and 
with transportation terminals, particularly bus stations.    
 
5.1.2  Research Design and Procedure   
 
A survey, using a paper-pencil questionnaire, was conducted to assess people’s risk 
perception associated with the threat of terrorism in relation to different public building-
uses in Texas and in Israel. A total of 135 individuals participated in the survey (84 
undergraduate students from Texas and 51 undergraduate students from Israel). 
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Participants in both societies, Texas and Israel, were asked to rate the probability 
of occurrence of a terrorism attack in each of 20 given building-uses, using a 0% to 
100% scale. The list included: City hall, courthouse, municipal library, post office, bank, 
hospital, stadium, amusement park, movie theater, restaurant, café, shopping mall, 
department store, airport terminal, central bus station or terminal, railroad or subway 
station, sea port terminal, church / synagogue (pending on society), university 
dormitories, and general office building. The building-uses were ordered randomly to 
create a mix of functions. (For the complete survey material see Appendix A). 
 
5.1.3  Results   
 
5.1.3.1  The Findings 
 
ANOVA tests were conducted on the perceived risk of terrorism associated with 20 
public building-uses in the two examined societies, Texas and Israel. The first ANOVA 
test concentrated on the overall ratings of probability of occurrence of a terrorism act 
and examined the main-effect of the societal context (Texas, US / Israel) on this general 
perception. For this examination, for every participant, a mean score was calculated, 
taking into account his/her ratings of all 20 buildings. Additional ANOVA tests were 
performed on the perceived risk associated with each of the 20 building-uses. Before 
performing any of the tests, statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research design 
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were examined. In addition, to compare patterns between societies, Spearman Rank 
Order Correlation Coefficient test was administered.     
The results of the first ANOVA test show that across building-uses (using the 
overall calculated mean per participant), the perceived probability of a terrorism attack 
(on a 0%-100% scale) was significantly higher in the Israeli sample (M=49.92) than in 
the Texan sample (M=37.34), F(1,134)=18.18, p<.01. The findings support hypothesis 
H-BU.1.  
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the mean scores for the perceived 
probability of occurrence of a terrorism attack in each of the 20 building-uses, in Texas 
and in Israel. The table also indicates the results of the ANOVA tests for each of the 
building-uses, comparing the samples from the two societies. The results of the ANOVA 
tests show that significant differences between the two samples in the perceived 
probability of terrorism incident appeared for the following building-uses: amusement 
park, movie theater, restaurant, café, shopping mall, department store, airport terminal, 
central bus station, church or synagogue, and municipal library. For all of these building-
uses, except for an airport terminal, Israelis’ perception of probability for terrorism 
attack was significantly higher than the Texans’. An airport terminal was rated to be of 
significantly higher probability for terrorism attack by Texans than by Israelis. The 
results support hypothesis H-BU.2. 
Other building-uses for which the Texan’s ratings for probability of terrorism 
attack were greater than the Israelis’: post office, bank, and hospital (though not 
statistically significant).  
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TABLE 5.1. Pretest: Mean ratings of the probability of a terrorism bombing attack in 20 building-uses in Texas and in Israel, and the 




 Israel Between-groups test for the effect of the 
Society variable 
  M 
 
 SD  M SD  F(1,134)  Sig. 
City hall 30.14   23.79  36.35 26.46  Non significant 
Courthouse 35.80 24.34  34.61 27.94  Non significant 
Post office 32.68 24.74  25.63 25.05  Non significant 
Municipal library 14.18 14.26  21.37 20.76  5.69 p<.02 * 
Bank 40.74 27.58  34.71 28.81  Non significant 
Hospital 43.04 27.02  39.55 29.41  Non significant 
Stadium  56.11 26.93  62.90 28.03  Non significant 
Amusement park 38.89 24.78  51.39 28.95  7.10 p<.01 
Movie theater 25.14 22.736  43.96 26.90  18.90 p<.01 
Restaurant 19.14 17.86  77.55 23.28  268.67 p<.01  
Café 14.86 16.01  78.98 24.51  338.18 p<.01  
Shopping mall 41.37 24.99  75.37 25.90  57.16 p<.01 
Department store 21.44 19.71  37.75 26.10  16.92 p<.01  
Airport terminal 69.60 26.74  57.41 35.15  5.17 p<.03 * 
Central bus station 54.60 25.71  84.31 23.57  45.10 p<.01 
Railroad or subway station 67.10 25.66  66.24 26.62  Non significant 
Seaport terminal 54.02 27.25  48.57 31.61  Non significant 
Church / Synagogue  32.43 27.17  56.82 30.58  23.25    p<.01  
University dormitories 25.20 21.30  29.98 25.55  Non significant  
General office building 
 
30.32 25.79  34.96 26.85  Non significant 
All building-uses (Mean) 
 
37.34 16.28  49.92 17.18  18.18 p<.01 
Note. For the statistical tests that are marked with *, Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance, for .01 Type 1 error rate, indicated a 
significant difference in the error variance across groups. 
         
 
 
Using the Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient provided an additional 
insight to the way the two samples associate terrorism with the different building-uses. 
The coefficient which compared the patterns between samples in the perceived 
probability of terrorism incident with relation to the 20 building-uses resulted in a low, 
insignificant correlation, Rs=.33, t(18)=1.47, p<.16 (two tailed). This finding provides 
additional support to hypothesis H-BU.2, according to which the association of building-
uses with the threat of terrorism is different in the two societies.  
The ranking of how probable terrorism incident is in each of the building-uses, 
detailed in Table 5.2, shows that in Israel, aside from the central bus station, which 
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received the highest probability for a terrorism act, the building-uses that were mostly 
associated with terrorism activities are the dining/commercial facilities. These building-
uses and other leisure related functions were ranked as the least associated with terrorism 
activity in Texas. In Texas, the building-uses that are mostly associated with threat of 
terrorism were all the transportation facilities (with airport being number 1, the most 
probable target), and a stadium. Government-related facilities received a middle range of 
scores in the Texan sample, while being the least associated with terrorism in Israel. 
Three building-uses were ranked similarly in both societies: amusement park (ranked 9), 




TABLE 5.2. Pretest: Mean ratings of the perceived probability of a terrorism bombing attack in 20 building-uses in Texas and in 







M SD  Rank Building-use M SD 
1 Airport 69.60 26.74  1 Central bus station/terminal 84.31 23.57 
2 Railroad/subway station 67.10 25.66  2 Café 78.98 24.51 
3 Stadium 56.11 26.93  3 Restaurant 77.55 23.28 
4 Central bus station/terminal 54.60 25.71  4 Shopping mall 75.37 25.90 
5 Sea port terminal 54.02 27.25  5 Railroad/subway station 66.24 26.62 
6 Hospital 43.04 27.02  6 Stadium 62.90 28.03 
7 Shopping mall 41.37 24.99  7 Airport 57.41 35.15 
8 Bank  40.74 27.58  8 Synagogue  56.82 30.58 
9 Amusement park 38.89 24.78  9 Amusement park 51.39 28.95 
10 Courthouse 35.80 24.34  10 Sea port terminal 48.57 31.61 
11 Post Office 32.68 24.74  11 Movie theater 43.96 26.90 
12 Church 32.43 27.17  12 Hospital 39.55 29.41 
13 General office building 30.32 25.79  13 Department store 37.75 26.10 
14 City Hall 30.14 23.79  14 City Hall 36.35 26.46 
15 University dormitories 25.20 21.30  15 General office building 34.96 26.85 
16 Movie theater 25.14 22.74  16 Bank 34.71 28.81 
17 Department store 21.44 19.71  17 Courthouse 34.61 27.94 
18 Restaurant 19.14 17.86  18 University dormitories 29.98 25.55 
19 Café 14.86 16.01  19 Post Office 25.63 25.05 
20 Municipal library 14.18 14.26  20 Municipal library  
21.37 20.76 
Note. For each society, a rank of 1 indicates the building that was perceived to be of the highest probability of occurrence of a 
terrorism attack, and the rank of 20 indicates the building that was perceived as the least probable target for a terrorism incident. 




5.1.3.2  The Relation of the Findings to the Reality of the Threat in the Two Societies 
 
The finding that the overall perceived probability of occurrence of terrorism activity 
(across building-uses) was significantly greater in the Israeli sample than in the Texan 
sample supports hypothesis H-1.1 and corresponds with the different occurrence rate of 
terrorism incidents in the two societies in the last few years. During 2001-2006, while 
Israel experienced 139 terrorism attacks that resulted in fatalities within its territory 
alone (and a total of 346 fatal attacks including those that occurred in Israeli settlements 
in the occupied territories), there were no attacks within Texas, and only 9 fatal terrorism 
incidents within the general U.S., all of them except for one occurred back in 2001 
(MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007).  
The significant differences found between Texan and Israeli participants in the 
ratings of the probability of a terrorism attack with relation to specific building-uses, and 
the difference in the rank order of the building-uses are for the most part congruent with 
difference in the experience these societies have with international terrorism attacks. 
This supports most of the assumptions underlying hypothesis H-1.2.  
As detailed in the findings, commercial, dining and leisure related building-uses 
were rated significantly higher by Israelis than by Texans. Moreover, while in Israel 
some of the dining and commercial facilities were ranked as the most probable targets, in 
Texas these building-uses were rated as the least probable targets for terrorism incidents. 
And in fact, in the years 2001-2006, out of a total of 139 fatal terrorism incidents in 
Israel, 17 occurred at dinning facilities (13 in cafés and restaurants, and 4 in fast food 
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stands), 6 in shopping malls, 3 in grocery stores, 9 in outdoor markets, and 13 in 
crowded streets (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). During the same period of 
time there were no significant terrorism incidents in the U.S. on any of these types of 
facilities.  
With relation to the difference in perceived probability of terrorism associated 
with transportation facilities, the response of the Israeli sample, ranking a bus station as 
the most probable target, reflects numerous attacks on buses and stations. In 2001-2006 
there were 20 terrorism attacks on buses in Israel, and 13 on bus stations or hitchhiking 
posts, all of which resulted in fatalities (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007).  
The response of the Texan sample, identifying airports as the most probable 
target, fits the occurrences of terrorism attacks in the U.S. Out of the total of 9 terrorism 
incidents that resulted in fatalities in the U.S. in the years 2001-2006, 4 attacks were 
related to airports or airplanes. In addition, the magnitude of the 3 coordinated events on 
September 11, can also be a contributing factor, as no other attack of the same scale 
happened since. In addition, the security measures and procedures at American airports, 
which are considerably different than security procedures in other public facilities in the 
U.S. may contribute to the level of threat that the public associate particularly with these 
facilities. Association of other type of transportation terminals and of stadium with 
terrorism in the Texan sample can be credited to their similarity to airports in scale.  
In addition, as the Texans have only limited experience with the threat, these 
findings as well as building-uses as hospital and bank being ranked higher by the Texan 
sample than by the Israeli sample may also be attributed to ideas that movies and TV 
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shows propagate, as they have no factual basis. With respect to the ranking of a stadium 
as the second most probable target in Texas, it should be noted that this building-use is 
particularly relevant and familiar to the Texan sample of participants, living in what can 
be considered as a “college town” in a society and atmosphere that promotes big sports 
venues.  
The findings which indicate a statistically significant difference between the two 
samples in their perceived probability of terrorism associated with a religious function 
(church / synagogue) seem to correspond with the realities of each society. In the past 
few years, there has been no terrorism attack on churches in the U.S. In Israel, in the 
years 2001-2006, there were two attacks associated with synagogues. One occurred at a 
street next to the entrance to a synagogue in Jerusalem, and the other within a synagogue 
of an Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. In addition, the Israeli public may 
recall significant attacks that took place in synagogues around the world in the last few 
years (in Tunisia in 2002 and in Tuerkey, 2003) and hence perceive this building-use as 
a probable target (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007).  
The assumption detailed in H-BU.2 according to which Texans perceive 
governmental facilities as more associated with terrorism than Israelis was validated by 
the rank order analysis. Relatively to other building-uses, these buildings were ranked 
higher by the Texan sample, than by the Israeli sample.    
The third governmental facility, a city hall, is the only building-use that was 
found not only as not significantly different in the two societies in its rating as a 
probable target, but also received the same ranking as relative to other building-uses by 
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both samples (ranked 14). With relation to these findings, Israel had experienced one 
fatal terrorism attack on two buses which blew up next to a city hall (and one attack on a 
political party center). This might have influenced the ranking of city hall to be 
considered as a more probable target than courthouse or post office, while still being not 
very high on the list of probable targets as compared to all the locations of other terror 
incidents in Israel. In Texas, without any experience with terrorism with relation to the 
particular building-uses of courthouse or city hall, peoples’ recollection of attacks on 
authorities/government related facilities (Washington DC, September 11, Oklahoma, 
1995) may have influenced the perception of these facilities as probable targets.  
The difference found between the samples in the ranking of the post-office is 
compatible with media reports on anthrax and ricin envelopes in the U.S. (15 total in 
2001-2006, out of which 4 resulted in fatalities), and with lack of such experience in 
Israel (MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2007). A similar difference in the ranking was 
exhibited in the case of a courthouse, when relative to the other building-uses it was 
ranked in Texas as a more probable target than in Israel. This finding is not consistent 
with occurrence rates, as there were no terrorism incidents in courthouses in either of the 
countries in the past few years.  
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5.1.4  Conclusion and Selection of Building-uses  
 
The findings of the first stage of the investigation show that across all building-uses, 
Israeli participants perceived the probability of a terrorism attack as higher than the 
Texan participants. This difference in the risk perception corresponds to the actual 
occurrence rate in each of the societies. Disagreements between the samples were found 
with regards to particular transportation facilities, commercial buildings (including 
dining, shopping and entertainment facilities) and to most government facilities. Texans 
exhibited the highest sensitivity to transportation terminals (particularly airports), and 
large sports venues (stadiums), while Israelis considered bus stations and dining 
facilities as the most probable targets. Government facilities, with the exception of a city 
hall, were found to be perceived as moderately probable targets in Texas, relative to 
other building-uses, and the least probable targets in Israel.  
These results, as well as other factors lead to the decision to focus the next stages 
of the investigation on two building-uses: (a) city hall and (b) shopping mall. Looking 
closely at these two building-uses, we find several factors which support this decision.  
First, as the results of this investigation show, both of these building-uses did not 
make the top three most probable targets or the bottom three most unlikely targets by 
both groups of participants. Using these building-uses in the main investigation will 
increase the sensitivity of the research design to the effects of the remaining variables in 
the conceptual model.   
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Second, an interesting comparison can be made between the two building-uses. 
The two building-uses represent larger groups of functions, where a city hall is a 
government facility, and a shopping mall is a commercial function. Moreover, the 
analysis of this pretest shows a difference in the association of these building-uses with 
terrorism threat in general and within each of the societies. More specifically, by both 
samples, a shopping mall was ranked as a more probable target than a city hall. In 
addition, a shopping mall was perceived as a significantly more probable of a target by 
the Israeli sample than by the Texan participants. At the same time, the city hall was the 
only building-use which not only received a similar evaluation by participants from the 
two societies of how probable of a target it is, but was also ranked the same relatively to 
other building-uses in each country.  
The logic behind the selection of these two building-uses was further supported 
by two other factors. One is the fact that both city hall and shopping mall are commonly 
found in both societies, and specifically in the local communities from which 
participants were selected in all stages of this research (College Station, Texas, and Tel 
Aviv, Israel). Hence, participants can relate to these building-uses, rather than comment 
on places they are not familiar with. The other relevant and important factor in the 
selection of these two building-uses is their similarity in scale and general architectural 
manifestation. This made it reasonable to use the same manipulations of the examined 
architectural factors for both building-uses.  
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5.2  Study 1: Reactions to Levels of Terrorism Threat, as Affected by Building-use 
in Two Societies  
 
5.2.1  Objective and Hypotheses   
 
The general objective of this part of the investigation was to examine the effects of the 
two levels of terrorism threat (almost no threat vs. the highest level of security alert) and 
the two building-uses (shopping mall vs. city hall) on people of two societies of different 
exposure to the threat (Texas and Israel). In this study, only the conceptual model’s first 
three dependent variables were addressed: level of awareness of security from terrorism 
(i.e., how much security from terrorism is on the respondent’s mind), the respondent’s 
feeling of security, and the respondent’s level of anxiety. The model’s fourth dependent 
variable, i.e., the propensity to enter the building, was not tested as no “tangible” 
architectural solution was introduced.  
More specifically, the examination, at this stage, was directed towards: (1) 
Testing whether the written manipulations which define the treatments of high level of 
terrorism threat vs. almost no terrorism threat work; (2) examining the difference 
between the samples from the two societies in terms of reactions to the low or high 
levels of terrorism threat; (3) observing the difference between city hall and shopping-
mall for reactions to threats of terrorism before architectural solutions are introduced. 
This first study, tests only the first set of hypotheses outlined in the conceptual 
framework. As explained in section 3.2.1, these hypotheses relate to the independent 
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variables that combine the “distal” level (before architectural solutions are introduced). 
These hypotheses assume interdependency among the dependent variables. This 
interdependency links a rise in the awareness of the issue of security to a reduction in the 
sense of security (elevation in perceived risk and in feeling of insecurity), an increased 
level of anxiety and an inclination to avoid going to the building.  
Below are the hypotheses that were tested in this study. Please note that while the 
hypotheses refer to all four dependent variables, only three dependent variables were 
examined here. The action propensity (i.e., the propensity to avoid or enter the building) 
was not tested in this study.  
(H-1.a)  Variation in the level of current terrorism threat influences a person’s 
awareness of security issue, his/her sense of security and the stress level (i.e., state of 
anxiety). The greater the current threat from terrorism is - the more the issue of security 
from terrorism occupies the person’s mind, and the lower his/her sense of security is 
(i.e., the higher the perceived risk and danger, and the less secure the person feels). 
Subsequently, people in this situation are more anxious.     
(H-1.b) The societal-security-context influences a person’s awareness of security 
from terrorism, his/her sense of security and the stress level (i.e., state of anxiety). 
People from a society that is usually under a high level of terrorism threat (e.g., Israel) 
have security from terrorism more on their minds, have a lower sense of security (i.e., 
perceive such attacks to be of higher probability of occurring and feel less secure), and 
are more anxious than people from a society which is not accustomed to living under 
such threat (e.g., Texas).   
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(H-1.c)  The extent by which the current level of terrorism threat influences 
people’s awareness of security from terrorism, their sense of security and anxiety level is 
moderated by how used the person is to such a reality (i.e., his/her societal-security-
context). Variations in the current level of terrorism threat has greater influence on how 
much security from terrorism is on a person’s mind in a society that is not accustomed to 
live under high level of security threat (e.g., Texas), than in a society that usually lives 
under high level of threat (e.g., Israel). In other words, people who are used to live with 
the threat of terrorism, have it on their minds regardless of the current threat level. 
People who are not used to the threat are more affected by the current threat level. 
Accordingly, the fluctuations in a person’s sense of security and his/her anxiety level is 
greater in a society that is not accustomed to live under high level of terrorism threat 
(e.g., Texas), than in a society that usually lives with high level of threat (e.g., Israel).  
(H-1.d) The effects of building-use on people’s reactions (awareness of security 
from terrorism, sense of security and level of anxiety) is interlinked to the societal-
security-context. The later factor influences the extent by which the building-use is 
considered in that society as a probable target of terrorism. More specifically, and based 
on the results of the pretest (detailed in section 5.1), a city hall should trigger similar 
thoughts with regards to security from terrorism, similar sense of security, and similar 
anxiety level in Texas and Israel. A shopping-mall, on the other hand, would create a 
greater awareness of the issue of security from terrorism, a lower sense of security and a 
higher anxiety level with Israelis than with Texans.  
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5.2.2  Research Design and Procedure   
 
A 2 x 2 x 2 study of between-groups research design was conducted utilizing a web-
based computerized system. The study tested the effects of the two building-uses (city 
hall and shopping mall) and two levels of terrorism threat (almost no threat vs. the 
highest level of security alert) on people of two different political societies (Texas and 
Israel). The manipulations of the current level of terrorism threat and the building-use 
were introduced by written descriptions of scenarios.  
The participants reactions were measured along three of the four dimensions 
outlined in the conceptual framework: how much the issue of a terrorism threat is on the 
respondent’s mind, how safe the respondent feels and his/her level of anxiety.  
A total of 175 undergraduate students participated in the study (89 from Texas 
and 86 from Israel). Within each location, participants were randomly assigned to the 
manipulated scenarios. For a detailed description of the research design, procedure and 
material, see the methodology chapter, section 4.3.2. 
 
5.2.3  Results   
 
The statistical analysis of the data included two stages. The first stage was conducted per 
dependent variable: how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the respondent’s 
mind, the respondent’s sense of security, and his/her state of anxiety. The second stage 
of analysis looked for associations among the dependent variables within the study.  
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5.2.3.1  Results per Dependent Variable  
 
5.2.3.1.1  Findings on the Level of Awareness of Security from Terrorism  
 
An ANOVA test (α=.05) was conducted for the recorded responses to how much the 
issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind, i.e., to the level of awareness of the 
subject (Question 1.5 in the questionnaire; see screenshots in Appendix A for exact 
wording). Before performing the Analysis of Variance test, descriptive statistics were 
reviewed (see Appendix B, Table B-1) and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect 
research design were examined. Independence within and between groups was assumed. 
Levene’s test of equality of error variance (for .01 Type 1 error rate) was conducted to 
assess homogeneity of variance. This test resulted in insignificant findings, 

























Level of terrorism threat 11.68    1 11.68 6.64 .011 .038 
Society 8.26    1 8.26 4.69 .032 .027 
Building-use .12    1 .12 .07 .799 .000 
Building-use * Society 12.63    1 12.63 7.18 .008 .041 
Level of terrorism threat * Society .18    1 .18 .10 .748 .001 
Building-use * Level of terrorism threat 4.212E-05     1 4.212E-05 .00 .996 .000 
Building-use * Level of terrorism threat * Society 1.74     1 1.74 .99 .321 .006 
Error 293.86 167 1.76      
Total 1828.00 175       
a  R Squared = .110 (Adjusted R Squared = .072) 
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Results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5.3, demonstrate two significant 
main effects and one significant interaction, all of which had low effect sizes.   
As hypothesized (hypothesis H-1.a), the analysis shows that across the two 
samples the manipulated level of terrorism threat yielded a significant effect on how 
much security from terrorism occupies the mind of the participants, F(1, 174)=6.64, 
p<.02. The item was rated significantly higher when the scenario described a high level 
of security alert (M=3.20) than when the scenario was of a peaceful circumstances 
(M=2.66). The effect size was Partial η2=.04. 
Another statistically significant main effect on how much security from terrorism 
occupies the mind is accredited to the society variable, F(1, 174)=4.69, p<.04, Partial 
η2=.03. This corroborates the second research hypothesis (H-1.b). The issue of security 
from terrorism was generally more on the minds of the Israeli participants (M=3.16), 
which live under relatively high level of terrorism threat, than on the minds of Texans 
(M=2.70) that represent a society which is not experienced with the threat. 
Hypothesis H-1.c, which speaks of the moderating effect of society on how much 
the current level of terrorism threat elicits thoughts about terrorism, was not supported 
by the findings. The interaction between the variable of society and the variable of threat 
of terrorism did not produce a statistically significant result, F<1.00.  
Hypothesis H-1.d, which states that society moderates the effect of a building-use 
on how much security from terrorism occupies the mind, was supported by a statistically 
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Two additional ANOVA tests were conducted to test the simple effects within 
the above interaction for each of the building-uses. The results support the specific 
assumption detailed in hypothesis H-1.d. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the two samples 
were similar in their ratings of a city hall, M=2.90 for Texans, and M=3.00 for Israelis, 
F(1, 84)<1.00. The ratings proved to be significantly different considering a shopping 
mall, F(1, 89)=13.85, p<.01. With respect to a shopping mall function, Israelis had 
security from terrorism much more on their mind, M=3.41, than Texans, M=2.41. In 
addition, the results show that while in Texas a city hall elicited higher ratings for how 
much security from terrorism is on the respondents’ mind than a shopping mall, in Israel, 






FIGURE 5.1. Study 1: Interaction of building-use and society in the ratings of how much the issue of security from terrorism 




5.2.3.1.2  Findings on the Sense of Security 
 
Pearson’s correlation test was conducted on the responses to the questions of how 
dangerous participants perceive the situation to be (Question 2 in the questionnaire, 
Appendix A), and how safe they would feel entering the building (Question 3 in the 
questionnaire, Appendix A). This test was performed to assess whether responses to 
these two measures can collectively inform about the overall personal sense of security. 
The test found a significant -.47 correlation (r) between the two indicators (p<.01). Due 
to this finding, responses to the two questions were recoded into one variable. The new 
value to indicate a participant’s sense of security equaled the average score of the 
answers to the two questions (calculated with the reverse value to the answers for the 
question of how safe they feel). Consequently, this value ranged between 1 and 5 — a 
score of 1 indicating a secure feeling and 5 corresponding with a high sense of 
insecurity. 
An ANOVA test (α = .05) was performed on the new calculated value of the 
sense of security/insecurity. Before performing the Analysis of Variance test, descriptive 
statistics were reviewed (see Appendix B, Table B-2) and statistical assumptions for a 
fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and between groups 
was assumed. Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of the 
calculated values to indicate sense of security resulted in insignificant findings, 
F(7,167)=.22, p>.05.  
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The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5.4, demonstrate two significant 
main effects with similar effect sizes and no significant interaction.  
 
 




















Level of terrorism threat 12.20    1 12.20 17.06 .000 .093 
Society 11.63    1 11.63 16.27 .000 .089 
Building-use .61    1 .61 .85 .358 .005 
Building-use * Society 2.14    1 2.14 2.99 .086 .010 
Level of terrorism threat * Society 1.20    1 1.20 1.68 .197 .005 
Building-use * Level of terrorism threat .57     1 .57 .80 .372 .018 
Building-use * Level of terrorism threat * Society .29     1 .29 .41 .525 .002 
Error 119.36 167 .72      
Total 1172.00 175        
a  R Squared = .202 (Adjusted R Squared = .168s) 
b. Calculation of the values of the general sense of security for each participant was:  
    (Response to Question 2, Appendix A + Reversed values of response to Questions 3, Appendix A)/2. 
      
 
 
The first significant main effect on the sense of security/insecurity corresponds 
with Hypothesis H-1.a and is attributed to the manipulated level of terrorism threat. 
Overall, all the participants (in both samples) exhibited greater insecurity when terrorism 
was a major threat (M=2.70), than when terrorism was not a threat (M=2.14), F(1, 
174)=17.06, p<.01, Partial η2=.09.  
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As hypothesized in hypothesis H-1.b, another main effect was due to the society 
variable, Partial η2=.09. Israelis demonstrated significantly greater feeling of insecurity 
(M=2.69) than Texans (M=2.15), F(1, 174)=16.27, p<.01, regardless of level of threat or 
building-use.  
The interaction of the variable of terrorism threat with the variable of society was 
not found to be statistically significant, p>.05. Hence, hypothesis H-1.c was not 
supported by the findings. 
 
5.2.3.1.3  Findings on the State of Anxiety 
     
The handling of the responses to the twenty statements from the State Anxiety Inventory 
followed the established procedure for evaluating it. As indicated in the methodology 
chapter, material and procedure section, every statement was rated on a 4 point scale (1 
“not at all” to 4 “very much so”). Responses to the statements that portrayed a positive 
state of mind were recoded into a reversed scale. The sum of all the answers to the 
twenty statements was the final score to portray the participant’s state of anxiety. Thus, 
these final scores ranged from 20 to 80; 80 being the highest level of anxiety.  
Prior to making analyses of the total score of anxiety state, two tests were 
conducted, one for each of the two samples, to assess the reliability of the combined 
index. This examination of the twenty items resulted in high reliability scores: 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .95 in the Texan sample and of .93 in the Israeli sample. 
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An ANOVA test examined the effects of the independent variables on the total 
score of the anxiety state. Before performing the ANOVA test, descriptive statistics were 
reviewed (see Table B-3 in Appendix B) and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect 
research design were examined. Independence within and between groups was assumed. 
Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of the calculated 
values to indicate anxiety state resulted in insignificant findings, F(7,167)=1.94, p>.05. 
The α used in all ANOVA test was set to .05, the common significance level in social 
sciences.       
As can be seen in Table 5.5, the test resulted in two statistically significant main 
























Level of terrorism threat 2844.34    1 2844.34 25.39 .000 .132 
Society 572.63    1 572.63 5.11 .025 .030 
Building-use 8.50    1 8.50 .08 .780 .000 
Building-use * Society 849.28    1 849.28 7.58 .007 .022 
Level of terrorism threat * Society 426.26    1 426.63 3.81 .053 .030 
Building-use * Level of terrorism threat 585.64     1 585.64 5.23 .023 .043 
Building-use * Level of terrorism threat * Society 6.64     1 6.64 .06 .808 .000 
Error 18710.65 167 112.04      
Total 274198.00 175        
a  R Squared = .223 (Adjusted R Squared = .190s) 
b. Calculation of the values for the total score of anxiety state was based on Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene’s Manual of the State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (1970), and is detailed in section 4.2.3 Method.   




As in the analyses of the two previous indicators of people’s responses to 
scenarios (i.e., how much security from terrorism occupies the mind, detailed in section 
5.2.3.1.1, and the general sense of security, detailed in section. 5.2.3.1.2), the two main 
effects on the total score of anxiety were of the manipulated level of terrorism threat and 
of the societal difference. The largest effect size was of the level of threat of terrorism, 
Partial η2=.13. As hypothesized in H-1.a, all participants exhibited higher level of 
anxiety when presented with a scenario of high level of terrorism threat (M=41.93) than 
when terrorism was not a threat (M=33.73), F(1, 174)=25.39, p<.01. A lower effect size 
was of the variable of society (Partial η2=.03). Israelis reported statistically significant 
higher level of anxiety than Texans [M=39.80 for Israelis vs. M=35.88 for Texans, F(1, 
174)=5.11, p<.03]. This supports hypothesis H-1.b (see section 4.2.2.3).  
The analysis shows a significant interaction between society and building-use, 
F(1, 174)=7.58, p<.01, Partial η2=.02. The results, shown in Figure 5.2, support 
hypothesis H-1.d. A separate ANOVA test for the city hall function further emphasis the 
fact that the exposure of participants to this building-use created similar anxiety levels in 
both countries, F(1, 84)<1.00 (M=37.93 in Texas, and M=37.31 in Israel). The test for 
the shopping mall function show a significant difference between the two samples, F(1, 
89)=12.01, p<.01. As exhibited in Figure 5.2, when presented with a shopping mall, 
Israelis were far more anxious (M=41.18) than Texans (M=33.96). The results also 
indicate that in Texas, a city hall elicited a higher level of anxiety than a shopping mall, 
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The third interaction that was found to significantly influence the state of anxiety 
is of the manipulated level of terrorism threat with the manipulated building-use, F(1, 
174)=5.23, p<.03, Partial η2=.04. Figure 5.3 shows that when introducing a high level of 
terrorism threat, the anxiety associated with a city hall (M=41.63) was greater than in the 
case of a shopping mall (M=40.40), while when there was no threat of terrorism, a 
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5.2.3.2  Results on the Linkages among the Dependent Variables in the Study 
 
In order to further examine the connections between the dependent variables of the 
conceptual model, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was conducted 
between any two dependent variables, for each sample separately (Table 5.6). 
 
 
TABLE 5.6. Study 1: Results of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, in each of the societies.  
 
 
Sense of insecurity  
 
State of anxiety  
 
 Texas Israel Texas Israel 
Awareness of security from terrorism .36 .40 .41 .44 
Sense of insecurity   .61 .57 
      
a  All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




For both samples, all the calculated Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients, between any two indicators of the three dependent variables, showed 
significant correlation at the significance level of p<.01. The results were quite similar 
for the two samples in each case. For testing the linkage between how much security 
from terrorism occupies the mind and the sense of security, it resulted in r=.36 for the 
Texan sample, and r=.40 for the Israeli sample. The correlation between how much 
security from terrorism occupies the mind and the state of anxiety showed r=.41 for 
Texans and r=.44 for Israelis. The strongest correlation was found between the sense of 
security and the state of anxiety: r=.68 for Texans and r=.57 for Israelis.  
 
5.2.4 Conclusion   
 
The findings of this stage of the investigation, which tested the effects of variations of 
building-use and level of terrorism threat in samples from two different societal-security-
contexts, on how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the person’s mind, how 
safe the person feels, and how anxious he/she is, support three of the four hypotheses.  
 This stage of the investigation demonstrated that variation in terrorism threat 
affected the participants’ responses along the three dependent variables that were tested. 
The biggest effect this independent variable had was on the state of anxiety (Partial 
η2=.13), the second biggest was on the sense of security (Partial η2=.09), and the 
smallest effect was on the awareness of security from terrorism (Partial η2=.04). 
Scenarios which described high level of terrorism threat elicited higher scores than the 
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scenarios in which terrorism was not a threat in the participants’ state of anxiety, their 
sense of insecurity, and how much security from terrorism was on their minds. These 
findings validate the treatments used for manipulating the level of terrorism threat.  
Differences between samples were obtained along all questions and across all 
conditions. The biggest effect of the societal-security-context was on the sense of 
security (Partial η2=.09), according to which, the Israeli participants had an overall 
lower sense of security than the Texan participants. The societal-security-context had a 
similar size effect on the awareness of security and the state of anxiety (Partial η2=.03). 
The Israeli participants had security from terrorism on the mind more than the Texans, 
and were more anxious than the Texans. These findings, using Texas as an instance of a 
society with almost no experience with the threat of terrorism, and Israel as an example 
of a society that is accustomed to live in a relatively high level of terrorism threat 
corroborate the research hypotheses. These results support the notion that a person’s 
ideas and reactions towards security are a product of the political-security society he/she 
is used to, regardless of a certain current level of threat or a specific building-use.  
The findings did not support the hypothesis that the societal-security context 
moderates the effects of the level of terrorism threat on people’s responses.   
Additional societal differences were observed in relation to the two examined 
building-uses. For the Israeli participants, while both building-uses created a similar 
sense of security, a shopping mall elicited more thoughts about terrorism threat, and 
caused a greater anxiety than a city hall. For Texans, while again, the sense of security 
was similar in relation to the two building-uses, the city hall evoked more thoughts of 
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terrorism than a shopping mall, and created greater anxiety. Furthermore, while the two 
samples were similar in all their responses to the city hall, they were very different in 
their level of awareness and state of anxiety considering a shopping mall. These findings 
demonstrate that some of the security-related responses to a specific building-use are 
dependant on the society and which building-uses are perceived in that society to be 
more or less associated with terrorism acts.  
To summarize, the findings of this study provide credence to the research design 
that was employed in this case, and to the written manipulations that were used in the 
different treatments of the study. In addition, the results validate the first part of the 
model – effects of building-use and societal context on human responses. Thus, this 
phase sets the stage for the next two studies in which the effects of specific architectural 
treatments on people’s responses as related to a certain building-use, in a certain level of 
terrorism threat, in two societies, have been tested.  
 
5.3  Study 2: Reactions to Façade Design as Affected by Levels of Terrorism Threat 
and Building-use, in Two Societies 
 
5.3.1  Objective and Hypotheses   
 
The second study added to the test the conceptual framework’s first architectural 
variable: the apparent level of fortification/openness of the façade of the building 
(represented in the façade’s glass-solid ratio). More specifically, this study tested the 
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effects of the level of fortification/openness of the façade, two levels of terrorism threat 
(almost no threat vs. the highest level of security alert), two building-uses (shopping 
mall vs. city hall) on participants from two societies of different exposure to the threat 
(Texas and Israel). In this stage, all four dependent variables were measured and 
analyzed: level of awareness of security from terrorism (i.e., how much security from 
terrorism is on the respondent’s mind), the respondent’s sense of security, the 
respondent’s level of anxiety, and the respondent’s propensity to enter the building.  
The examination in this stage focused on the conceptual framework’s second set 
of hypotheses, which relate to the effects of the glass-solid ratio in the façade design on 
people’s security-related-reactions. The examination also included testing the first set of 
hypotheses that relate to effects of variables of the “distal” level (current level of 
terrorism threat, societal-security-context, and building-use), as was done in first study 
(these hypotheses were outlined in section 5.2.1). It should be noted that while the first 
set of hypotheses assumes interdependency among the dependent variables, the second 
set presents a more complex relationship between the dependent variables.  
The following are the conceptual framework’s second set of hypotheses, which 
relate to the architectural variable of glass-solid ratio in the façade’s design.   
(H-2.a)  The apparent level of fortification of a building, as represented in the 
glass-solid ratio in the façade design, influences people’s awareness of security from 
terrorism and their sense of security. When confronted with a building of solid façade, 
people have security from terrorism more on their minds while their overall sense of 
security is higher than when confronted with a building of extensive window area. 
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(H-2.b) The effects of glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s 
awareness of security from terrorism and a person’s sense of security (perceived risk and 
feeling of security) are moderated by the current level of terrorism threat. When there is 
a terrorism threat, the effects are accentuated, and when there is no terrorism threat the 
effect is attenuated. 
 (H-2.c) The effects of glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s 
awareness of security from terrorism and a person’s sense of security are moderated by 
the societal-security-context. In a society that is not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., 
Texas), the variations in a person’s awareness of security and sense of security as 
affected by the design of the façade would be greater than in a society that is accustomed 
to living under the threat (e.g., Israel).  
(H-2.d) The effect of glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s 
stress/anxiety level is influenced by the current level of terrorism threat. When there is a 
terrorism threat, a person would be more anxious when confronted with a building of 
extensive window area (congruent with low sense of security). When there is no 
terrorism threat, a person would be more anxious when the building’s façade is solid (as 
this design elevates the awareness to the issue of security). 
(H-2.e)  People that are not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to 
follow their sense of security (as affected by the building-use, the glass-solid ratio in the 
façade design and the current level of threat) with actions, while people who are 
accustomed to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Israelis) tend to use buildings regardless of 
their feeling of security.     
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5.3.2  Research Design and Procedure   
 
The second study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups research design and was 
conducted utilizing a web-based computerized system. The study tested the effects of the 
apparent level of fortification/openness of the façade of the building (all glass façade vs. 
solid façade) in two building-uses (city hall and shopping mall) and two levels of 
terrorism threat (almost no threat vs. the highest level of security alert) on people of two 
different societies with different societal-security-contexts (Texas and Israel).  
The manipulations of the current level of terrorism threat and the building-use 
were introduced by written descriptions of scenarios. The manipulation of the 
architectural variable was done using an image of the main façade of the building. The 
image depicted a facade that is mostly glass or a façade that is mostly concrete.  
The participants’ reactions were measured along the four dimensions outlined in 
the conceptual framework: how much the issue of a terrorism threat is on the 
respondent’s mind (i.e., security awareness), the respondent’s overall sense of security, 
his/her level of anxiety and their inclination to use the building.  
A total of 362 undergraduate students participated in this examination (200 from 
Texas and 162 from Israel). Within each location, participants were randomly assigned 
to treatments. For a detailed description of the research design, the procedure and 
material, please see the methodology chapter, section 4.3.2. 
 
 189
5.3.3  Results   
 
The statistical analysis of the data included two stages. The first stage was conducted per 
dependent variable: how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the respondent’s 
mind, the respondent’s sense of security, his/her state of anxiety, and the respondent’s 
propensity to use the building. The second stage of the analysis looked for connections 
among the dependent variables within the study.  
 
5.3.3.1  Results per Dependent Variable  
 
5.3.3.1.1  Findings on the Level of Awareness of Security from Terrorism  
 
An ANOVA test was conducted for the recorded responses to how much the issue of 
security from terrorism occupies the mind, i.e., to the level of awareness of the subject 
(Question 1.5 in the questionnaire; see screenshots in Appendix A for exact wording). 
Before performing the Analysis of Variance test, descriptive statistics were reviewed 
(see Appendix B, Table B-4) and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research 
design were examined. Independence within and between groups was assumed. 
Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of how much the 
issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind resulted in a statistical significant 
result, F(15, 346)=1.71, p<.05. To deal with this violation of the underlying assumption 
of the ANOVA, a more stringent alpha was set (α=.03).  
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Results of the ANOVA test shown in Table 5.7, demonstrate two significant 
main effects and one significant interaction.  
 
 





















Facade design .01 1 .01 .00 .956 .000 
Level of terrorism threat 219.72 1 219.72 135.98 .000 .282 
Society 9.37 1 9.37 5.80 .017 .016 
Building-use .62 1 .62 .38 .537 .001 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat .00 1 .00 .00 .988 .000 
Façade design * Society .00 1 .00 .00 .971 .000 
Level of terrorism threat * Society .02 1 .02 .10 .914 .000 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society .18 1 .18 .11 .742 .000 
Façade design * Building-use .24 1 .24 .15 .703 .000 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use 1.04 1 1.04 .64 .423 .002 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * 
sBuilding-use .14 1 .14 .09 .769 .000 
Society * Building-use 8.23 1 8.23 5.09 .025 .015 
Façade design * Society * Building-use 3.37 1 3.37 2.08 .150 .006 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 1.24 1 1.24 .77 .381 .002 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society 
* Building-use 5.01 1 5.01 3.10 .079 .009 
Error 559.05    346  1.62     
Total 4245.00    362       
a  R Squared = .310 (Adjusted R Squared = .280) 




As hypothesized (hypothesis H-1.a), the analysis shows that across the two 
samples a significant effect, with the highest effect size (Partial η2=.28), on how much 
security from terrorism occupies the mind can be attributed to the manipulated level of 
terrorism threat, F(1, 361)=135.98, p<.01. The item was rated significantly higher when 
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the scenario described a high level of security alert (M=3.87) than when the scenario was 
of a peaceful circumstances (M=2.31).    
Another statistically significant main effect on how much security from terrorism 
occupies the mind is accredited to the society variable, F(1, 361)=5.80, p<.02, Partial 
η2=.02. This corroborates the second research hypothesis (H-1.b). The issue of security 
from terrorism was generally more on the minds of Israelis (M=3.27), which live under 
relatively high level of terrorism threat, than on the minds of Texans (M=2.93) that 
represent a society which is not experienced with the threat. 
Hypothesis H-1.c, which speaks of the moderating effect of society on how much 
the current level of terrorism threat elicits thoughts about terrorism, was not supported 
by the findings. The interaction between the variable of society and the variable of threat 
of terrorism did not produce a statistically significant result, F<1.00. This finding is 
similar to the one found in study 1. 
Hypothesis H-1.d, which states that society moderates the effect of a building-use 
on how much security from terrorism occupies the mind, was supported by a statistically 
significant interaction of the two variables, F(1, 361)=5.09, p<.03, Partial η2=.02. This 
finding is also similar to the results of the first study. 
The two additional ANOVA tests that were conducted for each of the building-
uses further support the specific assumption detailed in hypothesis H-1.d. As illustrated 
in Figure 5.4, the two samples were similar in their ratings of a city hall, M=3.01 for 
Texans, and M=3.06 for Israelis, F(1, 181)<1.00. The ratings proved to be significantly 
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mall function, Israelis had security from terrorism much more on their mind, M=3.46, 
than Texans, M=2.85. In addition, the results show that while in Texas a city hall elicited 
higher ratings for how much security from terrorism is on the respondents’ mind than a 
shopping mall, in Israel, it was the opposite. These findings in this stage of the study, in 
which visuals of buildings were presented to participants, replicate the ones found in 
study 1, which was only based on written descriptions with only a mention of a building-





FIGURE 5.4. Study 2: Interaction of building-use and society in the ratings of how much the issue of security from terrorism 
occupies the mind. 
 
 
With respect to the variable of glass-solid ratio in the design of the façade, the 
results show no main effect on the awareness of security from terrorism, F(1, 361)<1.00. 
Hence, hypothesis H.2-a was not supported.  
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5.3.3.1.2  Findings on the Sense of Security 
 
Pearson’s correlation test was conducted on the responses to the questions of how 
dangerous participants perceive the situation to be (Question 2 in the questionnaire, 
Appendix A), and how safe they would feel entering the building (Question 3 in the 
questionnaire, Appendix A). This test was performed to assess whether responses to 
these two measures can collectively inform about the overall personal sense of security. 
The test found a significant -.65 correlation (r) between the two indicators (p<.01). Due 
to this finding, responses to the two questions were recoded into one variable. The new 
value to indicate a participant’s sense of security equaled the average score of the 
answers to the two questions (calculated with the reverse value to the answers for the 
question of how safe they feel). Consequently, this value ranged between 1 and 5 — a 
score of 1 indicating a secure feeling and 5 corresponding with a high sense of 
insecurity. 
An ANOVA test was performed on the new calculated value of the sense of 
security/insecurity. Before performing the Analysis of Variance test, descriptive 
statistics were reviewed (see Appendix B, Table B-3) and statistical assumptions for a 
fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and between groups 
was assumed. Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of 
how much the issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind resulted in a statistical 
significant result, F(15,346)=2.02, p<.05. To deal with this violation of the underlying 
assumption of the ANOVA, a more stringent alpha was set (α=.03). 
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The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5.8, demonstrate two statistically 
























Facade design .03 1 .03 .05 .818 .000 
Level of terrorism threat 115.18 1 115.18 213.08 .000 .382 
Society 6.49 1 6.49 12.00 .001 .034 
Building-use 1.37 1 1.37 2.53 .113 .007 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat 2.60 1 2.60 4.81 .029 .014 
Façade design * Society 1.62 1 1.62 2.99 .085 .009 
Level of terrorism threat * Society .49 1 .49 .91 .341 .003 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society 1.19 1 1.185 2.19 .140 .006 
Façade design * Building-use .65 1 .65 1.21 .272 .003 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .13 1 .13 .24 .626 .001 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * 
Building-use 1.06 1 1.06 1.95 .163 .006 
Society * Building-use 5.54 1 5.54 10.25 .001 .029 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .39 1 .39 .71 .399 .002 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 3.94 1 3.94 7.28 .007 .021 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society 
* Building-use .34 1 .34 .64 .426 .002 












a  R Squared = .427 (Adjusted R Squared = .402) 




The two exhibited significant main effects are attributed to two “distal” level 
variables: The current level of terrorism threat and the society (i.e., societal-security-
context). These main effects correspond with the first two hypotheses of the conceptual 
framework. As hypothesized in H-1.a, overall, all the participants (in both societies) 
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exhibited greater insecurity when terrorism was a major threat (M=3.09), than when 
terrorism was not a threat (M=1.97), F(1, 361)=213.08, p<.01. The threat of terrorism 
had a considerably higher effect size than all the other effects, Partial η2=.38. 
Supporting Hypothesis H-1.b, Israelis demonstrated significantly greater feeling of 
insecurity (M=2.68) than Texans (M=2.39), F(1, 361)=16.27, p<.01, Partial η2=.03, 
regardless of level of threat or building-use.  
The interaction of the variable of terrorism threat with the variable of society was 
not found to be statistically significant, p>.05. Hence, hypothesis H-1.c, which proclaims 
that people who are not used to the threat are more affected by the current threat level 
than people from a society that is used to the threat, was not supported by the findings. 
Two of the statistically significant interactions include only variables of the 
“distal” level. These interactions do not include the architectural variable (i.e., the 
manipulated design of the façade) and hence refer to the first set of the conceptual 
framework’s hypotheses as well.    
The test of the interaction between building-use and society yielded F(1, 
361)=10.25, p<.01,  Partial η2=.03. This result shows a trend similar to the statistically 
significant interaction in the question of how much security from terrorism occupies the 
mind. Additional ANOVA tests specific for each building-use, further support 
hypothesis H-1.d which speaks of the moderating effect of society on how building-use 
influences the sense of security/insecurity. As illustrated in Figure 5.5, the difference 
between the samples from the two societies in the ratings of sense of insecurity with 
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(M=2.43 for Texas, vs. M=2.49 for Israel). In the case of a shopping mall, Israelis 
exhibited significantly greater sense of insecurity (M=2.87) than Texans (M=2.34), F(1, 
181)=14.09, p<.01. In addition, the Texans sense of security/insecurity was relatively 
similar with regards to the two building-uses, and only somewhat less secure when 
presented with a city hall than when presented with a mall. Israelis exhibited bigger 
difference in their level of insecurity as associated with the two buildings, and felt less 
secure when presented with a shopping mall, than when presented with a city hall. This 
result at this stage of the research, in which architectural solutions were shown to 
participants, again replicates the findings from the first study that did not include visual 
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The other interaction that pertains to the “distal” level, include all three variables: 
Current level of terrorism threat, societal-security-context (society), and building-use, 
F(1, 361)=7.28, p<.01, Partial η2=.02. As illustrated in Figure 5.6, the difference 
between the societies in the sense of insecurity as associated with a shopping mall, 
which speaks of a higher sense of insecurity among the Israeli sample than the Texan 
sample, was accentuated when the level of terrorism threat was high (M=3.56 for the 
Israeli sample and M=2.75 for the Texan sample). When there was no threat of terrorism, 
this difference was attenuated. For a city hall, when presented with a high level of 
terrorism threat, Texan’s (M=3.10) felt less secure than Israelis (M=3.00), while when 
there was no threat of terrorism, the Israeli participants (M=2.00) felt less secure than 










FIGURE 5.6. Study 2: Interaction of building-use, society and current level of terrorism threat in the overall sense of 
security/insecurity. 
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The influence of the architectural variable (i.e., the glass-solid ratio in the façade 
design) on people’s general sense of security/insecurity is exhibited in one statistically 
significant interaction, with a low effect size, Partial η2=.01. 
The statistically significant interaction of the glass-solid ratio in the façade 
design is with the variable of current level of terrorism threat (Figure 5.7), F(1, 
361)=4.81, p<.03. This interaction shows that under high level of terrorism threat, 
participants felt less secure when the façade was all glass (M=3.18) than when it was of 
solid concrete (M=3.00). In the context of no terrorism threat, on the other hand, the 
results show the reverse influence of the façade design on sense of security: participants 
felt a bit less secure when presented with a solid façade (M=2.02) than when shown a 











Though the first hypothesis of the second set of hypotheses, concerning the effect 
of the glass-solid ratio on the sense of security (H-2.a), was not supported by a 
statistically significant main effect, the above interaction does show a tendency which 
supports part of it: Respondents felt somewhat safer confronted with a solid façade than 
with a glass façade when the scenario described a high level of terrorism threat. In 
addition, these findings support the general claim in hypothesis H-2.b, which states that 
the effect of the glass-solid ratio in the design of the façade on people’s sense of security 
is moderated by the current level of terrorism threat. The details of the hypothesis, speak 
about the current level of terrorism threat as accentuating or attenuating the hypothesized 
main effect of the façade design. Since the façade design did not create a statistically 
significant main effect on the overall sense of security, the finer details of H-2.b were 
not supported.  
 
5.3.3.1.3  Findings on the State of Anxiety 
     
The handling of the responses to the twenty statements from the State Anxiety Inventory 
followed the established procedure for evaluating it. As indicated in the methodology 
chapter, material and procedure section, every statement was rated on a 4 point scale (1 
“not at all” to 4 “very much so”). Responses to the statements that portrayed a positive 
state of mind were recoded into a reversed scale. The sum of all the answers to the 
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twenty statements was the final score to portray the participant’s state of anxiety. Thus, 
these final scores ranged from 20 to 80; 80 being the highest level of anxiety.  
Prior to the analyses of the total score of the state of anxiety, two tests were 
conducted, one for each of the two samples, to assess the reliability of the index. This 
statistic examination of the twenty items resulted in high reliability scores: Cronbach’s 
Alpha of .96 in the Texan sample and of .72 in the Israeli sample. 
An ANOVA test examined the effects of the independent variables on the total 
score of the state of anxiety. Before performing the ANOVA test, descriptive statistics 
were reviewed (see Table B-6 in Appendix B) and statistical assumptions for a fixed 
effect research design were examined. Independence within and between groups was 
assumed. Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of how 
much the issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind resulted in a statistical 
significant result, F(15,346)=7.01, p<.01. To deal with this violation of the underlying 
assumption of the ANOVA, a more stringent alpha was set (α=.03). 
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Facade design .04  1 .04  .00 .982 .000 
Level of terrorism threat 8070.73 1 8070.73 95.98 .000 .217 
Society 3773.99 1 3773.99 44.88 .000 .115 
Building-use 14.96 1 14.96 .18 .673 .001 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat 68.32 1 68.32 .81 .368 .002 
Façade design * Society 14.66 1 14.66 .17 .677 .001 
Level of terrorism threat * Society 3574.90 1 3574.90 42.51 .000 .109 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society .56 1 .56 .01 .935 .000 
Façade design * Building-use 530.63 1 530.63 6.31 .012 .018 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use 99.47 1 99.47 1.18 .278 .003 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * 
Building-use 90.58 1 90.58 1.08 .300 .003 
Society * Building-use 22.13 1 22.13 .26 .608 .001 
Façade design * Society * Building-use 768.09 1 768.09 9.13 .003 .026 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 79.11 1 79.11 .94 .333 .003 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society 
* Building-use 90.95 1 90.95 1.08 .299 .003 
Error 29094.57 346 84.09   
Total 752074.00 362 752074.00   
 
a  R Squared = .388 (Adjusted R Squared = .361) 
      
 
 
The ANOVA test resulted in two statistically significant main effects and three 
interactions (Table 5.9). As in the analyses of the two previous indicators of people’s 
responses to scenarios (i.e., how much security from terrorism occupies the mind, 
detailed in section 5.3.3.1.1, and the general sense of security, detailed in section. 
5.3.3.1.2), the two main effects on the total score of anxiety were of the manipulated 
level of terrorism threat and of the societal-security-context. With regards to the level of 
threat of terrorism, as hypothesized in H-1.a, all participants exhibited higher level of 
anxiety when presented with a scenario of high level of terrorism threat (M=49.18) than 
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when terrorism was not a threat (M=39.16), F(1, 361)=8070.73, p<.01, Partial η2=.22. 
In relation to the main effect of the variable of society, the Israeli participants reported 
significantly higher level of anxiety than the Texan participants [M=47.81 for Israelis vs. 
M=41.13 for Texans, F(1, 361)=3773.99, p<.01, Partial η2=.12]. This result supports 
hypothesis H-1.b (see section 4.2.2.3).  
One statistically significant interaction was of the level of terrorism threat with 
the society variable, F(1, 361)=3574.90, p<.01, Partial η2=.11. As illustrated in Figure 
5.8, the difference between the Israeli sample and the Texan sample in the level of 
anxiety was relatively small considering a high level of terrorism threat (M=49.00 for 
Texans and M=49.40 for Israelis) while in the case of no threat of terrorism, the anxiety 
state of the Israeli sample was considerably higher than of Texans (M=46.26 vs. 
M=33.41). This trend supports hypothesis H-1.c, which claims that people’s security 
related responses to current level of terrorism threat are moderated by the societal-
security- in which they live.   
No statistically significant interaction was found between the variables of 
building-use and the societal-security-context, F(1,361)<1. Consequently, hypothesis H-
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FIGURE 5.8. Study 2: Interaction of level of terrorism threat and society in the reported anxiety state. 
 
 
Hypothesis H-2.d that relates anxiety level to an interaction of façade design and 
current level of terrorism threat was not supported by the findings as well, F(1,361)<1.  
Two statistically significant interactions that relate to the architectural variable of 
glass-solid ratio in the façade design, provide insight beyond the specific hypotheses of 
the research. One interaction is only with the building-use variable, and the other is with 
the building-use variable and the society (i.e., societal-security-context) variable.     
The significant interaction between façade design and building-use 
[F(1,361)=6.31, p<.02, Partial η2=.02], shown in Figure 5.9 shows that, overall, 
participants were more anxious seeing a glass façade (M=45.41) than a solid façade 
when it belonged to a city hall (M=42.96). When participant were presented with a 
shopping mall building, they reported higher anxiety when confronted with a solid 
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FIGURE 5.9. Study 2: Interaction of façade design and building-use in the self reported anxiety state. 
 
 
The third significant statistical interaction, F(1,361)=9.13, p<.01, Partial η2=.03, 
further qualifies the previous one, by differentiating between the samples from the two 
societies in terms of how façade design and building-use influence the state of anxiety. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.10, the self reported anxiety level in the Texan sample follows 
the pattern that was indicated by the previous interaction. This means that in the case of 
a city hall, participants were more anxious when viewing a glass façade (M=43.56) than 
a solid, concrete façade (M=39.16). And in the case of a shopping mall, Texan 
participants were more anxious when exposed to a solid façade (M=43.77) than to a 
glass façade (M=38.23). On the other hand, the reported anxiety level at the Israeli 
sample, wasn’t affected much by the either the building-use or the façade design (M 

























































FIGURE 5.10. Study 2: Interaction of façade design, building-use, and society in the self reported anxiety state. 
 
 
5.3.3.1.4  Findings on the Propensity to Enter/Avoid the Building 
 
Pearson’s correlation tests were conducted on every two of the three questions that were 
to collectively inform about the respondents’ propensity to enter the building. All three 
tests resulted in statistically significant correlations: (1) r =-.41, p<.01, for the rated 
reservations about going to the facility and the rated likelihood to enter the building;     
(2) r =.64, p<.01, for the rated reservations about going to the facility and whether they 
prefers to meet the friend at a different location; and (3) r =-.50, p<.01, for the rated 








Following these findings, responses to the three questions were recoded into one 
variable. The new value to indicate a participant’s propensity to use the building equaled 
the average score of the answers to the three questions (calculated with the reverse value 
to the answers for the question of how likely they are to enter the building). 
Consequently, this value ranged between 1 and 5 — a score of 1 indicating an 
inclination to use the building and 5 corresponding with a propensity to avoid the 
building. 
An ANOVA (α = .05) test was performed on the new calculated value of the 
propensity to avoid/enter the building. Before performing the Analysis of Variance test, 
descriptive statistics were reviewed (see Table B-7, Appendix B) and statistical 
assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and 
between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) to assess 
homogeneity of variance resulted in insignificant findings, F(15,346)=1.25, p>.05. 
The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5.10, demonstrate one 
statistically significant main effect and three statistically significant interactions with 
regards to participants’ propensity to avoid/enter the building.  
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Facade design 2.50  1 2.50  3.68 .056 .011 
Level of terrorism threat 53.31  1 53.31  78.57 .000 .185 
Society .25 1 .25 .37 .544 .001 
Building-use .00 1 .00 .00 .956 .000 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat 3.85 1 3.85 5.68 .018 .016 
Façade design * Society .09 1 .09 .14 .711 .000 
Level of terrorism threat * Society .74 1 .74 1.09 .298 .003 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society .01 1 .01 .02 .890 .000 
Façade design * Building-use .76 1 .76 1.13 .290 .003 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use 1.28 1 1.28 1.89 .170 .005 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * 
Building-use .08 1 .08 .12 .735 .000 
Society * Building-use 3.01 1 3.01 4.44 .036 .013 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .17 1 .17 .25 .619 .001 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 3.48 1 3.48 5.13 .024 .015 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society 
* Building-use .11 1 .11 .17 .683 .000 
Error 234.75 346 .68    
Total 2385.78 362 2385.78    
a  R Squared = .221 (Adjusted R Squared = .187) 
      
 
 
With regard to the research’s first set of hypotheses that relate to the “distal” 
level variables, the only main effect on the propensity to avoid/enter a building was of 
the current level of terrorism threat, F(1, 361)=78.57, p<.01. This main effect, which had 
the greatest effect size compared to the other independent variables on the propensity to 
enter/avoid a building, Partial η2=.19, corresponds with H-1.a. Overall, all the 
participants (in both societies) exhibited greater tendency to avoid entering both 
building-uses when terrorism was a major threat (M=2.78), than when terrorism was not 
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difference between the societies in people’s propensity to enter a building; nor did it 
support hypothesis H-1.c that assumed an interaction between the variables of current 
level of terrorism threat and society. 
Two statistically significant interactions were found with regards to variables of 
the “distal” level. One was between the societal-security-context and the building-use 
factor, F(1,361)=4.44, p<.04, Partial η2=.01. Figure 5.11 shows that in the case of a city 
hall, the Texan participants exhibited greater tendency to avoid the building (M=2.50) 
than the Israelis participants (M=2.28). In the case of a shopping mall, it was the 
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The additional statistically significant interaction of the “distal” level, further 
qualifies the findings of the first one. This interaction adds to the society and building-
use interaction a distinction between the two tested levels of current terrorism threat, 
F(1,361)=5.13, p<.03, Partial η2=.02. As illustrated in Figure 5.12, in high level of 
terrorism threat the propensity to avoid the building followed the pattern that was 
outlined in the first interaction. I.e., in the case of a city hall – the Texan sample 
(M=2.88) tended to avoid it more than Israeli sample (M=2.55), and in the case of a 
shopping mall – Israelis (M=3.06) tended to avoid it more than Texans (M=2.54). 
However, in the scenarios of no terrorism threat, for both building-uses, Texans (M=2.15 
for city hall, M=2.04 for a shopping mall) tended to avoid them more than Israelis 









FIGURE 5.12. Study 2: Interaction of building-use, society and current level of terrorism threat in the propensity to avoid/enter a 
building. 






These results support the basic premises in hypotheses H-1.c and H-1.d, as they 
corroborate that people’s action propensity is influenced by the societal-security-context 
and is interlinked to the current level of terrorism threat (H-1.c) and to the factor of 
building-use (H-1.d). However, the majority of the details of the hypotheses was not 
supported, and was further qualified by the findings.  
More specifically, hypothesis H-1.c assumed that the fluctuations in a person’s 
willingness to enter a building due to changes in the current level of threat is greater in a 
society that is not accustomed to live under high level of terrorism threat (e.g., Texas), 
than in a society that usually lives with high level of threat (e.g., Israel). The results per 
building-use show an opposite trend regarding a shopping mall building for which the 
variation in the Israelis’ propensity to enter/avoid a building (from M=3.06 in high level 
of terrorism threat to M=1.88 in low level of terrorism threat) was much greater than the 
Texans’ (from M=2.54 in high level of terrorism threat to M=2.04 in low level of 
terrorism threat). With respect to the city hall function – the variation in the tendency to 
avoid the building was only slightly bigger at the Texans’ sample (from M=2.88 in high 
level of terrorism threat to M=2.15 in low level of terrorism threat) than the Israeli (from 
M=2.55 in high level of terrorism threat to M=2.02 in low level of terrorism threat).  
In addition, hypothesis H-1.d assumed that a city hall would trigger a similar 
inclination to enter/avoid the building in Texas and Israel. A shopping-mall, according to 
hypothesis H-1.d should be avoided more by Israelis than by Texans. The latter 
assumption regarding a shopping mall function was only confirmed in the case of high 
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Building
terrorism threat, the Texan participants reported greater propensity to avoid the building 
(M=2.04) than the Israeli participants (M=1.88). The assumption concerning a city hall 
was not confirmed at all, as across the two levels of terrorism threat, the Texan sample 
exhibited higher inclination to avoid the building than the Israeli sample (M=2.50 in 
Texas, and M=2.28 in Israel).  
With regards to the influence of the architectural variable of glass-solid ratio in 
the façade design on people’s propensity to avoid/enter the building, the ANOVA test 
found a statistically significant interaction with the variables of society (i.e., societal-
security-context) and current level of terrorism threat, F(1,361)=5.68, p<.02, Partial 
η2=.02. The interaction, illustrated in Figure 5.13, shows that participants were more 
inclined to avoid buildings with glass façade (M=2.97) than with solid façade (M=2.61) 
only in the case of high level of terrorism threat. When presented with scenario of no 
terrorism threat, participants responded similarly to a building with a glass façade 
(M=2.00) and a building with a solid façade (M=2.05).     




FIGURE 5.13. Study 2: Interaction of façade design and level of terrorism threat in the propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
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5.3.3.2  Results on the Linkages among the Dependent Variables in the Study 
 
In order to further examine the connections between the dependent variables of the 
conceptual framework, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was conducted 




TABLE 5.11. Study 2: Results of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, in each of the societies.  
 
 
Sense of insecurity 
 
State of anxiety  
 
Propensity to avoid the 
building  
 
 Texas Israel Texas Israel Texas Israel 
Awareness of security from terrorism .45 .64 .39 .33 .36 .49 
Sense of insecurity   .71 .50 .68 .69 
State of anxiety     .66 .50 
Propensity to avoid the building       
a  All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 






For each of the samples, as detailed in Table 5.11, all the calculated Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients, between any two dependent variables, showed 
significant correlation at the significance level of p<.01. For the Texas sample, the 
highest correlations, r = .66, .68, .71, were found among the three dependent variables of 
sense of security, the state of anxiety and the propensity to avoid the building. For the 
Israeli sample, the highest correlations, r = .64, .69, were found between how much 
security from terrorism was on their mind (i.e., awareness of security from terrorism) 
and the sense of insecurity, and between the sense of insecurity and the propensity to 
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avoid the building. Correlations of the state of anxiety with all three other dependent 
variables were consistently lower at the Israeli sample than in the case of the Texan 
sample.   
The results of the correlation coefficient tests show that a similar, high 
correlation, in both societies was between the sense of insecurity and the propensity to 
avoid the building, r = .68 in the Texan sample, and r = .69 in the Israeli sample. This 
finding partially contradict hypothesis H-2.e, which speaks of a difference between a 
society that is accustomed to the threat, and a society that is not accustomed to the threat 
in the way their actions correspond with their feelings. Hypothesis H-2.e assumes that 
people which are not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to follow their 
sense of security (as affected by the glass-solid ratio in the façade design and the current 
level of threat) with actions, while people who are accustomed to the threat of terrorism 
(e.g., Israelis) tend to use buildings regardless of their feeling of security. While the 
results of the correlation coefficient test support the hypothesis assumption about the 
Texan sample, it seems that it casts doubt on the hypothesis about the Israelis.  
With that in mind, we have to consider the fact that Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient as a statistical test tells about a general tendency in the 
relationship between two variables. However, it does not speak of the actual values for 
each variable. A high correlation between two variables can exist even if one variable 
has low values and the other receives high values, as long as they change 
correspondingly.  
 214
For that reason, and in order to further examine hypothesis H-2.e, repeated 
measures ANOVA test was performed. The two dependent variables of the sense of 
insecurity and the propensity to avoid the building were defined as the within subject 
factor. This test, allowed to compare the mean ratings for these dependent variables, as 
affected by the independent variables. This examination was made possible with the 
available data, as the measurement for both dependent variables ranged on a similar 5 
point scale. As detailed in Table 5.12, the test of the within-subjects contrasts resulted in 



























Within factor * Façade design .91 1 .91 3.62 .058 .010 
Within factor * Level of terrorism threat 5.72 1 5.72 22.87 .000 .062 
Within factor * Society 4.83 1 4.83 19.32 .000 .053 
Within factor *Building-use .66 1 .66 2.65 .104 .008 
Within factor * Façade design * Level of terrorism 
threat .84 1 .84 .34 .563 .001 
Within factor * Façade design * Society 1.15 1 1.15 4.58 .033 .013 
Within factor * Level of terrorism threat * Society .02 1 .02 .10 .757 .000 
Within factor * Façade design * Level of terrorism 
threat * Society .42 1 .42 1.66 .198 .005 
Within factor * Façade design * Building-use 1.969E-07 1 1.969E-07 .00 .999 .000 
Within factor * Level of terrorism threat * 
Building-use 1.02 1 1.02 4.06 .045 .012 
Within factor * Facade design * Level of terrorism 
threat * Building-use .24 1 .24 .94 .333 .003 
Within factor * Society * Building-use .16 1 .16 .63 .430 .002 
Within factor * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use .01 1 .01 .04 .833 .000 
Within factor * Level of terrorism threat * Society 
* Building-use .02 1 .02 .07 .793 .000 
Within factor * Façade design * Level of terrorism 
threat * Society * Building-use .37 1 .37 1.48 .225 .004 
Error (Within factor) 86.31 345 .25    





















High Level of Threat No Threat
Current level of terrorism threat
Mean Ratings
One of the statistically significant interactions of the within-subject factor was 
with the level of terrorism threat, F(1,345)=22.87, p<.01, Partial η2=.06. This finding, 
illustrated in Figure 5.14, shows that when exposed to scenario of high level of terrorism 
threat, participants’ ratings of insecurity were indeed higher, M=3.09, than their 
propensity to avoid a building, M=2.78. However, in the case of no threat of terrorism, 
the reported level of insecurity and the propensity to avoid the building were about the 











FIGURE 5.14. Study 2: Interaction of current level of terrorism threat and the within factor, which included ratings of the sense 
insecurity/security and the propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
 
 
Another statistically significant interaction of the within factor was with the 
current level of terrorism threat and the building-use variables, F(1,345)=4.06, p<.05, 








































City Hall Shopping Mall
level of terrorism threat, the propensity to avoid the building was rated lower than the 
sense of insecurity for both a city hall as well as for a shopping mall. However, in the 
case of no terrorism threat, while in a shopping mall, the ratings of the two dependent 
variables were similar (M=2.04 for sense of insecurity and M=1.97 for the propensity to 
avoid the building), in the case of city hall, people’s ratings of the propensity to avoid 









FIGURE 5.15. Study 2: Interaction of current level of terrorism threat, building-use and the within factor, which included ratings of 
the sense insecurity/security and the propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
 
 
Other interesting statistically significant interactions of the within factor were 
with the society variable, the glass-solid ratio in the façade design, as well as an 
interaction of all three factors.   



























The interaction with the society variable (i.e., societal-security-context), 
F(1,345)=19.32, p<.01, Partial η2=.05, exhibited in Figure 5.16, shows that in Texas the 
ratings of insecurity and the ratings for the propensity to avoid the building were similar 
(M=2.39 for sense of insecurity and M=2.42 for the propensity to avoid the building). In 
Israel, the propensity to avoid a building (M=2.37) was lower than the rated sense of 







FIGURE 5.16. Study 2: Interaction of society and the within factor, which included ratings of the sense insecurity/security and the 
propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 illustrates the three-way interaction of the within-subject factor, the 
façade design and the society. This statistically significant interaction, F(1,345)=4.58, 
p<.04, Partial η2=.01, shows that in Texas there was no difference between the ratings 
of insecurity and the propensity to avoid the building, regardless of the façade design. In 










































the building, was much greater regarding a solid façade than in the case of an all-glass 
façade. In other words, in Israel respondents were inclined to enter a building of solid 
façade, even though they were afraid, and in glass façade their tendency to enter the 










FIGURE 5.17. Study 2: Interaction of façade design, society and the within factor, which included ratings of the sense 
insecurity/security and the propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
 
 
5.3.3.3  Results of the Additional Questions about the Security in the Building  
 
To achieve a better understanding of how the visual architectural variables affect the 
participants’ perception of the security of buildings, three more ANOVA tests (for α 
=.05) were performed on each of the last three additional questions (questions 8, 9 and 







building; whether the design triggers thoughts about terrorism; and how effective is the 
design in deterring terrorists.  
 For each ANOVA test, descriptive statistics were reviewed and statistical 
assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and 
between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) was used to 
assess homogeneity of variance.  
Among the three ANOVA tests, only one resulted in significant findings that 
relate to the architectural variable of façade design (see Appendix B for descriptive 
statistics of the responses to all three questions and the results of between-groups 
ANOVA tests). The findings relate to the question of how effective is the design to deter 
terrorists (question 10 in Appendix A). In the responses to this question, a statistically 
significant main effect was attributed to the façade design, F(1,361)=24.04, p<.01. Solid 
façade was rated as more effective than glass in deterring terrorists (M=2.96 for solid 
façade, M=3.39 for glass façade, on a scale of 1, very effective to 5 very ineffective).  
The analysis also shows a statistically significant interaction of the façade design 
with the variable of society (i.e., societal-security-context), F(1,361)=4.14, p<.05. This 
interaction (Figure 5.18) shows that while samples from both societies perceived 
similarly the effectiveness of a solid façade in deterring terrorists (M=2.96 in both 
samples), they were different in their perception of the effectiveness of a glass façade. 
Texans rated glass façade as more effective in deterring terrorists than Israelis did 
(M=3.22 in the Texan sample, M=3.59 in the Israeli sample, on a scale of 1 very 
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5.3.4  Conclusion   
 
This stage of the study tested the effects of variations in the glass-solid ratio in the 
façade design, variations in the level of terrorism threat, two different building-uses, in 
two societies, on how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the person’s mind, 
how safe the person feels, how anxious he/she is and his/her tendency to use the 
building. As such, this stage addressed the first and the second set of the research 
hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses refers to the effects of only the “distal level” 
variables — current level of terrorism threat, societal-security-context and building-use 
— on people’s range of reactions. The second set of hypotheses addresses how people 
are impacted by the architectural variable of the glass-solid ratio in the façade design 
(from the “proximate level”), and a combination of it with the “distal level” variables. 
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The following summary of the findings of this stage of the study is organized according 
to the research hypotheses.  
 The findings fully support hypothesis H-1.a, as variation in terrorism threat had 
statistically significant main effects on participants’ responses along the four dependent 
variables that were tested. Scenarios which described high level of terrorism threat 
elicited higher scores than the scenarios in which terrorism was not a threat in how much 
security from terrorism was on the respondents’ mind, the respondents’ sense of 
insecurity, their level of anxiety, and their tendency to avoid the building. As in the first 
study, these findings also validate the treatments used for manipulating the level of 
terrorism threat.  
Moreover, looking at the effect sizes of these main effects, we find that the 
variation of the current level of terrorism threat had much greater effects on all levels of 
people’s responses, compared to the effects of the other independent variables. The 
effect sizes (Partial η2) of the current level of terrorism threat ranged from .38 on the 
sense of security, to .28 on the awareness of security from terrorism, .22 on the state of 
anxiety, to .19 on the propensity to enter.  
Similar to the results of the first study, statistically significant overall differences 
between samples, across all manipulated scenarios, were obtained along the first three 
dependent variables of the conceptual model. The Israeli participants had security from 
terrorism on their mind more than participants from Texas, and felt less safe and more 
anxious than the Texans. Among these three main effects of the societal-security-
context, the greatest effect size was on the state of anxiety (Partial η2=.11). These 
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findings corroborate most of hypothesis H-1.b. The part in the hypothesis regarding a 
difference between the societies in the propensity to avoid/enter a building was not 
supported by the findings, as there was no statistically significant difference (main-
effect) between the societies in their responses. 
Hypothesis H-1.c, which speaks of the moderating effect of the societal-security-
context (i.e., society) on responses to variations in the current level of terrorism threat, 
was only supported in the findings with regards to the reported level of anxiety. The 
findings show that while the variations in treatment of level of terrorism threat produced 
a large difference in the level of anxiety of the Texan sample, Israeli participants were 
less sensitive to the change in the threat level. This was strengthened with the finding 
that correlations of the state of anxiety with the other three dimensions of responses were 
consistently lower at the Israeli sample than in the case of the Texan sample. This may 
illustrate that the anxiety level of a person that is conditioned to live in a high level of 
terrorism threat is less influenced by a reduction in the level of threat, while a person that 
is not used to live under the threat of terrorism exhibits a higher sensitivity to changes of 
threat.   
Hypothesis H-1.d which speaks of differences in the four dimensions of 
responses between societies as related to the specific building-uses was partially 
supported by the findings. For the Israeli participants, a shopping mall elicited more 
thoughts about terrorism threat, and caused a greater sense of insecurity, than a city hall. 
For the Texan sample the effect was reversed. In addition, while the two samples were 
similar in their responses to the city hall, they were very different in their responses to a 
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shopping mall. Unlike the first study, this tendency was not expressed at the anxiety 
level. With respect to the propensity to avoid/enter a building, the general tendency 
within each society corresponds with the ratings of the awareness of security from 
terrorism and the overall sense of security: Israelis tended to avoid more a shopping 
mall, while Texans tended to avoid more a city hall. In addition, in the case of a 
shopping mall—Israelis tended to avoid it more than Texans, and in the case of a city 
hall—it was the opposite. An additional correlation between the propensity to enter a 
building and the threat level indicates that the latter tendency occurred in high level of 
terrorism. However, in low level of terrorism, for both building uses, the Texan 
participants were less inclined to use them than the Israelis. 
With respect to the second set of hypotheses that relates to the influence of the 
architectural variable on the four dimensions of people’s responses, the examination 
resulted with the following. 
The findings do not support a statistically significant main effect of the variable 
of façade design on any of the four dimensions of people’s responses. This disagrees 
with the general notion of Hypothesis H-2.a, which claims that the glass-solid ratio in 
the façade design has a main effect on the awareness of security from terrorism and the 
sense of security. The hypothesis speaks about a different effect regarding the two 
dimensions of responses. The hypothesis states that when confronted with a building of 
solid facade, people tend to have security from terrorism more on their minds at the 
same time that they feel safer than when confronted with a building of extensive window 
area.  
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The findings did not show any significant effects of the façade design on 
awareness of security (how much it was on the mind). However, a statistically 
significant interaction of the variables of façade design and current level of terrorism 
threat was found in regards to the sense of security, and hence supports part of 
hypothesis H-2.b. Though, it should be noted that the effect size of this interaction was 
very low (Partial η2=.01). In high level of terrorism threat, a solid façade created a 
greater sense of security than a glass facade. In the case of no terrorism threat, a glass 
façade elicited a higher sense of security than a solid facade for both samples and across 
building-uses. 
The findings that in high level of terrorism threat solid façade created a greater 
sense of security than a glass facade goes along with the additional finding according to 
which all participants rated solid façade as more effective than glass in deterring 
terrorists. 
For hypothesis H-2.c, the findings do not support the claim that the effects of 
glass-solid ratio in the façade design on a person’s awareness of security from terrorism 
and a person’s sense of security are moderated by the societal-security-context. The 
findings do not indicate any difference between the societies in how the glass-solid ratio 
of the facades affected their awareness of security from terrorism or their sense of 
security.  
Hypothesis H-2.d, which proclaims that the effect of glass-solid ratio in the 
façade design on a person’s stress/anxiety level is influenced by the current level of 
terrorism threat, was not supported by the findings. However, other interactions of the 
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glass-solid ratio were found statistically significant in influencing the respondents’ state 
of anxiety. An interaction with the building-use and societal-security-context variables 
shows that in Texas, city hall elicited higher anxiety among participants when the façade 
of the building was all glass than when it was solid concrete. In the case of a shopping 
mall, solid façade elicited higher anxiety levels than a glass façade. In Israel, on the 
other hand, the anxiety level was not affected by façade design, or by building-use. This 
supports the conclusion that anxiety level of a person that is conditioned to live in a high 
level of terrorism threat is less sensitive to changes in the built environment 
(“distal”/”proximate”), while a person that is not used to live under the threat of 
terrorism exhibits a higher sensitivity to variations.   
Hypothesis H-2.e speaks of assumed differences between people that are not 
used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) and people who are used to the threat of 
terrorism in the connection of their action propensity (avoid/use the building) to their 
general sense of security. The hypothesis claims that Texans tend to follow their sense of 
security (as affected by the glass-solid ratio in the façade design, the building-use and 
the current level of threat) with actions, while Israelis tend to use buildings regardless of 
their feeling of security.  
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The initial, separate, examinations of each of the dimensions—of the sense of 
security and of the propensity to enter/avoid the building—show that across societies, 
the interaction of glass-solid ratio in the façade design and current level of terrorism 
threat, produced similar tendencies in the reported sense of security/insecurity and in the 
propensity to avoid/enter the building. Generally, in a high level of terrorism threat, all 
participants of both samples felt less secure and avoided more a building with glass 
façade compared to a building of solid façade. In scenarios of no terrorism threat, there 
was almost no difference between a glass and a solid façade in the respondents’ sense of 
security as well as in the respondents’ inclination to enter/avoid the building.  
In addition, with respect to the building-use variable, the tendency in each 
sample to feel less secure when confronted with one building-use and more secure with 
the other seemed to translate to their tendency to enter/avoid the buildings. In Israel, 
participants felt less secure confronted with a shopping mall than with a city hall, and 
tended to avoid a shopping mall more than a city hall. In Texas the attitude towards the 
two building-uses was opposite (though the differences between the building-uses were 
small for both dimensions).  
These finding, along with the fact that a high correlation, in both samples, was 
found between the sense of insecurity/security and the propensity to avoid/enter the 
building supports the claim in hypothesis H-2.e regarding the Texan sample, and seem to 
contradict the assumption regarding the Israeli sample.  
A direct comparison between the ratings of sense of insecurity/security and the 
propensity to avoid the building provided additional insight on the linkage between the 
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two dimensions of responses in the two societies. This analysis clearly indicates that in 
Texas, the participants’ ratings for the propensity to avoid a building went hand in hand 
with their sense of insecurity, regardless of the design of the façade or the current level 
of terrorism threat. In Israel, the propensity to avoid a building was constantly lower 
than the reported sense of insecurity, more so in respect to a solid façade than to a glass 
façade. This finding gives credence to hypothesis H-2.e and the claim that people who 
are not accustomed to live with the threat of terrorism, tend to follow their sense of 
security (as affected by the glass-solid ratio in the façade design and the current level of 
threat) with actions, while people who are used to the threat tend to use buildings 
regardless of their feeling of security.  
To summarize, the findings of this stage of the study provide credence to the 
research design that was employed in this case. The results confirm the findings from the 
first study on people’s responses to “distal” level variables, providing additional insight 
with regards to people’s behavioral disposition. In addition, the results validate the 
second part of the model, looking at a specific “proximate” level variable that influences 
a first impression of a building—the design of the façade. More specifically, focusing on 
the level of fortification vs. openness as represented in the façade design (i.e., glass-solid 
ratio) and its effects on human responses in the context of terrorism threat. This phase 
sets the stage for the third study that tests how people are affected by another variable 
that participates in a first encounter with a public building: the conspicuousness of the 
access control security measures in the overall architectural design of the entrance. 
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5.4  Study 3: Reactions to Entrance Design as Affected by Façade Design and 
Building-use, in Two Societies 
 
5.4.1  Objective and Hypotheses   
 
The third study added to the test the model’s second architectural variable: the 
conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the overall architectural 
design of the entrance (designed vs. temporary stationed machines). More specifically, 
this stage tested the effects of the conspicuousness of the access control security 
measures in the overall architectural design of the entrance (designed vs. temporary 
stationed machines) and the level of fortification/openness of the façade (glass-solid 
ratio), as related to two building-uses (shopping mall vs. city hall) on people of two 
societies of different exposure to the threat (Texas and Israel).  
The variation in the current level of terrorism threat was eliminated in this study, 
and all the experimental conditions were set to a high level of security alert from 
terrorism. In this study, as in the second study, all four of the dependent variables of the 
conceptual model were measured and analyzed: level of awareness of security from 
terrorism (i.e., how much security from terrorism is on the respondent’s mind), the 
respondent’s sense of security, the respondent’s level of anxiety, and the respondent’s 
propensity to enter the building.  
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The examination in this stage focused on the conceptual framework’s third set of 
hypotheses which addresses how the four dimensions of people’s responses are 
influenced by the new variable that was introduced in this examination: the 
conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the overall architectural 
design of the entrance. The examination also included hypotheses from the second and 
first sets, excluding the ones that address the variable of current level of terrorism, which 
was not tested in this study (see the detailed hypotheses in section 5.2.1 and 5.3.1).  
The following is the third set of hypotheses, focusing on the effects of the design 
of access control security measures on people’s security-related reactions. It should be 
noted that while the presented assumptions discuss the main effects that this variable has 
on the four dimensions of people’s reactions, it is expected that these effects are 
moderated by the “distal variables”. The statistical analyses of this study look to see 
what these interactions are, and whether there are additional interactions with the 
architectural variable of glass-solid ratio in the façade design. 
(H-3.a)  Having access control security measures at the entrance to a building 
(whether designed or as temporary stationed machines) increases people’s awareness of 
the issue of security from terrorism.  
(H-3.b) When confronted with conspicuous security measures that appear as 
temporary stationed machines people’s overall sense of security is reduced and their 
anxiety level is increased. Well-designed measures, which seem as part of the entrance, 
enhance the sense of security (i.e., reduce perceived risk and increase perception of 
personal safety) and reduce the level of anxiety.   
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(H-3.c)  People that are not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to 
follow their sense of security (as affected by the design of access control security 
measures and building-use) with actions, while people who are accustomed to the threat 
of terrorism (e.g., Israelis) tend to use buildings regardless of their sense of security.     
 
5.4.2  Research Design and Procedure   
 
The third study employed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups research design and was 
conducted utilizing a web-based computerized system. The study tested the effects of the 
conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the overall architectural 
design of the entrance (designed vs. temporary stationed machines), and the apparent 
level of fortification/openness of the façade of the building (all glass façade vs. solid 
façade) as related to two building-uses (city hall and shopping mall) on people of two 
different societies with different societal-security-contexts (Texas and Israel).  
All manipulated scenarios included a written description and two images. The 
written description in all the scenarios was of a high level of terrorism alert. From the 
two images, one showed the main façade of the building. The image depicted a facade 
that is mostly glass or a façade that is mostly concrete. The second image zoomed on the 
entrance to the building. This one presented an entrance in which the access control 
security measures are temporary stationed machines, or the same entrance with designed 
security measures that appear as part of the overall design.  
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The participants’ reactions were measured along the four dimensions outlined in 
the conceptual model: how much the issue of a terrorism threat is on the respondent’s 
mind (i.e., security awareness), the respondent’s overall sense of security, his/her level 
of anxiety and their inclination to use the building.  
A total of 399 undergraduate students participated in this examination (229 from 
Texas and 171 from Israel). Within each location, participants were randomly assigned 
to treatments. For a detailed description of the research design, procedure and material, 
please see the methodology chapter, section 4.3.2. 
 
5.4.3  Results   
 
The statistical analysis of the data included two stages. The first stage was conducted per 
dependent variable: how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the respondent’s 
mind, the respondent’s sense of security, his/her state of anxiety, and the respondent’s 
propensity to use the building. The second stage of analysis looked for connections 
among the dependent variables within the study.  
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5.4.3.1  Results per Dependent Variable  
 
5.4.3.1.1 Findings on the Level of Awareness of Security from Terrorism  
 
An ANOVA test (α=.05) was conducted for the recorded responses to how much the 
issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind, i.e., to the level of awareness of the 
subject (Question 1.5 in the questionnaire; see screenshots in Appendix A for exact 
wording). Before performing the Analysis of Variance test, descriptive statistics were 
reviewed (see Appendix B, Table B-14) and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect 
research design were examined. Independence within and between groups was assumed. 
Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of how much the 
issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind resulted in an insignificant result, 
F(15, 383)<1. Results of the ANOVA test shown in Table 5.13, demonstrate one 
significant main effect and two significant interactions, all with a low effect size.  
The analysis shows that across the two societies a significant effect on how much 
security from terrorism occupies the mind can be attributed to the societal-security-
context variable, F(1, 398)=4.83, p<.03, Partial η2=.01. This corroborates the research 
hypothesis H-1.b. The issue of security from terrorism was generally more on the minds 
of Israeli participants (M=3.58), which live under relatively high level of terrorism 
threat, than on the minds of Texan participants (M=3.31) that represent a society which 
is not experienced with the threat. 
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Entrance design 1.40 1 1.40 .84 .360 .002 
Facade design 3.66 1 3.66 2.19 .140 .006 
Society 8.09 1 8.09 4.83 .029 .012 
Building-use .00 1 .00 .00 .960 .000 
Entrance design * Façade design  .25 1 .25 .15 .702 .000 
Entrance design * Society 17.79 1 17.79 10.63 .001 .027 
Facade design * Society .28 1 .28 .17 .684 .000 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society 3.40 1 3.40 2.03 .155 .005 
Entrance design * Building-use 1.56 1 1.56 .93 .335 .002 
Façade design * Building-use .18 1 .18 .10 .747 .000 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use 1.65 1 1.65 .99 .321 .003 
Society * Building-use 6.89 1 6.89 4.12 .043 .011 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use .45 1 .45 .27 .606 .001 
Façade design * Society * Building-use 5.90 1 5.90 3.52 .061 .009 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use .06 1 .06 .04 .851 .000 
Error 641.055 383 1.67    
Total 5380.00 399     
a  R Squared = .071 (Adjusted R Squared = .034) 
      
 
 
A statistical significant interaction of the societal-security-context variable with 
the building-use variable supports hypothesis H-1.d, F(1, 398)=5.09, p<.03, Partial 
η2=.01. As illustrated in Figure 5.19, participants from the two societies were similar in 
their ratings of a city hall, M=3.42 for Texans, and M=3.45 for Israelis. The ratings 
proved to be significantly different considering a shopping mall. With respect to a 
shopping mall function, the Israeli participants had security from terrorism much more 
on their mind, M=3.72, than the Texans, M=3.22. In addition, the results show that while 
in Texas a city hall elicited higher ratings for how much security from terrorism is on the 
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FIGURE 5.19. Study 3: Interaction of building-use and society in the ratings of how much the issue of security from terrorism 
occupies the mind. 
 
 
With respect to the variable of glass-solid ratio in the design of the façade, the 
results show no main effect on the awareness of security from terrorism, F(1,398)=2.19, 
p>.05. Hence, hypothesis H.2-a was not supported.  
Another statistically significant interaction was found between the variables of 
society and the design of the access control security measures at the entrance, F(1, 
398)=10.63, p<.01, Partial η2=.03. As illustrated in Figure 5.20, the ratings of how 
much security from terrorism occupies the mind as affected by the design of the entrance 
was different in the two samples. For the Texan sample, an entrance with temporary 
stationed machines (M=3.55) elicited more thoughts of terrorism than an entrance in 
which the access control security measures that appeared as part of the overall design 
(M=3.04). In Israel it was the opposite effect (M=3.44 for temporary machines and 
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FIGURE 5.20. Study 3: Interaction of the design of the access control security measures at the entrance and society in the ratings of 
how much the issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind. 
  
 
Hypothesis H-3.a states that any access control security measures at the entrance 
to a building increase people’s awareness of the issue of security from terrorism. In order 
to examine this statement, another ANOVA test was performed between the data 
collected at this stage and the data collected in study 2 for high level of threat of 
terrorism, before any access control security measures were introduced. The only effect 
that was tested was of the two studies. The results show a significant effect of the 
difference between studies, F(1,577)=14.31, p<.01. In a high level of terrorism threat, 
the existence of access control security measures at the entrance to the building (study 3) 
resulted in lower ratings for how much security from terrorism was on the respondents 
minds, M=3.43, than when there were no visible access control security measures at the 
entrance (study 2), M=3.87. These findings show an opposite trend to what was expected 
according to hypothesis H-3.a.       
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5.4.3.1.2  Findings on the Sense of Security 
 
Pearson’s correlation test was conducted on the responses to the questions of how 
dangerous participants perceive the situation to be (Question 2 in the questionnaire, 
Appendix A), and how safe they would feel entering the building (Question 3 in the 
questionnaire, Appendix A). This test was performed to assess whether responses to 
these two measures can collectively inform about the overall personal sense of security.  
The test found a significant -.60 correlation (r) between the two indicators 
(p<.01). Due to this finding, responses to the two questions were recoded into one 
variable. The new value to indicate a participant’s sense of security equaled the average 
score of the answers to the two questions (calculated with the reverse value to the 
answers for the question of how safe they feel). Consequently, this value ranged between 
1 and 5 — a score of 1 indicating a secure feeling and 5 corresponding with a high sense 
of insecurity. 
An ANOVA test (for a .05 Type 1 error rate) was performed on the new 
calculated value of the sense of security/insecurity. Before performing the Analysis of 
Variance test, descriptive statistics were reviewed (see Appendix B, Table B-15) and 
statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence 
within and between groups was assumed. Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of 
variance in the examination of the calculated values to indicate sense of security resulted 
in insignificant findings, F(15,383)=1.32, p>.05. 
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Entrance design .53 1 .53 .72 .396 .002 
Facade design 1.15 1 1.15 1.57 .211 .004 
Society 2.94 1 2.94 4.03 .045 .010 
Building-use 3.33 1 3.33 4.56 .033 .012 
Entrance design * Façade design  1.15 1 1.15 1.58 .210 .004 
Entrance design * Society .30 1 .30 .41 .525 .001 
Facade design * Society .72 1 .72 .98 .323 .003 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society .50 1 .50 .68 .409 .002 
Entrance design * Building-use 2.18 1 2.18 2.99 .085 .008 
Façade design * Building-use .02 1 .02 .02 .876 .000 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use .82 1 .82 1.12 .292 .003 
Society * Building-use 2.95 1 2.95 4.04 .045 .010 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use .00 1 .00 .00 .959 .000 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .64 1 .64 .88 .350 .002 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use .70 1 .70 .96 .328 .003 
Error 279.89 383 .73    
Total 3625.75 399     
a  R Squared = .057 (Adjusted R Squared = .020) 
      
 
 
The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5.14, demonstrate two 
statistically significant main effects and one statistically significant interaction, all with 
small effects sizes.  
The two statistically significant main effects are attributed to the two “distal” 
level variables: societal-security-context and building-use. Supporting Hypothesis H-1.b, 
Israeli participants demonstrated significantly greater feeling of insecurity (M=2.99) than 
the Texan participants (M=2.81), F(1, 398)=4.03, p<.05, Partial η2=.01. The effect of 
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both samples, people felt less secure with regards to a shopping mall (M=2.96) than to a 
city hall (M=2.81), F(1, 398)=4.56, p<.04, Partial η2=.01.     
The latter finding was further qualified with the statistically significant 
interaction of the building-use variable with the societal-security-context variable 
(Figure 5.21), F(1, 398)=4.04, p<.05, Partial η2=.01. Similar to the findings in study 2, 
the two samples were close in the ratings of sense of insecurity with regards to the city 
hall function (M=2.80 for Texas, and M=2.81 for Israel). In the case of a shopping mall, 
the Israeli participants exhibited a greater sense of insecurity (M=3.16) than the Texans 
(M=2.83). In addition, sense of security/insecurity in the Texan sample was relatively 
similar with regards to the two building-uses. Israelis exhibited bigger difference in their 
level of insecurity as associated with the two buildings, and felt less secure when 
presented with a shopping mall, than when presented with a city hall. These findings 










FIGURE 5.21. Study 3: Interaction of building-use and society in the overall sense of security/insecurity. 
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 Hypotheses H-2.a and H-2.c were not supported by the findings as no effects 
were attributed to the design of the façade. Since the analysis did not indicate a main 
effect for the variable of the design of the security measures at the entrance, hypothesis 
H-3.b was not supported as well.  
 
5.4.3.1.3  Findings on the State of Anxiety 
     
The analysis of the responses to the twenty statements from the State Anxiety 
Inventory was conducted as in the first two studies (sections 5.3.3.1.3 and 5.2.3.1.3). The 
statistic examination of the twenty items resulted in high reliability scores: Cronbach’s 
Alpha of .96 in the Texan sample and of .71 in the Israeli sample. 
An ANOVA test examined the effects of the independent variables on the total 
score of the anxiety state. Before performing the ANOVA test, descriptive statistics were 
reviewed (see Table B-16 in Appendix B) and statistical assumptions for a fixed effect 
research design were examined. Independence within and between groups was assumed. 
Levene’s test to assess homogeneity of variance in the examination of how much the 
issue of security from terrorism occupies the mind resulted in a statistical significant 
result, F(15,383)=10.88, p<.01. To deal with this violation of the underlying assumption 
of the ANOVA, a more stringent alpha was set (α=.03).       
As indicated in Table 5.15, the results of the test show no statistically significant 
effect or interactions. These findings contradict any of the hypotheses concerning the 
level of anxiety (H-1.b, H-1.d, H-2.d, H-3.b).    
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Entrance design 4.70 1 4.70 .04 .844 .000 
Facade design 85.95 1 85.95 .07 .401 .002 
Society 55.81 1 55.81 .46 .498 .001 
Building-use 7.72 1 8.72 .07 .789 .000 
Entrance design * Façade design  96.27 1 96.27 .79 .374 .002 
Entrance design * Society 13.34 1 13.34 .11 .741 .000 
Facade design * Society 26.03 1 26.03 .21 .644 .001 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society 37.14 1 37.14 .31 .581 .001 
Entrance design * Building-use 121.49 1 121.49 1.00 .318 .003 
Façade design * Building-use 286.31 1 286.31 2.36 .126 .006 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use 10.23 1 10.23 .08 .772 .000 
Society * Building-use 6.90 1 6.90 .06 .812 .000 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use 175.19 1 175.81 1.44 .231 .004 
Façade design * Society * Building-use 265.68 1 265.68 2.19 .140 .006 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use 6.836 1 6,836 .06 .813 .000 
Error 46554.29 383 121.55    
Total 958269.00 399     
a  R Squared = .032 (Adjusted R Squared = -.006) 
      
 
 
5.4.3.1.4  Findings on the Propensity to Enter/Avoid the Building 
 
Pearson’s correlation tests were conducted on every two of the three questions that were 
to collectively inform about the respondents’ propensity to enter the building. All three 
tests resulted in statistically significant correlations: (1) r =-.41, p<.01, for the rated 
reservations about going to the facility and the rated likelihood to enter the building;     
(2) r =.59, p<.01, for the rated reservations about going to the facility and whether they 
prefers to meet the friend at a different location; and (3) r =-.46, p<.01, for the rated 
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likelihood to enter the building and whether they prefers to meet the friend at a different 
location.  
Following these findings, responses to the three questions were recoded into one 
variable. The new value to indicate a participant’s propensity to use the building equaled 
the average score of the answers to the three questions (calculated with the reverse value 
to the answers for the question of how likely they are to enter the building). 
Consequently, this value ranged between 1 and 5 — a score of 1 indicating an 
inclination to use the building and 5 corresponding with a propensity to avoid the 
building. 
An ANOVA (for .05 Type 1 error rate) test was performed on the new calculated 
value of the propensity to avoid/enter the building. Before performing the Analysis of 
Variance test, descriptive statistics were reviewed (see Table B-17, Appendix B) and 
statistical assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence 
within and between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) to 
assess homogeneity of variance resulted in insignificant findings, F(15,383)=0.77, 
p>.05.  
The results of the ANOVA test, shown in Table 5.16, demonstrate two 
statistically significant main effects and one statistically significant interaction with 


























Entrance design 1.31 1 1.32 1.95 .164 .005 
Facade design 4.09 1 4.09 6.04 .014 .016 
Society 2.03 1 2.03 3.00 .084 .008 
Building-use 6.16 1 6.16 9.09 .003 .023 
Entrance design * Façade design  1.02 1 1.02 1.50 .222 .004 
Entrance design * Society 1.37 1 1.37 2.03 .156 .005 
Facade design * Society .18 1 .18 .26 .611 .001 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society .47 1 .47 .70 .404 .002 
Entrance design * Building-use .17 1 .17 .25 .617 .001 
Façade design * Building-use .11 1 .11 .16 .686 .000 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use .70 1 .70 1.03 .310 .003 
Society * Building-use 5.35 1 5.35 7.89 .005 .020 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use .60 1 .60 .88 .349 .002 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .51 1 .51 .75 .388 .002 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use 1.69 1 1.69 2.50 .115 .006 
Error 259.44 383     
Total 3097.22 399     
a  R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .047) 
      
 
 
The results indicate a statistically significant main effect of the building-use 
variable on the propensity to enter or avoid buildings, F(1, 398)=9.09, p<.01, Partial 
η2=.02. Overall, respondents from both samples and across all experimental conditions 
tended to avoid more a shopping mall than a city hall.  
However, this finding is qualified by a statistically significant interaction of the 
building-use variable with the society factor, F(1, 398)=7.89, p<.01, Partial η2=.02., 
which has relevance to hypothesis H-1.d. Hypothesis H-1.d assumes that a city hall 
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mall, according to the hypothesis is avoided more by Israelis than by Texans. The 
general tendency of the found interaction, illustrated in Figure 5.22, seems to support 
hypothesis H-1.d with respect to a shopping mall (M=2.80 for Israelis, M=2.73 for 
Texans), and to oppose it regarding a city hall (M=2.34 for Israelis, M=2.70 for Texans).  
In order to clarify whether the differences between the samples of the two 
societies per building-use are statistically significant, additional ANOVA tests were 
performed for each of the building-uses. The tests show that for a shopping mall, the 
difference between the samples in the ratings of the propensity to avoid/enter it was 
insignificant, F(1, 208)<1, p>.05. The test for a city hall, confirmed that the difference 
between the samples was statistically significant, F(1, 189)=9.171, p<.01. For both 
building uses, these findings are different than what was hypothesized in H-1.d. In 
addition, the interaction also indicates that while the Texan’s tendency to avoid/enter the 
building was similar for both building-uses, in Israel, respondents tended to avoid a 










FIGURE 5.22. Study 3: Interaction of building-use and society in the propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
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With regards to the influence of the architectural variable of façade design (i.e., 
glass-solid ratio) on people’s propensity to avoid/enter the building, the ANOVA test 
found a statistically significant main effect attributed to this variable, F(1,398)=7.89, 
p<.01, Partial η2=.02. The main effect shows that overall, participants were more 
inclined to avoid buildings with solid façade (M=2.76) than with glass façade (M=2.55). 
This finding is opposite to the effect that was found in study 2, and to the additional 
finding in study 2 which indicates that participants rated solid façade as more effective 
in deterring terrorists than glass facade.    
No statistically significant effect on the propensity to avoid/enter the building 
was found with relation to the conspicuousness of the access control security measures at 
the entrance (designed vs. temporary machines).     
 
5.4.3.2  Results on the Linkages among the Dependent Variables in the Study 
 
In order to further examine the connections between the dependent variables of the 
conceptual model, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was conducted 
between any two dependent variables of the four, for each sample separately. The results 




TABLE 5.17. Study 3: Results of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, in each of the samples.  
 
 
Sense of insecurity  
 
State of anxiety  
 
Propensity to avoid the 
building  
 
 Texas Israel Texas Israel Texas Israel 
Awareness of security from terrorism .36 .56 .34 .33 .36 .45 
Sense of insecurity     .61 .47 .74 .67 
State of anxiety       .71 .48 
Propensity to avoid the building         
a  All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




For each of the samples, as detailed in Table 5.17, all the calculated Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficients, between any two dependent variables, showed 
significant correlation at the significance level of p<.01. For the Texas sample, the 
highest correlations, r = .61, .74, .71, were found among the three dependent variables of 
sense of security, the state of anxiety and the propensity to avoid the building. For the 
Israeli sample, the highest correlation, r = .56, .67, were found between how much 
security from terrorism was on their mind (i.e., awareness of security from terrorism) 
and the sense of insecurity, and between the sense of insecurity and the propensity to 
avoid the building. Correlations of the state of anxiety with all three other dependent 
variables were consistently lower at the Israeli sample than in the case of the Texan 
sample.   
The results of the correlation coefficient tests show that the highest correlation, in 
both samples, was between the sense of insecurity and the propensity to avoid the 
building, r = .74 in the Texan sample, and r = .68 in the Israeli sample. This finding 
partially contradict hypothesis H-2.e, which speaks of a difference between a society that 
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is accustomed to the threat, and a society that is not accustomed to the threat in the way 
their actions correspond with their feelings. Hypothesis H-2.e assumes that people which 
are not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to follow their sense of security 
(as affected by the glass-solid ratio in the façade design and the current level of threat) 
with actions, while people who are accustomed to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Israelis) 
tend to use buildings regardless of their feeling of security. While the results of the 
correlation coefficient test support the hypothesis assumption about the Texan sample, it 
seems to disprove the premise about the Israelis.  
With that in mind, we have to consider the fact that Pearson product-moment 
correlation coefficient as a statistical test tells about a general tendency in the 
relationship between two variables. However, it does not speak of the actual values for 
each variable. A high correlation between two variables can exist even if one variable 
has low values and the other receives high values, as long as they change 
correspondingly.  
For that reason, and in order to further examine hypothesis H-2.e, repeated 
measures ANOVA test was performed. The two dependent variables of the sense of 
insecurity and the propensity to avoid the building were defined as the within subject 
factors. This test, allowed to compare the mean ratings for these dependent variables, as 
affected by the independent variables. This examination was made possible with the 
available data, as the measurement for both dependent variables ranged on a similar 5 
point scale. As detailed in Table 5.18, the test of the within-subjects contrasts resulted in 













































Within factor * Entrance design .09 1 .09 .43 .514 .001 
Within factor * Facade design .45 1 .45 2.17 .142 .006 
Within factor * Society 4.93 1 4.93 23.62 .000 .058 
Within factor * Building-use .22 1 .22 1.03 .311 .003 
Within factor * Entrance design * Façade design  .00 1 .00 .01 .918 .000 
Within factor * Entrance design * Society .20 1 .20 .94 .332 .002 
Within factor * Facade design * Society .09 1 .09 .44 .508 .001 
Within factor * Entrance design * Façade design * 
Society .00 1 .00 .00 .976 .000 
Within factor * Entrance design * Building-use 1.79 1 1.79 8.56 .004 .022 
Within factor * Façade design * Building-use .02 1 .02 .10 .757 .000 
Within factor * Entrance design * Façade design * 
Building-use .00 1 .00 .01 .919 .000 
Within factor * Society * Building-use .18 1 .18 .65 .358 .002 
Within factor * Entrance design * Society * 
Building-use .33 1 .33 1.59 .208 .004 
Within factor * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use .00 1 .00 .02 .891 .000 
Within factor * Entrance design * Façade design * 
Society * Building-use .11 1 .11 .51 .474 .001 
Error (Within factor) 79.96 383 .21    







FIGURE 5.23. Study 3: Interaction of society and the within factor, which included ratings of the sense insecurity/security and the 
propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
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A significant interaction between the within factor and the society variable (i.e., 
societal-security-context) was found, F(1,383)=23.62, p<.01, illustrated in Figure 5.23. 
The interaction shows that while in both samples the ratings of insecurity were higher 
than the propensity to avoid the building, this trend was attenuated in the Texas sample 
(M=2.81 for sense of insecurity and M=2.72 for the propensity to avoid the building) and 
accentuated in the Israeli sample (M=2.99 for sense of insecurity and M=2.57 for the 
propensity to avoid the building). These finding support hypothesis H-2.e, illustrating 
that the behavioral disposition of the Texan participants tended to followed their sense of 
security more than in the case of the Israeli sample.  
Another statistically significant interaction of the within factor was found with 
the building-use variable and the variable of the conspicuousness of access control 
security measures at the entrance (designed vs. temporary machines), F(1,383)=8.56, 
p<.01. This interaction, shown in Figure 5.24, shows that the general tendency of the 
ratings of the propensity to avoid a building to be lower than the ratings of insecurity has 
fluctuated based on the building-use and entrance design.  
In the case of a city hall, the difference between the ratings of the two 
dimensions was higher when the access control security measures were part of the 
overall design, vs. when they appeared as temporary stationed machines. In addition, for 
a city hall, while the ratings of insecurity were higher for inconspicuous (i.e., designed) 
security measures (M=2.91) than in the case of conspicuous temporary machines 
(M=2.71), the tendency to avoid the building was about the same for both cases (M=2.58 









































In the case of a shopping mall, the difference between the ratings of the 
propensity to avoid the building and the ratings of insecurity was attenuated in relation 
to inconspicuous access control security measures (i.e., designed) and accentuated with 
relation to conspicuous security measure (i.e., temporary machines). In this case, while 
the ratings of insecurity for the two variations in the design of the security measures 
were close (M=2.92 for inconspicuous security measure, and M=3.00 for conspicuous), 
the propensity to avoid the building was greater with relation to conspicuous, temporary 










FIGURE 5.24. Study 3: Interaction of the design of the access control security measures at the entrance, society and the within factor, 
which included ratings of the sense insecurity/security and the propensity to avoid/enter a building. 
 






5.4.3.3  Results of the Additional Questions about the Security in the Building  
 
To achieve a better understanding of how the visual architectural variables affect the 
participants’ perception of the security of the buildings, three more ANOVA tests (α 
=.05) were performed on each of the last three additional questions (questions 8, 9 and 
10 in Appendix A). The questions asked: how sophisticated is the security in the 
building; whether the design triggers thoughts about terrorism; and how effective is the 
design in deterring terrorists.  
 For each ANOVA test, descriptive statistics were reviewed and statistical 
assumptions for a fixed effect research design were examined. Independence within and 
between groups was assumed. Levene’s test (for .01 Type 1 error rate) was used to 
assess homogeneity of variance.  
All three ANOVA tests resulted in significant findings that relate to the 
architectural variables of façade design (i.e., solid-glass ratio) and the entrance design 
(i.e., designed vs. temporary access control security measures). Descriptive statistics of 
the responses to all three questions and the results tables of the between-groups ANOVA 
tests appear in Appendix B.  
The question of how sophisticated is the security in the building (question 8 in 
Appendix A) resulted in one statistically significant interaction between building-use 
and entrance design, F(1,398)=3.90, p<.05. This interaction (Figure 5.25) shows an 
opposite trend for each of the building-uses, in how the perception of level of 
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access control security measures at the entrance. For a shopping mall, access control 
security measures that appeared as part of the overall design of the entrance (M=2.76) 
elevated the perceived sophistication of security, compared to temporary stationed 
machines (M=3.03). In a city hall, it was the opposite effect, though the difference in 
responses to the two options of entrance design was attenuated compared to the case of a 
shopping mall (M=2.96 for designed security measures, M=2.86 for temporary security 










FIGURE 5.25. Study 3: Interaction of the design of the access control security measures at the entrance and building-use in the 
ratings of how sophisticated is the security in the building (1 - very sophisticated, 5 - very unsophisticated). 
 
 
To the question on whether the design triggers thoughts about terrorism (question 
9 in Appendix A), the test resulted in one significant interaction that involved the façade 
design (glass-solid ratio). This interaction was again with the building-use variable, 
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triggered more thought about terrorism than solid façade (M=2.23). The opposite effect 
happened in the case of a shopping mall (M=2.38 for glass and M=2.60 for solid façade). 
This interaction brings an interesting point, especially when compared to the previous 
findings regarding the perceived sophistication of security in the building. In this 
examination, when the design of the façade created a perception of a sophisticated 
security, it also triggered more thoughts about terrorism, and when the more the design 
of the façade created a perception of an unsophisticated security, the less it triggered 








     
 
FIGURE 5.26. Study 3: Interaction of the glass-solid ratio in the façade design and building-use in the ratings of whether the design 
triggers thoughts about terrorism (1 – not at all, 5 – vary much). 
 
 
The ANOVA test to the last question on how effective is the design to deter 
terrorists (question 10 in Appendix a) resulted in two statistically significant findings 
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As found in study 2, a main effect was attributed to the façade design, 
F(1,398)=6.60, p<.02. Solid façade was rated as more effective than glass façade in 
deterring terrorists (M=3.11 for solid façade, M=3.33 for glass façade on a scale of 1 
being very effective to 5 being very ineffective).  
The second finding was an interaction between building-use and the 
conspicuousness of the security measure at the entrance (designed vs. temporary), 
F(1,398)=5.00, p<.03. The interaction (Figure 5.27) shows that for a city hall, 
inconspicuous, designed, access control security measures (M=3.38) were rated as less 
effective than conspicuous temporary machines (M=3.04) in deterring terrorists. In a 
shopping mall there was no significant difference in the ratings of the two alternative 
designs for the access control security measures (M=3.20 for designed access control 









     
FIGURE 5.27. Study 3: Interaction of the design of the access control security measures at the entrance and building-use in the 
ratings of how effective/ineffective the design is in deterring terrorists (1 - very effective, 5 - very ineffective). 
 
 254
5.4.4  Conclusion   
 
This stage of the study tested the effects of variations of two visible architectural 
elements at the approach to a public building as related to two different public building-
uses, on people from two different societal-security-contexts, when the current level of 
threat is of high alert from terrorism. The two architectural elements that were tested are 
the conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the entrance (designed vs. 
temporary machines) and the façade’s apparent level of fortification (glass-solid ratio in 
the façade design). The examined effects were along four dimensions of people’s 
responses: (1) how much the issue of security from terrorism is on the person’s mind, (2) 
how safe the person feels, (3) how anxious he/she is, and (4) his/her tendency to use the 
building.  
The examination addressed all three sets of the research hypotheses, excluding 
the specific hypotheses that address a variation of the level of terrorism threat, which 
was not tested at this stage. The hypotheses that were tested from the first set address the 
effects of two of the “distal level” variables—the societal-security-context and building-
use—on people’s range of reactions. The hypotheses from the second set address how 
people are impacted by the architectural variable of the glass-solid ratio in the façade 
design (from the “proximate level”), and a combination of it with the “distal level” 
variables. The third set of hypotheses focus on the effects of the conspicuousness of the 
access control security measures at the entrance (designed vs. temporary machines) on 
people’s range of reactions. The following summary of the findings of this stage of the 
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study is organized according to the research hypotheses. It should be noted that all the 
effects that were found statistically significant in this study had a small effect size 
(Partial η2 ranged from .01 to .03). 
The first hypothesis that was addressed in this examination, H-1.b, was only 
partially confirmed by the findings. Statistically significant overall differences between 
samples, across all manipulated scenarios, were obtained along the first two dependent 
variables of the conceptual model: Israelis had security from terrorism on their mind 
more than Texans, and their overall sense of security was lower than the Texans’. The 
societal-security-context did not have the hypothesized main effect on the state of 
anxiety and the propensity to enter the building.     
Hypothesis H-1.d which speaks of differences in the four dimensions of 
responses between societies as related to the specific building-uses was also partially 
supported by the findings. As in the case of hypothesis H-1.b, the results support the 
hypothesis with regards to the two dimensions of responses—the awareness of security 
from terrorism and the sense of security. The city hall elicited similar ratings among the 
Texan and Israeli samples on how much security from terrorism was on their minds and 
their overall sense of security. As hypothesized, in the case of a shopping mall, security 
from terrorism was more on the minds of the Israeli participants than the Texan 
participants, while their sense of security was lower than of the Texans. These findings 
are similar to the ones in the previous two studies.  
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As in study 2, no statistically significant interaction was found between the 
building-use and the society with regards to the anxiety state. With respect to the 
propensity to enter/avoid a building, the findings are different than what was 
hypothesized. With regards to a shopping mall, participants from the two societies were 
similar in their inclination to use/avoid the building. With regards to a city hall, the 
results show that Texans tended to avoid it more than the Israelis. Additional findings 
regarding the two building-uses show that across both samples, a shopping mall created 
lower sense of security and a greater tendency to avoid it than a city hall.  
With respect to the second set of hypotheses that relates to the influence of the 
glass-solid ratio in the façade design on the four dimensions of people’s responses, the 
examination resulted with the following. 
The analysis did not find a statistically significant effect of the variable of façade 
design on how much security from terrorism is on the mind or on the sense of security. 
This disagrees with the Hypothesis H-2.a, which claims that when confronted with a 
solid façade, people tend to have security from terrorism more on their minds at the 
same time that they feel safer than when confronted with a building of extensive window 
area. Consequently, Hypothesis H-2.c which refers to a moderating effect that the 
societal-security-context has on the influence of glass-solid ratio in the façade on 
people’s awareness of security from terrorism and their sense of security, was not 
supported as well.  
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The glass-solid ratio in the façade design was found to influence only the 
propensity to enter/avoid a building. The statistically significant main effect shows that 
across samples and building-uses, participants reported a greater inclination to avoid a 
solid façade than a glass façade.   
With respect to the effect of the access control security measures at the entrance 
on people, the general claim in hypothesis H-3.a that the mere existence of such 
measures at the entrance to a building increases people’s awareness of the issue of 
security from terrorism was disproved. The overall ratings for how much security from 
terrorism was on the respondents’ minds were compared to the ratings collected in study 
2 for scenarios of high level of terrorism threat, in which no security measures were 
shown. The results show an opposite tendency to what was hypothesized: In a high level 
of terrorism threat, the existence of access control security measures at the entrance to 
the building (study 3) resulted in lower ratings for how much security from terrorism 
was on the respondents minds, than when there were no visible access control security 
measures at the entrance (study 2).    
Additional findings concerning the awareness of security from terrorism show 
that the two samples responded differently to the variation in the conspicuousness of the 
access control security measures. For the Texan sample, an entrance with temporary 
stationed machines elicited more thoughts of terrorism than an entrance in which the 
access control security measures appeared as part of the overall design. In Israel it was 
the opposite. 
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Hypothesis H-3.b proclaims that when confronted with conspicuous security 
measures that appear as temporary stationed machines people’s overall sense of security 
is reduced and their anxiety level is increased. Designed measures, which seem as part of 
the entrance, enhance the sense of security (i.e., reduce perceived risk and increase 
perception of personal safety) and reduce the level of anxiety. This hypothesis was not 
supported as the design of the access control security measures was not found to 
influence the sense of security or the anxiety level.  
Hypotheses H-2.e and H-3.c specify a certain relation, which is society-
dependent, between the behavioral disposition to avoid/enter the building and the sense 
of security as affected by a combination of the proximate and distal level variables.  The 
hypotheses claim that Texans tend to follow their sense of security (as affected by the 
glass-solid ratio in the façade design and the conspicuousness of the access control 
security measures at the entrance) with actions, while Israelis tend to use buildings 
regardless of their feeling of security.    
The initial, separate, examinations of each of the dimensions—of the sense of 
security and of the propensity to enter/avoid the building—show that the only effect that 
was due to an architectural variable was of the façade design on the propensity to use the 
building. And that effect was across samples.  
Differences between participants from the two societies were found in regards to 
the particular building-uses. However, the connection between the effect on sense of 
security and the tendency to enter suggests that in both societies the participants’ action 
propensity followed their sense of security as related to the building-use. In Israel, 
 259
participants reported lower sense of security in regards to a shopping mall and wanted to 
avoid it more than a city hall. In Texas, both building-uses received similar ratings in the 
sense of security and similar ratings in the propensity to use/avoid them.     
A direct comparison between the ratings of sense of insecurity/security and the 
propensity to avoid the building provided additional insight on the relationship between 
the two dimensions of responses in the two samples. The analysis does not indicate the 
building-use variable or the two architectural variables as elements that create a 
difference between the two samples. However, the findings indicate a general difference 
between the two samples in their responses to the two dimensions. In Texas, the ratings 
for the propensity to avoid a building were close to the overall sense of insecurity. In 
Israel, the propensity to avoid a building was considerably lower than the reported sense 
of insecurity. This finding gives credence to hypotheses H-2.e H-3.c and the claim that 
people who are not accustomed to live with the threat of terrorism, tend to follow their 
sense of security with actions, while people who are used to the threat tend to use 
buildings regardless of their feeling of security.  
    The comparison of the propensity to avoid/enter the building and the reported 
sense of insecurity/security adds additional insight with respect to the specific building-
uses and the conspicuousness of the access control security measures at the entrance. 
The findings show that while for both building-uses and both variations of entrance 
design the propensity to avoid a building was lower than the sense of insecurity; this 
difference was almost non-existent in the case of a shopping mall with inconspicuous 
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designed access control security measures. For that specific case – the difference in the 
sense of insecurity and the propensity to avoid was statistically insignificant.  
Ratings of additional measurements further elaborate on the respondents’ 
perception of security as related to the different building-uses and the different variations 
in the architectural variables of the study. These findings show that in the case of a 
shopping mall, the two façade designs were rated similarly on how sophisticated is the 
security in the building, while solid façade seemed to trigger more thoughts about 
terrorism than glass. Temporary machines were rated as more sophisticated than 
designed access control measures, while both entrance designs were rated similarly on 
their effectiveness to deter terrorists. In the case of a city hall, solid façade was rated 
higher for how sophisticated is the security in the building, while glass façade triggered 
more thoughts about terrorism. For a city hall, designed control security measures were 
rated as more sophisticated and more effective than temporary machines.  
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5.5  Summary of the Main Findings 
 
The results of the first two studies corroborate the hypothesis concerning the effect of 
the current level of terrorism threat on people along all the dependent variables. High 
level of terrorism threat (compared with scenarios in which terrorism was not a threat) 
increased the awareness to the issue of security from terrorism, reduced the sense of 
security, increased the level of anxiety and the tendency to avoid the building in samples 
from both societal-security-contexts, across building-uses and façade designs. These 
findings also validate the treatments used for manipulating the level of terrorism threat. 
 In addition, the size effect associated with current level of terrorism threat, as 
indicated in Table 5.19, were greater than the effect sizes of the other independent 
variables. This finding emphasizes the importance of this variable in influencing 
perceptions of security. Moreover, the fact that the effect size of the current level of 
terrorism threat was considerably greater in the second study than in the first, suggests 
that the magnitude of the threat is amplified by a visual representation of the 
environment. In other words, seeing the building and the visual cues of the environment 





TABLE 5.19. Summary of main findings.  
 





Study 1 Awareness of security Level of terrorism threat 6.64 .011 .038 
  Society 4.69 .032 .027 
  Society * Building-use 7.18 .008 .041 
      
 Sense of security  Level of terrorism threat 17.06 .000 .093 
  Society 16.27 .000 .089 
      
 State of Anxiety Level of terrorism threat 25.39 .000 .132 
  Society 5.11 .025 .030 
  Level of terrorism threat * Building-use 5.23 .023 .043 
  Society * Building-use 7.58 .007 .022 
      
      
Study 2 Awareness of security Level of terrorism threat 135.98 .000 .282 
  Society 5.80 .017 .016 
  Society * Building-use 5.09 .025 .015 
      
 Sense of security  Level of terrorism threat 213.08 .000 .382 
  Society 12.00 .001 .034 
  Society * Building-use 10.25 .001 .029 
  Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 7.28 .007 .021 
  Façade design  * Level of terrorism threat  4.81 .029 .014 
      
 State of Anxiety Level of terrorism threat 95.98 .000 .217 
  Society 44.88 .000 .115 
  Level of terrorism threat * Society 42.51 .000 .109 
  Façade design * Building-use 6.31 .012 .018 
  Façade design * Building-use * Society 9.13 .003 .026 
      
 Propensity to enter Level of terrorism threat 78.57 .000 .185 
  Society * Building-use 4.44 .036 .013 
  Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 5.13 .024 .015 
  Façade design  * Level of terrorism threat  5.68 .018 .016 
      
      
Study 3 Awareness of security Society 4.83 .029 .012 
  Society * Building-use 4.12 .043 .011 
  Entrance design * Society 10.63 .001 .027 
      
 Sense of security  Society 4.03 .045 .010 
  Building-use 4.56 .033 .012 
  Society * Building-use 4.04 .045 .010 
      
 State of Anxiety No statistically significant effects    
      
 Propensity to enter Building-use 9.09 .003 .023 
  Society * Building-use 7.89 .005 .020 
  Façade design 6.04 .014 .016 
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With regards to the hypothesized differences between the two examined 
societies, the results only partially support the assumed main effect, and indicate a more 
complex pattern of reactions that is affected by the societal-security-context. In all three 
studies, the findings show that the expected differences between societies were obtained 
with regards to the first two dependent variables: Israelis had security from terrorism on 
their mind more than Texans, and their overall sense of security was lower than the 
Texans’, regardless of the other independent variables. However, the expected 
differences between samples of the two societies in their overall anxiety level and their 
propensity to enter/avoid were not found in all three studies.  
With regards to the anxiety level, while as expected, the Israeli participants were 
more anxious than participants from Texas across all conditions in the first and second 
studies, no difference between the samples was found in the third study. Digging into the 
reason behind this result, we find an interaction, in the second study, of the societal-
security-context and the current level of terrorism threat. This interaction indicates that 
in scenarios of no terrorism threat, Texans were considerably less anxious than Israelis, 
while in scenarios of high level of terrorism threat the societies’ anxiety levels were 
similar. The later finding is consistent with the results of the third study, which included 
only scenarios of high level of terrorism threat.  
In addition, focusing on each of the societal-security-contexts, the results of the 
second study indicate that the anxiety level of the Texan sample was considerably 
greater when there was high level of terrorism threat vs. when there was no threat. The 
anxiety level of the Israeli participants, on the other hand, was not affected much by the 
 264
change in the current level of threat. These findings regarding the anxiety level support 
part of the hypothesis which claims that people who are not used to the threat (i.e., 
Texans) are more affected by a change in the current threat level than people who 
usually live under a high level of terrorism threat (e.g., Israel).  
With regards to the propensity to enter the building, and how it is affected by the 
societal-security-context, the expected result for Texans to be generally more inclined to 
enter a building than Israelis was not corroborated by the findings.  
The hypothesis which speaks of differences between societies as related to the 
specific building-uses was supported for the most part, with further qualifications. As 
hypothesized, in all three studies, a shopping mall elicited more thoughts of security 
from terrorism among the Israeli participants compared to the Texan participants. And in 
the second and third studies, also a lower sense of security for the Israeli participants 
compared to the Texans. In addition, city hall elicited similar ratings by participants 
from both societal-security-contexts for the awareness of security from terrorism and the 
overall sense of security.  
With regards to the anxiety level, the results of the first study follow the first two 
dimensions of reactions and corroborate the research hypothesis: shopping mall created 
higher anxiety among participants from Israel compared Texans, while city hall elicited 
similar ratings of anxiety among the two samples. The second and third studies show no 
statistically significant interaction between the building-use and the societal-security-
context with regards to the anxiety state.  
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The findings suggest a different pattern than hypothesized concerning the 
propensity to enter/avoid a building, In the case of a city hall, instead of the assumed 
similar reaction by both samples, the results show that in study 2 (across the two levels 
of threat), as well as in study 3 (which was only high threat), the Texan participants 
tended to avoid it more than the Israelis.  
The results concerning the shopping mall were more complicated. In the second 
study, in low level of terrorism threat, the Texan participants avoided a shopping mall 
building more than the Israeli participants. In high level of terrorism threat, the tendency 
was opposite – Israelis avoided a shopping mall more than the Texans. However, in the 
third study, which dealt only with high level of terrorism, the samples from the two 
societies were similar in their inclination to use/avoid a shopping mall.  
Looking at the mean ratings of these findings, we find that the action propensity 
of the Israeli sample was more affected than the Texans’ by the change in threat level as 
well as by the visibility of access control security measures. A high level of terrorism 
elevated the Israelis tendency to avoid a shopping mall more than it affected the Texans. 
The existence of visible access control security measures (regardless of their design) 
decreased the Israelis tendency to avoid the building, while it seemed to somewhat 
elevate the tendency to avoid a shopping mall by the Texan sample. 
These findings suggest that the action propensity of people that are used to living 
in a high level of terrorism threat is more influenced by changes of threat level. In 
addition, the level of familiarity with security measures seems to influence the tendency 
to use the environment. 
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With respect to the second set of hypotheses that relate to variations in how 
fortified the building appears to be, based on the glass-solid ratio of the façade, the 
results did not corroborate the hypothesized main effect of this variable on the awareness 
of security and the sense of security. However, the expected interactions between this 
variable, the current level of terrorism threat and the societal-security-context were 
partially supported and other interactions were found.   
In both study 2 and 3, the variable of façade design did not in influence the 
awareness of security from terrorism at all. Concerning the sense of security, and the 
propensity to enter/avoid the building, the results of studies 2 and 3 show different 
tendencies. The variation of the glass-solid ratio in the façade design in the second study 
created an opposite effect as related to the two examined levels of threat. When the 
threat of terrorism was high, a solid façade created a greater sense of security and 
participants were more inclined to enter the building than when the façade was all glass. 
When terrorism was not a threat, a glass façade elicited a slightly higher sense of 
security than a solid façade for all participants and for all building-uses while the 
tendency to enter/avoid building was not affected at all by the façade design. The results 
for high level of terrorism were not corroborated in the third study, as no statistically 
significant differences were found in the sense of security as related to the two façade 
designs. In addition, in the third study, people were more inclined to enter buildings with 
glass façade than with solid facades.  
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The discrepancies in the two studies regarding the effect of the glass-solid ratio 
on the sense of security and the tendency to avoid/enter a building when the threat of 
terrorism was high suggest that the mere existence of access controls security measures 
in study 3 changed the effect. As long as the respondents did not see access control 
security measures (study 2), they felt safer with a solid façade and were more inclined to 
enter a building of a solid façade than of a glass façade. Seeing the access control 
security measures (study 3) seemed to reassure the participants enough to have the same 
sense of security towards both façade designs, and even make them more inclined to 
enter the glass façade than the solid façade. Further research should focus on verifying 
this proposition.           
The hypothesis which posits that the effect of glass-solid ratio in the façade 
design on a person’s stress/anxiety level is influenced by the current level of terrorism 
threat was not supported by the findings. In study 2, a different interaction with the 
building-use and society variables was found statistically significant in influencing the 
respondents’ state of anxiety. In the Texan sample, city hall elicited higher anxiety when 
the façade of the building was all glass than when it was solid concrete. In the case of a 
shopping mall, solid façade elicited higher anxiety levels than a glass façade. In Israel, 
on the other hand, the participants’ anxiety level was not affected by façade design, or by 
building-use. This suggests that the anxiety level of a person that is used to living in a 
high level of terrorism threat is less sensitive to changes in the built environment 
(whether “distal” or ”proximate”), while a person that is not used to the threat of 
terrorism exhibits higher sensitivity to variations.   
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With respect to the effect of the access control security measures at the entrance, 
the general hypothesis that the mere existence of such measures at the entrance to a 
building (whether designed or as temporary stationed machines) increases people’s 
awareness of the issue of security from terrorism was disproved for high level of 
terrorism threat. A comparison between the second study (for scenarios with high level 
of terrorism), which did not include access control security measures, and the third 
study, which did, showed that when the level of the threat was high, the existence of 
access control security measures at the entrance to the building reduced thoughts about 
terrorism. Additional findings concerning the awareness of security from terrorism show 
that the two samples responded differently to the variation in the conspicuousness of the 
access control security measures. For the Texan sample, an entrance with temporary 
stationed machines elicited more thoughts of terrorism than an entrance in which the 
access control security measures appeared as part of the overall design. In Israel the 
pattern of results was the opposite.  
The findings do not support the proposition that the design of access control 
security measures influence the level of anxiety or the sense of security.     
The assumption that people who are not accustomed to live with the threat of 
terrorism (i.e., Texans), tend to follow their sense of security with actions, while people 
who are used to the threat (i.e., Israelis) tend to use buildings regardless of their feeling 
of security was generally supported by the findings in both the second and the third 
studies. Both studies show that in Texas, the participants’ ratings for the propensity to 
avoid a building were generally close to the overall sense of insecurity. In Israel, the 
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participants’ propensity to avoid a building was considerably lower than the reported 
sense of insecurity.  
Following the detailed descriptions and results of all the stages of the research, 
the next chapter provides a comprehensive summary and discussion. The review in the 
concluding chapter encompasses the goals of the research, the methodology that was 
employed and the main findings. The discussion of the findings consolidates the results 
of different stages and examines their implications to the conceptual framework and to 
the methodology. The chapter provides further inference on the applicability of the main 
findings in the real world, the ethical implication of using them and looks into potential 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The underlying question of this dissertation concerns the role of the built 
environment in influencing people’s perceptions of security from terrorism and their 
consequential responses. In order to address this question, a conceptual framework was 
developed and examined. More specifically, and based on the details of the conceptual 
framework, the examination focused on how the building-use and the visible design 
elements of the façade and entrance of buildings, in conjunction with a certain level of 
threat and the individual's societal background, influence people. The effects were 
examined along four dimensions of people’s responses: how much the issue of terrorism 
threat is on a person’s mind, how safe and how anxious the individual feels, and how 
likely he/she is to use the building.  
The project and its findings contribute to the current body of knowledge along 
several levels: First, this dissertation deals with a question that has never been addressed 
before, and a question that, based on the literature review, is worth asking. Second, the 
dissertation developed and used a conceptual model that is based on an interdisciplinary 
body of existing literature. Third, a rigorous methodology that employs the latest tools 
and platforms to empirically examine and illustrate the conceptual model and its related 
hypotheses was implemented. In addition, the research design, procedure and 
instruments allow future replications of this research in other social-political-contexts, as 
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well as examinations of other architectural design elements and/or building-uses and 
their effect on people.   
The following section presents the development of the research question and the 
rationale behind it, while outlining the ethical dilemma that accompanies them (section 
6.1). Section 6.2 summarizes the formation of the conceptual framework, its components 
and related hypotheses. A short review of the methodology is presented in section 6.3. 
This chapter concludes with a synopsis of the main findings of the research, as well as 
expresses the limits of the conclusions and directions for future research (section 6.4).   
 
6.1  The Research Question and Its Ethical Implications 
 
Architecture has always been a form of response to the practical and political concerns 
of the time, and often, these involved issues of security. In our era, the growing public 
concern for terrorism has made it a salient issue despite its relative rarity. The terrorism 
threat, with its lethality, abundance of potential targets and forms of attack, and the 
ability to adapt to protective means, introduces unique challenges to the design 
profession.  
One challenge to the design field is rooted in the fact that terrorism can happen 
anywhere, anytime, without warning. The literature offers different ways to deal with 
this challenge by prioritizing which buildings to protect against terrorist attack and to 
what extent. This is done through the assessment of the specific security needs for a 
certain place at a certain context. In addition, the literature recommends different 
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measures of security to help prevent, mitigate and facilitate a desired response in the 
event of a terrorism attack. The measures of security range from: specific elements of 
design, techniques to achieve structural hardening, resilient materials and additional 
technological equipment, to - certain operational policies.  
These efforts to counter terrorism in the built environment are targeted at 
providing the users of the environment with physical security from terrorism. However, 
considering the terrorists’ goal to terrorize, and being that this threat is particularly 
dreaded by the public and one that is so socially amplified, it is also important to 
consider the psycho-emotional implications of the protective measures. The existing 
body of knowledge indicates that people search for threatening cues in the environment. 
Moreover, such visual cues influence people’s levels of stress, psycho-emotional states, 
and consequently their physical-well-being and high-order cognitive functioning, 
thereby linking to a resulting behavior.  
In this lies another challenge to the design profession in the face of terrorism, one 
that has been relatively neglected: How to introduce security measures into the built 
environment in ways that can promote the overall well-being of the public, and attend to 
people’s psycho-emotional needs as well as to their physical need of security?  
The latter challenge brings out acute ethical questions: Considering the well-
being of people who face the threat of terrorism—is it better that they remain stressed 
and alert rather than be reassured by the architectural design, and therefore would tend to 
keep away from certain buildings? Or, should the design reduce the level of stress and 
facilitate some sense of safety that, to some extent, may be false?    
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On the one hand, it can be argued that the design profession should not always be 
about making people feel better. A more important goal is to keep people safe from 
harm’s way. And since there is no absolute security from terrorism, a design that is 
perceived as less secure might be the moral solution—keeping people away from a 
prospective target.    
On the other hand, when we consider the rarity of the threat of terrorism, 
promoting healthy, active communities by attending to the psycho-emotional needs of 
security (i.e., making people feel safe) might be the right thing to do – as long as the 
selected design solutions also provide the desired level of protection according to the 
assessment of the specific security needs of the building. This claim can be further 
supported by the notion that in the face of the dreadful threat of terrorism, architecture 
only plays a supportive role. The findings of this dissertation show that the mere 
existence of the threat of terrorism, and a person’s long-term exposure to the threat (i.e., 
familiarity), are key factors in influencing one’s perception of security and consequential 
responses. These two factors can be considered as more influential than the 
specifications of the built environment. If that is the case, and the fear of terrorism is so 
predominant, why not use the design of the environment to ease at least some of the 
concern?  
While recognizing the above ethical dilemma, this dissertation does not attempt 
to answer it. Instead, the research focuses on the question that stands behind this 
discussion, looking at whether the built environment—and specific elements of it—can 
alter people’s perception of security from terrorism.  
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6.2  The Conceptual Framework 
 
6.2.1  The Basis 
 
To be able to address the research question, a broad interdisciplinary literature review 
was conducted. The review began with existing theories on human perception in general 
and specifically with regards to aspects of security. This part of the review helped in 
outlining the basic elements of the conceptual model: What are the general factors that 
influence people’s reactions to security threats in a certain built environment, and the 
range of reactions that should be taken into account. The discussion brought up an 
interesting question regarding the relationship between people and the threat of 
terrorism: Is there an innate global pattern of reactions to the threat, and to what extent 
are people’s reactions to it based on personal familiarity? This question influenced the 
second section of the literature review which concentrated on the threat of terrorism, and 
resulted in a comparison of two societies that differ in their exposure to it: Texas and 
Israel.   
Consequently, the review of the threat itself included characteristics of the threat 
of terrorism, its manifestation in different parts of the world (e.g., Texas and Israel), 
what the potential targets are, and what aspects in the environment can influence the 
vulnerability to it. In addition, the review of the nature of the threat linked the struggle 
against terrorism with former historical strategies of defense against enemies, as well as 
with modern theories of crime prevention.  
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The latter two subjects were then investigated in the third part of the literature 
review which concentrated on the continuous link between architecture and security. 
This historical review of the architecture of security extracted key concepts and 
strategies that have always been pertinent for achieving a secure built environment while 
placing the research as relevant in the context of history. The key concepts of security 
were then used in the analysis of the current policies and recommendations for dealing 
with the threat of terrorism. This last part ended the literature review and pointed to the 
architectural elements that were included in the conceptual model. 
 
6.2.2  The Components 
 
The conceptual model focuses on how the users of public buildings are affected by 
factors of the built environment in the context of terrorism threat. The model identifies 
five independent variables. Three of them relate to the conceptual “distal” level, and two 
refer to what was identified in the literature as the tangible “proximate” level, i.e., visible 
elements in the built environment.  
The first independent variable is the current level of threat. This research focuses 
on terrorism of explosives, the most common type of terrorism. In addition, the measures 
that are used to counter this form of terrorism in the design of the built environment have 
the potential to affect the image of a building (e.g., resilient envelope, simple geometry, 
no overhangs, access control). This research examines two levels of the current threat of 
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terrorism: whether bombing attacks are currently considered as a major threat in the area 
of the facility (state/country) or are not a threat at all. 
The conceptual model presents the second and third independent variables as two 
interrelated factors that moderate people’s responses to architectural elements in the 
context of terrorism threat.  
The second independent variable is the social-security-context that expresses the 
level of exposure and experience a certain society has with the threat of terrorism of 
explosives and with counter measures. This societal background may condition members 
of that society to security issues and may influence their reactions to a current level of 
threat as well as to elements of the built-environment. In addition, the level of familiarity 
with the threat and with ‘living in its shadow’ may taint the individual’s emotional 
endurance to variations in risk, and ultimately affect decisions on whether to avoid or 
use the environment. In this dissertation, College Station, Texas, and Tel Aviv, Israel, 
were chosen to represent different security contexts: A society with a very low exposure 
(almost none) to the threat of terrorism vs. a society which for many years has been 
experiencing a high exposure to the threat of explosives.  
The third independent variable, linked to the experience a certain society has 
with the threat of terrorism, is building-use. This research focuses on buildings of a 
public nature. These represent the most probable targets of terrorism, and it is for such 
buildings that issues of accessibility and projected image are important. Within this 
general group of buildings, the research looks into which building-uses the public in 
each of the examined societies perceives to be associated with terrorism.  
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The two additional independent variables that the conceptual model outlines are 
two groups of visual cues that can be detected in the built environment: The 
physical/structural cues of the environment (i.e., design elements), and the social cues. 
This research only examines the physical/structural cues of the environment. The design 
elements that were tested in this dissertation are related to the façades and entrances of 
buildings. These two design components have major security functions and can also 
impact the first impression of a building.  
Within the general concept of façade and entrance design, the specific foci of this 
dissertation were elements that, as indicated in the literature review, are extremely 
relevant to security from terrorism as well as to the question of human perception: The 
level of fortification/openness as represented in the façade design (i.e., solid-glass ratio), 
and the conspicuousness of the access control security measures in the overall 
architectural design of the entrance (to what extend the access control security measures 
appear as part of the overall design or look as temporarily stationed machines). 
The model specifies four dependent variables which resonate with the range of 
people’s responses. This range of responses includes cognitive processes (i.e., thought 
and resulted feeling), level of emotional comfort (i.e., stress level), and behavioral 
disposition (i.e., action propensity).  
The first dependent variable relates to the level of awareness of security from 
terrorism, i.e., how much this issue is on the person’s mind. This variable indicates 
whether the specific building-use and design trigger thoughts about the threat of 
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terrorism without placing judgment on how secure a person considers the environment to 
be.  
The second dependent variable is the person’s overall sense of security. The 
model suggests that the overall sense of security is comprised of two intertwined 
appraisals of a situation. One refers to the perceived probability of a terrorist attack in a 
specific building-use and with specific design features. The other appraisal relates 
directly to how safe the individual feels in that environment.  
The third dependent variable proposed in the conceptual model is the individual’s 
level of stress, i.e., his/her state of anxiety. Examination of this factor may show what 
instances of the independent variables can be considered as stress inducing stimuli and 
what may facilitate a reduction in the stress level, particularly as we examine different 
design alternatives.  
The fourth dependent variable is the person’s behavioral disposition as a reaction 
to the independent variables. This includes the person’s level of motivation and 
likelihood to enter the facility and use the building.  
 
6.2.3  The Hypotheses 
 
Two levels of research hypotheses were included in the conceptual framework. The first 
level assumes interdependency among the dependent variables when people are exposed 
to the independent variables of the distal level (i.e., the current level of threat, the 
societal-security-context and the building-use variables). This interdependency links a 
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rise in the awareness of the issue of security to a reduction in the sense of security 
(elevation in perceived risk and in feeling insecure), and to an increase in the level of 
anxiety and the tendency to avoid entering the building.  
 The hypotheses of the first level assume main effects to the current level of 
terrorism threat and the societal-security-context, as well as an interaction between these 
two variables in influencing all four dependent variables. With respect to the current 
level of threat, the assumption is that the greater it is, the more the issue of security from 
terrorism occupies the person’s mind, the lower the sense of security, and the higher the 
anxiety level and the tendency to avoid entering the building. Regarding the societal-
security-context, a similar tendency was hypothesized in the case of a society that is 
usually under a high level of terrorism threat (e.g., Israel) vs. a society that is not 
accustomed to living under such a threat (e.g., Texas). The assumed interaction claims 
that the extent to which the current level of terrorism threat influences all aspects of 
people’s reactions is moderated by how accustomed the person is to such a reality. 
People who are not used to the threat (i.e., Texans) are more affected by the current 
threat level than people who usually live under a high level of terrorism threat (e.g., 
Israel).  
This level of hypotheses also interlinks the effects of building-use on people’s 
reactions with the societal-security-context. The more a building-use is perceived in a 
certain society as a probable target of terrorism, the more the issue of security from 
terrorism is on a person’s mind, the lower the sense of security, the higher the anxiety 
level, and the greater the inclination to avoid the building. More specifically, and based 
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on the results of the pretest (detailed in section 5.1), a city hall should trigger similar 
thoughts with regards to security from terrorism, a similar sense of security, and a 
similar anxiety level both in Texas and in Israel. A shopping-mall, on the other hand, 
would create a greater awareness of the issue of security from terrorism, a lower sense of 
security and a higher anxiety level with Israelis than Texans. 
The second level of hypotheses relates to the tangible, visible elements in the 
environment, and speaks of what happens when people approach a building. These 
hypotheses elaborate on the assumed effects that each of the two visual architectural 
variables (i.e., the solid-glass ratio in the façade design and the conspicuousness of the 
access control security measures in the overall architectural design of the entrance) in 
combination with the distal level variables have on the four different dependent 
variables. This level of hypotheses presents a different, more complex relationship 
between the dependent variables.  
Focusing on the examined variable of façade design, it is hypothesized that 
people’s awareness of security from terrorism and their sense of security are both higher 
when confronted with a building that looks more fortified, with a mostly solid concrete 
façade than when approaching a building of extensive window area. The magnitude of 
this effect is assumed to be affected by both the current level of terrorism threat as well 
as by the societal-security-context. With respect to the threat level, the higher the threat 
of terrorism is—the greater the effect is presumed to be. Focusing on the societal-
security-context, the variations in a person’s awareness of security and sense of security 
as affected by the design of the façade would be greater in a society that is not used to 
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the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texas), than in a society that is accustomed to living under 
the threat (e.g., Israel).   
Another hypothesis interlinks the variable of glass-solid ratio in the façade design 
to the current level of terrorism threat, in the way that these influence a person’s 
stress/anxiety level. When there is a terrorism threat, a person would be more anxious 
when confronted with a building of extensive window area (congruent with low sense of 
security). When there is no terrorism threat, a person would be more anxious when the 
building’s façade is solid (as this design elevates the awareness to the issue of security). 
Focusing on the architectural variable of the access control security measures at 
the entrance to a building, it is assumed that the mere existence of visible measures 
(whether designed or temporary stationed machines) increases people’s awareness of the 
issue of security from terrorism. With respect to variations in this variable, the 
hypothesis is that when confronted with conspicuous security measures that appear as 
temporary stationed machines, people’s overall sense of security is reduced and their 
anxiety level is increased. Well-designed measures, which seem as part of the entrance, 
enhance the sense of security and reduce the level of anxiety.   
 For both examined architectural variables, the assumption is that people that are 
not used to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Texans) tend to follow their sense of security 
with actions, while people who are accustomed to the threat of terrorism (e.g., Israelis) 
tend to use buildings regardless of their sense of security.     
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6.3  Examining and Illustrating the Conceptual Framework 
 
The methodology used to empirically test and illustrate the conceptual framework 
entailed a cross-national examination, and was composed of three main studies and a 
pretest. The three studies constituted a sequence of progressive phases where each study 
replicated and extended the previous one, putting another variable to the test.  
The pretest, which was the first step of the empirical examination of the 
conceptual model, identified for each society the building-uses that are perceived to be 
associated with terrorism threat. Participants in both societies rated the probability of a 
bombing attack occurrence in each of 20 given building-uses on a 0% to 100% scale. 
The statistical analysis of the collected data utilized Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
tests, as well as Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients. The results of this 
survey guided the selection of two building-uses that were subsequently included in the 
series of studies.   
The subsequent three studies, administered in both countries, utilized a quasi-
experimental procedure. The use of this procedure enabled full control of the variations 
in critical variables in correspondence with the conceptual model. First, the procedure 
facilitated the testing of the effects of two specific building-uses, two variations of each 
of the two examined architectural elements, in two different levels of terrorism threat. 
Second, the procedure made it possible to have the exact same examination in two 
societies of different exposure to the threat (hence “quasi-“). The research included a 
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total of 1071 participants. These were convenience samples of undergraduate students 
from College Station, Texas and Tel Aviv, Israel.  
The three studies utilized computer-based web driven research platforms. The 
computer program randomly assigned participants from both societies to different 
scenarios. Each scenario described a “reality” of a high or low level of terrorism threat in 
the country and a certain public building to which the respondent was about to go and 
meet a friend. The scenarios in the first study consisted of written descriptions, while the 
second and third studies included images of the building as well. After reviewing a 
scenario, each participant was asked to answer several questions.  
The complete questionnaire, used in studies 2 and 3, included seven questions 
pertaining to the four dependent variables of the conceptual model. These questions were 
devised to test how important the issue of a terrorism threat is in the respondent’s mind, 
the respondent’s sense of security, his/her state of anxiety, and the respondent’s 
tendency to use the environment in light of the given situation. The first study included 
the same questions except for the questions regarding the tendency to enter the building, 
since no visual manipulations were included. The second and third studies included three 
additional questions at the end of the questionnaire to clarify the respondent’s basic 
impression of the building’s security as affected by the visual manipulation. 
The first study explored how a specific building-use moderates the effects of 
variations in the current threat of terrorism on people from two societies of different 
exposure to the threat (Texas vs. Israel). As such, this was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups 
research design. The examination pertained only to the distal level hypotheses, focusing 
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on the conceptual characteristics of a building, before architectural solutions are 
introduced. This examination also allowed to test whether the treatments that defined the 
current level of terrorism threat worked.  
   The second study added the architectural variable of façade design. This phase 
was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups research design and tested the effects of the glass-
solid ratio in the façade design as related to two building-uses in two possible levels of 
terrorism threat (high threat vs. no threat) and on respondents from two societies of 
different exposure to the threat (Texas vs. Israel). The two variations to the architectural 
variable were achieved using the same basic image and manipulating only the examined 
variable. One image showed an all-solid concrete façade, the other displayed an all-glass 
façade.  
The third study set the variable of terrorism threat level at the high level, and 
added to the investigation the variable of the conspicuousness of the security measures in 
the overall design of the entrance. Therefore, the third study employed a  2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
between-groups research design with four independent variables: building-use, societal-
security-context, glass-solid ratio in the façade design and the conspicuousness of the 
security measures in the overall design of the entrance. Each participant was exposed to 
a scenario depicting a high level of threat, a certain building-use (one of two possible), 
and two images—one of the façade (showing an all-glass or a solid façade) and a close-
up image of the entrance of the building (showing access-control security measures that 
appear as part of the overall architectural design of the entrance or those that look as 
temporary stationed machines). As in the second study, the manipulation of each 
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architectural variable consisted of a basic image that varied only in the examined 
element. 
The material for the three studies was developed utilizing techniques that have 
been recognized as effective in previous social sciences research, political science and 
architecture research (please see section 4.3.2.3.1 for details). The questionnaire was 
carefully developed using scales that have been proven as reliable and valid for self-
reported responses in social research (please see section 4.3.2.3.2 for details). The 
reliability of measurement was further strengthened using multiple questions to test each 
of the dependent variables. Statistical examinations were performed to confirm the level 
of reliability or association between indicators of the same variable.  
The statistical analysis of the data collected in the three studies was conducted in 
a few stages. The first stage of the statistical analysis for each study was conducted per 
dependent variable. The main statistical examination in each case was a univariate 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The second stage of analysis looked for connections 
among the dependent variables within each study. For that purpose bi-variate Pearson 
product-moment correlations were performed for each sample separately. In the second 
and third studies, further examination of the specific links between the tendency to 
avoid/enter a building and the sense of security was done using a repeated-measure 
ANOVA. Additional analysis focused on the questions that were intended to clarify the 
effect of the visual architectural manipulations on the perception of the level of security 
in the building.  
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6.4  Discussion of Main Findings, Inferences and Concerns   
 
The results of the studies show that the existence of the threat of terrorism, i.e., the 
knowledge that terrorism is or is not an imminent threat, is predominant in influencing 
all levels of people’s security-related responses: How much it is on their mind, their 
sense of security, their level of anxiety and their inclination to use/avoid public buildings 
(see Table 6.1). This notion highlights an issue that has been mentioned in the literature 
review as relevant and important: the power of the media as it alarms the population 
about terrorism attacks. The results also illustrate the fact that the characteristics of the 
built environment have only a small role in influencing feelings of security in the context 
of terrorism threat.  
It can be argued that these findings support the legitimacy of using architectural 
design in ways that promote people’s psycho-emotional well-being (i.e., make them feel 
better by reducing their fear). In other words, in light of the overwhelming effect that the 
threat of terrorism has on people, architectural design does not have the power to revoke 
the fear altogether, but may alleviate some of the concern. 
Concerning the globalism that is associated with the threat of terrorism, the 
findings exemplify several levels of differences between the samples of the two 
examined societies (i.e., Texas and Israel). The first level relates to general differences in 
the scope of reactions. The second concerns differences between the participants from 
the two societies with regards to the specific building-uses that were tested in the 
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research. The third level refers to differences that were found in the participants’ 
reaction to the mere existence of access control security measures at the entrance.  
These findings support the notion that people’s reactions to the threat of 
terrorism in the context of the built environment are to some extent based on over-time 
familiarity with the threat. This can be linked back to the learning proposition that was 
presented in the literature review, which emphasizes the importance of familiarity with a 
certain threat and with the physical conditions which can either facilitate or hinder it.  
Nonetheless, other findings indicate similarities in the responses of participants 
from the two societies. These similarities were found in particular with relation to the 
specific design configurations of the architectural elements that were tested throughout 
the research.  
The resemblance in the responses of participants from Texas and Israel, as 
related to visual cues of the environment may provide credence to the innate 
proposition, discussed in the literature review. These findings suggest that people from 
different cultures/societies around the world, with very different experiences with the 
threat of terrorism, still react similarly to some cues of the environment. Following this 
line of thought, this may imply that there is some sort of a global pattern of reactions to 
architectural cues in the context of terrorism threat.    
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TABLE 6.1. Summary of the general findings that relate to the effects of variations in the levels of terrorism threat, and variations in 
the societal-security-context on all the participants’ examined security-related responses.   
 
Dependent variables Independent variables  
 Current level of terrorism threat 
 
Societal-security-context 
Perceived probability of attack 
(examined in the pretest)   
  
 Texas < Israel 
Awareness (how much security 
from terrorism is on the mind) 
High threat > Low threat Texas < Israel 
 
Anxiety state High threat > Low threat In low level of threat  In high level of threat 
 (studies 1, 2):    (studies 2, 3):  
 Texas < Israel Texas = Israel 
   
   
   
   
   






Sense of insecurity High threat > Low threat Texas < Israel 
 
Tendency to avoid the building  High threat > Low threat Texas = Israel 
  
“>/<“ symbol indicates which of the two variations of the independent variable elicited statistically significant higher ratings in the 
dependent variable compared to the other optional variation.  
“=” symbol indicates that no statistical significance was found between the ratings of the two variations of the variable.   





 The overall differences between the participants from the two societies were 
exhibited along the different parameters of human reaction. As shown in Table 6.1, 
participants from the two societies exemplified difference in the general assessment of 
terrorism risk which corresponds to the actual occurrence rate in each of the societies: 
The Israeli participants perceived the probability of a terrorism attack as higher than 
Texans, regardless of the current threat level or the characteristics of the built 
environment. In addition, the results show that the Israeli participants, who are used to 
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life with the threat of terrorism, had security from terrorism on their minds more than the 
Texan participants and had a lower sense of security than the Texan participants who are 
not used to the threat.  
With regards to the anxiety state, as Table 6.1 indicates, participants from the 
two societies were similar in their responses when terrorism was a major concern. 
However, when terrorism was not a concern, the Texans exhibited a much lower anxiety 
level than the Israelis. The anxiety level of the Israeli participants was quite high and did 
not change due to changes in any of the examined independent variables—whether 
“distal”: current level of threat and building-use, or ”proximate”: architectural variables. 
The anxiety level of the Texan participants was more sensitive to variations in these 
variables.  
The findings also support the notion that people who are not accustomed to living 
with the threat of terrorism (i.e., Texans), tend to follow their sense of security with 
actions, while people who are used to the threat (i.e., Israelis) tend to use buildings 
regardless of their feeling of security. The latter finding has implications especially with 
regards to commercial buildings whose purpose is to attract people.  
Differences between participants from the two societies with regards to the 
specific building-uses were observed in the participants’ assessment of risk of terrorism, 
in their awareness of security from the threat, in their overall sense of security and in 
their tendency to use the building.  
In the pretest, the Israeli participants, having experienced the threat, seemed to 
associate terrorism with building-uses that had been targeted in their country, and 
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considered bus stations and dining facilities as the most probable targets. The Texan 
perception of risk of terrorism as associated with building-uses seemed to be based on 
the participants’ recollection of the September 11 attack, as well as on ideas that movies 
and TV shows propagate. Texan participants exhibited the highest sensitivity to 
transportation terminals (particularly airports) and large sports venues (stadiums). 
Government facilities, with the exception of a city hall, were found to be perceived as 
moderately probable targets in Texas, relative to other building-uses, and the least 
probable targets in Israel. The analysis of the pretest concluded with the selection of city 
hall and a shopping mall as the two building-uses on which the subsequent three studies 
focused.  
With regards to the particular building-uses of a city hall and a shopping mall, 
participants from both societies were similar in their perceived probability of attack as 
associated with a city hall, while the Israelis rated a shopping mall as of higher 
probability of attack than the Texans did (pretest).   
Following this notion, the main examination found that a city hall had a similar 
effect on the participants from the two societal-security-contexts with respect to how 
much security from terrorism was on their mind, their general sense of security and their 
anxiety level. A shopping mall elicited more thoughts of terrorism and greater insecurity 
at the Israeli participants, compared to the Texans.  
The action propensity was the only measure that did not follow these general 
patterns. In the case of a city hall, instead of the assumed similar reaction by participants 
from both societies, the results show that the Texan participants tended to avoid it more 
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than the Israeli participants. The results concerning the shopping mall show that in the 
second study, in low level of terrorism threat, the Texan participants avoided it more 
than the Israeli participants. In high level of terrorism threat, the tendency was opposite 
– Israelis avoided a shopping mall more than the Texans. However, in the third study, 
which dealt only with high level of terrorism, the samples from the two societies were 
similar in their inclination to use/avoid a shopping mall.  
Looking at the mean ratings of these findings (Table 6.2), we find that the action 
propensity of the Israeli sample was more affected than the Texans’ by the change in 
threat level as well as by the visibility of access control security measures. A high level 
of terrorism elevated the Israelis tendency to avoid a shopping mall more than it affected 
the Texans. The existence of visible access control security measures (regardless of their 
design) decreased the Israelis tendency to avoid the building, while it seemed to 
somewhat elevate the tendency to avoid a shopping mall by the Texan sample.  
These findings suggest that the action propensity of people that are used to living 
in a high level of terrorism threat is more influenced by changes of threat level. In 
addition, the level of familiarity with security measures seems to influence the tendency 






TABLE 6.2. Summary of the findings that relate to effects of the interaction between the building-use and the societal-security-
context on all the participants’ examined security-related responses.   
 
Dependent variables                                            Building-use 
 City hall Shopping mall 
Perceived probability of attack  In pretest: In pretest: 
 Texas = Israel Texas < Israel 
 
 
Awareness (how much security 
from terrorism is on the mind) 
Across all conditions 
(studies 1, 2, 3): 
Across all conditions  
(studies 1, 2, 3): 
 Texas = Israel Texas < Israel 
 
 
Anxiety state Across all conditions 
(studies 1, 2, 3): 
Before seeing the building 
(study 1):                    
After seeing the building 
(studies 2, 3):                  
 Texas = Israel Texas < Israel  Texas = Israel 
 
 
Sense of insecurity Across all conditions 
(studies 1, 2, 3): 
Before seeing the building 
(study 1): 
After seeing the building 
(studies 2, 3):                 
 Texas = Israel Texas = Israel Texas < Israel 
  
 
Tendency to avoid the building  Across all conditions 
(studies 2, 3): 
Low threat &  High threat & 
See façade  
High threat &  
 See façade See façade and access 
control measures  Texas > Israel (study 2): (study 2): 
    (study 3): 
  Texas > Israel Texas < Israel Texas = Israel 
  (2.04)   (1.88) (2.56)    (3.06) (2.73)   (2.80) 











    








“>/<“symbol indicates which of the two variations of societal-security-context elicited statistically significant higher ratings in the 
dependent variable compared to the other optional variation.   
“=” symbol indicates that no statistical significance was found between the ratings of the two variations of the variable. 




With respect to the effects of the visual/architectural cues of the environment, the 
results show some general patterns that were similar between participants from the two 
societies, and others, more specific per building-use or level of terrorism threat, that 
were different. 
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The glass-solid ratio of the façade did not influence the awareness of security 
from terrorism of participants from both societies and across the different studies 
(studies 2, 3). 
Nonetheless, the design of the façade was found to influence the sense of security 
and the tendency to use the building of participants from the two societies. The effects 
were similar across societies, though different for the variations of the level of terrorism 
threat and of the existence of access control security measures.  
As illustrated in Table 6.3, for participants from both societies, and for both 
building-uses, when terrorism was not a threat and there were no visible access control 
security measures (study 2), a glass façade elicited a higher sense of security than a solid 
façade, though the tendency to avoid/enter the building was similar for both façade 
designs. When the threat of terrorism was high, and as long as the access control security 
measures were not visible to the participants (study 2), a solid façade elicited a higher 
sense of security and all the respondents had a higher propensity to enter the building 
than when the façade was all glass. However, when access control security measures 
were visible to participants (regardless of their design) in high level of terrorism threat 
(study 3), then the two façade designs elicited similar ratings of security/insecurity, 
while participants from both societies tended to enter more a glass façade than a solid 




TABLE 6.3. Summary of the effects of the glass-solid ratio in the façade design on the participants’ sense of security and tendency to 
enter the building, across societal-security-contexts and building-uses, in variations in the current level of terrorism threat and in the 
existence of access control security measures. 
 
Dependent variables Variation in current level of terrorism threat and in the existence of access control security measures 
 
Low threat & No access 
control security measures 
(study 2) 
High threat & No access 
control security measures 
(study 2) 
High threat & Some access 
control security measures 
(study 3) 
 
> Glass façade Solid façade < Glass façade Solid façade = Glass façade Sense of insecurity Solid façade 












Tendency to avoid Solid façade = Glass façade Solid façade < Glass façade Solid façade > Glass façade 












“>/<“ symbol indicates which variation of the façade design elicited statistically significant higher ratings in the dependent variable 
compared to the other design alternative.  
“=” symbol indicates that no statistical significance was found between the ratings of the dependent variable due to the two variations 
of façade design.   
       Indicates the mean rating of a solid façade                Indicates the mean rating of a glass facade 





Focusing on the influence of the variable of façade design on the anxiety level, 
the results indicate differences between participants from the two societies. The anxiety 
level of the Israeli participants was not affected by the façade design (or by any other 
variable). However, in Texas, as exhibited in Table 6.4, for both levels of terrorism 
threat, as long as there was no indication of access control security measures, a city hall 
elicited higher anxiety when the façade of the building was all glass than when it was 
solid concrete. In the case of a shopping mall, a solid façade elicited higher anxiety 
levels than a glass façade.       
 
 
TABLE 6.4. The effects of the glass-solid ratio in the façade design on the participants’ anxiety level, per societal-security-context 
and building-use, in variations of the current level of terrorism threat and in the existence of access control security measures. 
 






Low threat & No access 
control security measures 
(study 2) 
 
High threat & No access 
control security measures 
(study 2) 
High threat & Some access 
control security measures 
(study 3) 
Texas City hall Solid façade < Glass façade Solid façade < Glass façade Solid façade = Glass façade 
 Shopping mall Solid façade > Glass façade Solid façade > Glass façade Solid façade = Glass façade 
     
Israel Both building-uses Solid façade = Glass façade Solid façade = Glass façade Solid façade = Glass façade 
     
“>/<“ symbol indicates which variation of the façade design elicited statistically significant higher ratings of anxiety compared to the 
other design alternative.  
“=” symbol indicates that no statistical significance was found between the ratings of anxiety due to the two variations of façade 
design.   
   
 
 
Concerning the variable of access control security measures, the results show that 
when the threat of terrorism was high, the mere existence of such measures (regardless 
of their design) changed the effects that variations in the façade design had on several 
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levels of the participants’ responses. As illustrated in Table 6.4, the effect of the façade 
design on the anxiety level of the Texan participants was attenuated. The results shown 
in Table 6.3 suggest that being able to see any type of access control security measures 
while approaching the building reassured all participants enough to have the same sense 
of security towards both façade designs, and even make them more inclined to enter the 
glass façade than the solid façade.  
The last few results illustrate how different combinations of threat level, façade 
design and location of access control security measures may affect people’s perceptions 
of security and their consequential responses in different ways. For example, in a reality 
where terrorism is a major concern and access control security measures need to be used 
and are seen from the outside of the building, the design would attract people more if the 
access control security measures are associated with a glass façade. At the same time, if 
the access control security measures are internal and cannot be detected from the 
outside, a building would foster greater sense of security and be more attractive when the 
façade is solid and looks more fortified. Further research should focus on verifying and 
further establishing this proposition. 
This example, and other propositions that may emerge from the findings, may 
provide a basis to the development of design guidelines. Such guidelines may direct new 
designs and assist in the adaptation of existing buildings to a change in the level of 
terrorism threat.  
With this in mind, it should be noted that this research did not test the effect of 
access control security measures in scenarios where terrorism was not a threat. Hence, 
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the calming effect it had on the participants that were facing a glass façade might not 
take place or even be reversed in a reality in which terrorism is not a concern. Further 
study should examine the effect of access control security measures on people in a 
peaceful, terrorism-free context.  
The analysis of these results can also be addressed on a more theoretical level, 
referring to concepts and theories of security and perception of security that have been 
reviewed in the literature review. As indicated by many sources, the basic physical 
attributes of a place that are considered to influence perception of security are: prospect 
(visual openness), escape and refuge (Appleton, 1975; Fisher and Nasar, 1992; Holahan, 
1982; Kaplan, et al., 1998; Nasar and Jones, 1997; Newman, 1972; Tijerino, 1998; 
Ulrich, 1993). Using that terminology, a solid, concrete façade, may seem to provide a 
greater refuge, i.e., greater level of protection that the building appears to provide against 
an attack, compared to a glass façade. However, a glass façade, compared to a solid 
concrete façade, can be considered as of better prospect as it provides a greater visual 
openness. In addition, a glass façade may indicate less entrapment in the event of attack, 
and hence provide a greater opportunity to escape, than in the case of a solid concrete 
façade.  
Continuing this line of thought, the results of the research suggest that different 
qualities of the building (as represented in the façade design) influenced the sense of 
security and the attractiveness of the building as a factor of the level of terrorism threat. 
In low level of terrorism threat, the qualities of escape and prospect were more 
prominent than the quality of refuge in fostering a sense of security. However, when the 
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threat of terrorism was high, then the quality of refuge, i.e., the apparent level of 
fortification, became more important in fostering a greater sense of security and even in 
attracting the participants to the building.  
In addition, the introduction of visible access control security measures at the 
entrance, in the context of high level of terrorism, seemed to balance the “security 
qualities” of the building in a way that made both façade designs foster similar sense of 
security, and event make a glass façade be more attractive than a solid concrete facade. It 
can be argued that access control security measures contributes to the quality of refuge 
of a building (as it elevates protection), and also regulates some sort of social 
surveillance and therefore relates to the quality of prospect.   
These theoretical propositions can be furthered investigated and developed, 
through the examination of other social-security-context, other architectural design 
elements and possibly – other levels of terrorism threat.   
 In looking at the two examined designs of the access control security measures, 
the results show that the difference between them influenced only the participants’ 
awareness of security. The effect on the awareness of security from terrorism was 
different in the two societies though similar for both building-uses. As shown in Table 
6.5, for the Texan sample, an entrance with temporary stationed machines elicited more 
thoughts of terrorism than an entrance in which the access control security measures 




TABLE 6.5. Summary of the effects of the design of the access control security measures at the entrance to the building on the 
participants’ awareness of security from terrorism (i.e., how much it was on the mind), per societal-security-context, across building-
uses.  
 
Societal-security-context High level of terrorism threat & Some indication of access control security measures  
(study 3) 
 
Texas Access control security measures that seem part of the design < Temporary machines 
Israel Access control security measures that seem part of the design > Temporary machines 
  
“>/<“ symbol indicates which variation of the façade design elicited statistically significant higher ratings in how much security 
from terrorism was on the mind compared to the other design alternative.  
“=” symbol indicates that no statistical significance was found between the ratings of in how much security from terrorism was on 
the mind due to the two variations of façade design.   





As we near the end of this discussion, additional comments need to be made 
about the limitations of this research. Some relate to the conceptual framework while 
others concern the constraints of the methodology and design.  
The conceptual framework presented in this dissertation concentrates on how the 
use and image of public buildings moderate perceived threats to personal security 
associated with terrorism. For that purpose, an attempt to develop a comprehensive 
conceptual model was made, through detailing its components and narrowing the 
specific investigation to certain controllable variables. Though the model addresses a 
host of cultural/political variables as well as architectural elements, it might not be 
exhaustive, and might not capture the complexity of the real world. For example, one 
can add additional variables that may influence individual’s perception of safety. For 
example: demographic characteristics that relate to specific knowledge regarding 
security issues, age, or personal family status that may influence the sense of 
responsibility and level of cautiousness. In addition, though the model tries to cover the 
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spectrum of people’s reactions to threatening situations, other and more detailed nuances 
may be found.    
 In examining characteristics of the built-environment this dissertation focuses on 
very specific design elements in the façade and entrance of two very specific building-
uses. There is a need to examine other building-uses under the framework, as well as 
consider other architectural elements that may influence perceptions of security. These 
include: proportions of facades, proportions of fenestrations and entrances, colors, 
materials, etc. In addition, with the intent to simulate a first experience with a building, 
the focus on façade and the entry in that façade are not necessarily representative to all 
the possible “viewsheds” for a first encounter with a building. Other scenarios of first 
encounter with buildings may include different architectural elements, as some public 
buildings have garages underneath or may be accessed directly through a public 
transportation compound. Finally, the element of social cues, represented in the scheme 
of the conceptual model as a factor of possible influence on people’s security-related-
reactions, was not developed or tested in this research. Future research should test this 
factor as well. 
 Concerning the methodology that was used in this research, a few cautionary 
notes must be made. The use of quasi-experimental methodology, while allowing 
attribution of causality, and facilitating the cross-cultural aspect of the investigation, may 
not be able to create conditions that replicate a complex phenomenon in the real world. 
In order to minimize this problem, the research utilized a phased design (three studies 
and a pretest) that allowed for a thorough investigation in which every phase added 
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another variable to the test. Furthermore, the material used in the studies was carefully 
developed to account for as realistic variations as possible of the independent variables, 
utilizing techniques that have been recognized as effective in previous research. The 
questionnaire was devised using scales and type of questions that have been proven as 
reliable and valid for self-reported responses in social research. The reliability of 
measurement was further strengthened using multiple questions to test each of the 
dependent variables, and statistical examinations were performed to confirm the level of 
reliability or association between indicators of the same variable. 
The generalizability of the findings requires another cautionary note due to the 
use of convenience samples comprising college students who were aware of being in a 
study. Though, as indicated in the literature, when testing the merit of a theoretical 
proposition, if the examined sample is a part of the population to which the theoretical 
proposition relates, then it should work on that sample (Aronson et al., 1995; 
McDermott, 2002; Mook, 1983). In addition, the research design facilitated the exposure 
of each participant to only one treatment and reduced the risk that participants would 
change their responses in order to conform to what they think the researcher’s 
expectations are.  
The focus of the research on only two societies with two extreme levels of threat 
exposure helped in reaching significant statistical results. Still, this factor was an 
additional constraint to the generalizability of the results. The two specific communities 
that were tested, each with its own cultural and societal “baggage”, may have produced 
findings that cannot be generalized to other places around the world. To further 
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substantiate the findings of this research, and to be able to make general claims on how 
architecture influences people’s responses to the global threat of terrorism, future 
research should be conducted in other societal-political-contexts around the world. 
In conclusion, while recognizing the above limitations, the results of this research 
illustrate that while the characteristics of the built environment are only supportive 
actors in influencing people’s perceptions of security in the face of the threat of 
terrorism - they do count. Hopefully, this research will serve as a first step in exploring 
how buildings, with their specific use and design, and how security measures and their 
design influence all levels of people’s well-being. 
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Consent Form, English Version 
 
Version 3, 12/12/06 
CONSENT FORM 
You have been asked to take part in a research study on people's security related responses to architectural elements, 
which will be the basis for Gali Zilbershtein's research in architecture at Texas A&M University. You have been 
selected to be a possible participant because you are a student at Texas A&M University, Texas, or at Tel Aviv 
University, Israel, one of up to 1,200 college students who will participate in this study. The purpose of this study is to 
better understand the influence of the built environment on people’s perception of personal safety in the face of current 
world events. 
If you agree to be part of this study you will be asked to review a scenario which includes a written description of a 
situation within a hypothetical reality and an image of a building associated with that description; you would be asked 
to place yourself within the scenario and answer questions regarding your response to the building in the scenario. It 
should take about 10-20 minutes to finish the exercise, which will be conducted via computer. Since the experiment 
deals with issues of security in today's reality, you should be aware that the scenario may be to some extent sensitive 
in nature. Nevertheless, there are no risks associated with participation in this study greater than those ordinarily 
encountered in daily life.  
This Study is anonymous. To ensure your anonymity, your name will not appear on any documents in this packet and 
all your responses in this experiment will be coded. The records of this study will be kept private and no identifiers 
linking you to the study will be included in any sort of report that may be published. Research records will be stored 
securely, and only Gali Zilbershtein and Dr. Andrew Seidel will have access to the records. Your decision whether or 
not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations with Texas A&M University or with Tel 
Aviv University. If you decide to participate, you are free to refuse to answer any of the questions that may make you 
uncomfortable. You can withdraw at any time without your relations with the university, your job, benefits, etc., 
being affected. You will receive no monetary compensation or any other kind of benefits for your participation. 
If you have any questions regarding the study and/or your participation in it, you should contact Gali Zilbershtein at 
the address listed below. Alternatively, I may also contact Dr. Andrew Seidel at the address listed below with any 
questions regarding the study and/or your participation in it. 
This research study has been reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board -Human Subjects in Research, 
Texas A&M University, and the appropriate authority at the Tel Aviv University (the Ethics Committee). For 
research-related problems or questions regarding subjects' rights, you can contact the Institutional Review Board 
through Ms. Angelina M. Raines, Director of Research Compliance, Office of Vice President for Research at (979) 
458-4067 (araines@vprmail.tamu.edu). Additionally, you may contact Student Counseling Services at (979) 845-4427 
to discuss this experience. 
 
Please be sure you have read the above information, asked questions and received answers to your 
satisfaction. You will be given a copy of this consent document for your records. By signing this 
document you consent to participate in the study. 
 
 
Signature of Participant: _________________________________________ Date: _______________  
Signature of Researcher: _________________________________________ Date: _______________ 
 
 
Gali Zilbershtein, Ph.D. Candidate    Dr. Andrew Seidel 
Dept. of Architecture, Texas A&M University   Dept. of Architecture, Texas A&M University 
College Station, TX 77843-3137  College Station, TX 77843-3137 
1-(979) 412-1568, in Israel: (052) 555-775  1-(979) 845-6584 
E-mail: galiez@tamu.edu  Email: a-seidel@tamu.edu 
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מסמך הסכמה מדעת
  
 חלק מעבודת מחקר וזה הינ מחקר. התבקשת לקחת חלק במחקר העוסק בתגובות אנושיות הקשורות לנושאי ביטחון ולאלמנטים ארכיטקטונים
כיוון שהנך , פת במחקר זה/נבחרת כמשתתף. M&A saxeTי גלי זילברשטיין באוניברסיטת "המתבצעת ע, בתחום הארכיטקטורה
 ובאוניברסיטת באוניברסיטת תל אביב, סטודנטים 002,1 –אחת מ /אחד, M&A saxeTבאוניברסיטת  או ברסיטת תל אביבית באוני/סטודנט
מטרת המחקר היא להגיע להבנה טובה יותר של השפעות הסביבה הבנויה על תפישת הביטחון האישי  .שייקחו חלק במחקר זה, M&A saxeT
  .של האדם בתקופתנו הנוכחית
ותמונה של בנין המקושרת , י לסקור תסריט הכולל תיאור כתוב של מצב במציאות דמיונית/תתבקש, לקחת חלק במחקר זהמי /אם תסכים
. ולענות על שאלות באשר לתגובותיך למבנה המופיע בתסריט, י לדמיין את עצמך במציאות המתוארת בתסריט/תתבקש;  זהרלתיאו
, ימנו של מאחר שהמחקר עוסק בנושאי ביטחון במציאות. דקות 02 -ל  01 בין אמורה להמשך, שיתבצע דרך מחשב, ההשתתפות בסקר
  .יום-ההשתתפות במחקר אינה כרוכה בסיכון גדול מזה בו נתקלים בחיי היום, למרות זאת. בטבעו התסריט עשוי להיות רגיש
פרטים מזהים .  וכל תשובותיך לסקר יקודדו,שמך לא יופיע בשום מסמך הכלול בניסוי זה, להבטחת האנונימיות. מחקר זה הוא אנונימי
כשהגישה אליהם מוגבלת לגלי , רשומות המחקר ישמרו באופן מאובטח. הקושרים בינך למחקר זה לא יכללו באף פרסום הנוגע למחקר
שפיע בהווה או לא ת, או לא לקחת חלק בו, החלטתך באם לקחת חלק במחקר. בלבד)ledieS werdnA(סיידל  אנדרו זילברשטיין ולפרופסור
 ,ת לסרב לענות לשאלות הגורמות לך לחוסר נוחות/ה רשאי/תהיי, י להשתתף/אם תחליט. אוניברסיטת תל אביבבעתיד על יחסיך עם 
  . יפגעו' וכד, עבודתך, ללא חשש שיחסיך עם המוסד האקדמי, ת להפסיק את השתתפותך בכל שלב/ה רשאי/ותהיי
עומדת בפניך , לחילופין.  שכתובתה מצוינת בתחתית עמוד זה,י לגלי זילברשטיין/פנה,  בואו השתתפותך/בכל שאלה בדבר המחקר ו
  .שאף כתובתו מצוינת בזאת, סיידל אנדרו האפשרות לפנות לפרופסור
  באוניברסיטת המקבילה והסמכות במדעי ההתנהגות אדם בבני למחקר  אוניברסיטת תל אביבהאתיקה של י ועדת"מחקר זה אושר ע
 י/הפנ, בעיות הקשורות למחקר או לזכויות משתתפים/לשאלות M&A saxeT )stcejbuS namuH-draoB weiveR lanoitutitsnI(.
י לפנות לשרות הייעוץ /תוכל, בנוסף. li.ca.uat.tsop@vivar 3969046 )30(,, ראש החוג לפסיכולוגיה, עמירם רביב' פרופ פרופסורל
  . לדון בהתנסות זו,li.ca.uat.tsop@ohcysp, 5058046-30 ,לסטודנט
ינתן . ששאלת שאלות וקבלת תשובות לשביעות רצונך, ל"ה שקראת את המידע הנ/ה בטוח/בבקשה היי
נת את /בחתימתך על מסמך זה הנך נותן. לצורך רשומותיך הפרטיות, לך עותק של מסמך הסכמה זה
  .הסכמתך להשתתף במחקר
 
  ___________: תאריך   _____________________________________________: ת/חתימת המשתתף
  ___________: תאריך   ________________________________________________: חתימת החוקר
 
 
 ledieS werdnA .rD    etadidnaC .D.hP ,niethsrebliZ ilaG
 ytisrevinU M&A saxeT ,erutcetihcrA fo .tpeD   ytisrevinU M&A saxeT ,erutcetihcrA fo .tpeD
 7313-34877 XT ,noitatS egelloC     7313-34877 XT ,noitatS egelloC
 4856-548 )979(-1  577-555 )250( :learsI ni ,8651-214 )979(-1
  ude.umat@ledies-a :liamE  ude.umat@zeilag :liam-E
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Pretest: Survey Material, English Version 
 
Page 1 (Introduction, description of procedure, demographic information): 
 
Date:       
Gender (please circle):        M / F  




As we all know, life holds a lot of uncertainty. This uncertainty is often considered as the risks faced in our everyday 
living. There are risks due to forces of nature; there are health related risks that concern our personal choices and 
habits; there is the risk of malfunction of technology or equipment we use; risks of accidents due to human error or 
coincidences; and risks of becoming a victim to an act committed by another human being. The latter relate to acts of 
crime as well as to terrorism attacks which are part of our world.  
 
In this study we would like to learn how people form their perception of risks associated with terrorism, and how these 
risks relate to specific locations.  
 
In the next pages you will be presented with a list of locations. We ask you to record what you consider as the 
probability of a terrorism activity occurring in every one of those places. 









Please record the probability of a terrorism activity occurring in every one of the following buildings. When you 
estimate that probability, consider each particular facility (building) as it is located generally in United States, rather 
than being related to a specific town.  
 
Insert a probability number from 0 – 100, in the brackets after each building. 
A rating of 0 implies that you think there is no chance of a terrorism action in this type of building.  
A rating of 100 suggests that you are certain that such a building will be hit by a terrorism action.  
Naturally, the number between 0 and 100 indicate your risk assessment – the higher the number, the more risk of 
terrorism is associated with the building.  
 
List 
1. Railroad/subway station (                ) 
2. Shopping mall (              ) 
3. Hospital (    )   
4. University dormitories (           )  
5. Airport terminal (                ) 
6. Restaurant  (         )   
7. Stadium (     )   
8. Courthouse (         )    
9. Café (          )   
10. Municipal library (                 )  
11. General office building (             )  
12. Post office (         )  
13. Sea port terminal (                      ) 
14. Bank (             )    
15. Department store (                  ) 
16. City hall (     )   
17. Church (               ) 
18. Amusement park  (                  ) 
19. Central bus station/terminal (                    ) 
20. Movie theater (                     )  
813 
 noisreV werbeH ,lairetaM yevruS :tseterP
 
 :)noitamrofni cihpargomed ,erudecorp fo noitpircsed ,noitcudortnI( 1 egaP
 
  _________________: תאריך
נ/ ז          (:אנא הקף בעיגול)מין 




ישנם . יום-זו מוגדרת כסיכונים אותם אנו לוקחים בחיי היום אי ודאות, פעמים רבות. החיים טומנים בחובם הרבה אי ודאות, כידוע לכולם
קיים סיכון של תקלה טכנולוגית או ; ים בנושאי בריאות שקשורים בהחלטות והרגלים מתוך בחירהישנם סיכונ; סיכונים הקשורים בכוחות הטבע
. והסיכון של להיות קורבן למעשה זדון של אדם אחר; סיכונים של תאונות מקריות או כאלה הנובעות מטעות אנוש; של ציוד בו אנו משתמשים
  .שהם חלק מעולמנו, ראו להתקפות טרו, מתיחס למעשי פשע אלימים, סיכון זה
  
  . אנו מעוניינים ללמוד על תפישת הסיכון הקשור בטרור בהתיחס למקומות ספציפיים, במחקר זה
  
ת לסמן את הערכתך לסבירות התקיימות התקפת טרור בכל אחד מהמקומות /ה מתבקש/את. תוצג בפניך רשימת מקומות, בעמודים הבאים
  . המצויינים
  !כנותך חשובה והכרחית. י לעבוד באופן איטואיטיבי ומהיר/נסה. דה לפני תחילת העבודהי את ההוראות בקפי/אנא קרא
  









י לסבירות /התייחס, של כל אחד ואחד מהמבניםבהערכתך . ני את מידת הסבירות של התקפת טרור בכל אחד מהמבנים הבאים/בבקשה ציין
  .בישראל באופן כללי ולאו דווקא בהקשר לישוב ספציפי
  
  . בסוגריים שלצד כל מבנה001 ל 0י ערך הסתברותי בין /הכנס
  .ת שאין סיכוי שהתקפת טרור תתקיים בסוג זה של מבנה/ה חושב/ מבטא שאת0ערך 
  .ר תתקיים בסוג זה של מבנהה שהתקפת טרו/ה בטוח/ מבטא שאת001ערך של 
  .כך הסיכון של התקפת טרור במבנה זה גבוה יותר,  ככל שהערך גבוה יותר– מציינים את תפישת הסיכון שלך 001 - ו0הערכים שבין , כמובן
  
  רשימה
  ( _________ )בניין משרדים  .11
  ( _________ )בית דואר  .21
  ( _________ )טרמינל בנמל  .31
  ( _________ )בנק  .41
  ( _________ )חנות כלבו  .51
  ( _________ )בניין עירייה  .61
  ( _________ )בית כנסת  .71
  ( _________ )פארק שעשועים  .81
  ( _________ )תחנת אוטובוסים מרכזית  .91
 ( _________ )בית קולנוע  .02
 
  ( _________ )תחנת רכבת  .1
  ( _________ )קניון  .2
  ( _________ )בית חולים  .3
  ( _________ )מעונות סטודנטים  .4
  ( _________ )טרמינל בשדה תעופה  .5
 ( _________ )מסעדה  .6
  ( _________ )איצטדיון  .7
 ( _________ )בית משפט  .8
  ( _________ )בית קפה  .9
  ( _________ )ספרייה עירונית  .01
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The Three Studies: Complete Written Material, English Version 
 




In the following screens you will be presented with a hypothetical scenario. Please read the description of the situation 
carefully and try to place yourself in it.  
 
Upon reviewing the scenario you will be asked to respond to several questions.  
 
Now, please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Just try to choose the answers which seem to best 
describe the way you feel at the moment you are asked.  
 
Try to work quickly and intuitively - Your honesty is crucial!  
 
Before we begin, please take the time to answer some questions about your background. Note that your complete 
anonymity is assured!!!  
 




Screen 2 (Collection of demographic information): 
 
Hi there,  
Below are some simple questions about your background. Please take a few minutes and answer them.  
Please click on the "Next" button when you are done, in order to flip to the next page.  
  
1.   Gender:  
Please select: Male / Female   
 
2.   What is your age?  
 Please select: 18-21 /  21-30 / +30   
 
3.  What is your major area of study?   
Please Select: Agriculture / Political Science / Architecture / Behavioral Sciences / Biology / Chemistry / 
Computer Science / Education / Engineering / Fine Arts / History / Linguistics / Literature / Physics / Other   
 
4. What is your marital status? 
 Please Select: Single / Married / Divorced / Widow/Widower   
 
5. Do you have any children?  
 Please Select: Yes / No   
 
6.  Have you ever served in the military / National Guard / police? 
 Please Select Yes No   
 
7.  What is the size of the town or city in which you spent most of your life? 
 Please Select: Less than 250000 residents / 250000-500000 residents / Above 500,000 residents  
 
8.  How religious do you consider yourself to be?  
 Please Select: Not at all / Somewhat / Moderately / Very much so   
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Screen 3 (Specific instructions): 
 
OK, we have some more instructions now...  
 
We are going to ask you to consider a scenario. Please try to place yourself in the reality it describes, and answer the 
questions following it as intuitively as possible.  
 
(The following text appeared only in study 1:)  
 
Before we begin, we would like you to think of a *[insert building use variations: “city hall” / “shopping mall”]* 
you have been to in the last month or two.  
Please fill in the FULL name of this shopping mall in the box below (for example: The Sunnyvill Mall) :  
 





Screen 4 (Description of a specific scenario: Manipulating the level of terrorism threat and defining the building 
use. For the Texan sample, in creation of a low level of terrorism threat, terrorism threat was not mentioned at all 
Each participant was exposed to only one variation):  
 
 
(Scenario, Variation I) 
 
Urgent Newsbreak: 
A t t e n t i o n !!! 
 
The Secretary of Homeland Security has put the nation in the highest, most critical, RED ALERT warning, because of 
the recent number of acts of terror that were committed in many public buildings, all over the country (including 
several cases in Texas).  
The terrorist bombings, reported daily in the media, have become a major concern in every state of the nation!!!  
 
Today, you have to meet your friend at *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall” or, in the 
first study, the name of the facility that the participant had entered in screen 3,]*.  
 
(The following text appeared only in studies 2 and 3:)  
 
The following picture is of the *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall”]*. Please look at 
it as you answer the following questions. 
 
 
(Scenario, Variation II) 
 
Today, you have to meet your friend at *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall” or, in the 
first study the name of the facility that the participant had entered in screen 3,]*.  
 
(The following text appeared only in in studies 2 and 3:) 
 
The following picture is of the *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall”]*. Please look at 




The following is the questionnaire material. The questions were presented to the participants one question per 
screen. In studies 2 and 3, the images which included the architectural manipulations appeared at the top of each 
screen, above every question.  
 
 
Question 1 (Appeared in all three studies): 
  
Consider that you are now walking towards *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall” or 
the name of the facility that the participant had entered in screen 3, in study 1]* -- as you approach the building 
different aspects come to mind. 
 
Please rate how much each of the following aspects occupies your mind. 
 
 Not at all Very little Somewhat Moderately Very much 
1.1  The looks (aesthetics) of the building 1 2 3 4 5 
1.2  The orientation in the building (finding your
way around) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.3  The security from criminal activity 1 2 3 4 5 
1.4  The monumentality of the building (whether
it is imposing in size and shape) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1.5  The security from terrorism 
 




Question 2 (Appeared in all three studies):  
 
Given the circumstances *(insert reminder on the level of warning, pending on manipulation of threat)*, how 
dangerous do you consider your visit to the *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall” or 
the name of the facility that the participant had entered in screen 3, in study 1]* ? 
 
Not at all 
dangerous 
Not dangerous Undecided / neutral Dangerous Very 
dangerous 




Question 3 (Appeared in all three studies):  
 
How safe would you feel entering the *(Insert: building use)*? 
 
Very unsafe Unsafe Undecided / neutral Safe Very safe 




Question 4 (Appeared only in studies 2 and 3): 
 
Do you have reservations about meeting your friend in this location? 
 
Not at all Not much Undecided / neutral Yes, to some extent Very much so 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Question 5 (Appeared only in studies 2 and 3): 
 
What is the likelihood you would enter the building? 
 
Not at all likely Not likely Undecided / neutral Likely Very likely 




Question 6 (Appeared only in studies 2 and 3): 
 
Would you prefer to meet your friend at a different location? 
 
Not at all No Undecided / neutral Yes Very much 




Question 7 (Appeared in all three studies; Based on Spielberger et al., 1970): 
 
You are now on your way to meet your friend at *[insert building use variation: “the city hall” / “the shopping mall” 
or the name of the facility that the participant had entered in screen 3, , in study 1]*, (For high level of alert, insert: 
“while the country is under a red alert warning”)*.  
 
For each of the following statements, please select the option that best describes how you feel at this moment in time.  
 
 Not at all Somewhat Moderately Very much so
1.  I feel calm 1 2 3 4 
2. I feel secure 1 2 3 4 
3. I am tense 1 2 3 4 
4. I am regretful 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel at ease 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel upset 1 2 3 4 
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel rested 1 2 3 4 
9. I feel anxious 1 2 3 4 
10. I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
11. I feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 
12. I feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
13. I am jittery 1 2 3 4 
14. I feel "high strung" 1 2 3 4 
15. I am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16. I feel content 1 2 3 4 
17. I am worried 1 2 3 4 
18. I feel over-excited and rattled 1 2 3 4 
19. I feel joyful 1 2 3 4 
20.  I feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
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Question 8 (Appeared only in studies 2 and 3): 
 
How sophisticated is the security in this building? 
 
Very sophisticated Sophisticated Undecided / neutral Unsophisticated Very unsophisticated 




Question 9 (Appeared only in studies 2 and 3): 
 
Does the design of the building trigger thoughts about threats of terrorism? 
 
Not at all No Undecided / neutral Yes Very much 




Question 10 (Appeared only in studies 2 and 3): 
 
How effective is the design to deter terrorists? 
 
Very effective Effective Undecided / neutral Ineffective Very ineffective 






 noisreV werbeH ,lairetaM nettirW etelpmoC :seidutS eerhT ehT
 
 :)snoitcurtsni lareneg dna erudecorp fo noitpircseD( 1 neercS
 
  !ברוכים הבאים
 
י /י בקפידה את התאור של הסיטואציה ונסה/בבקשה קרא. במסכים הבאים יוצג תרחיש מסויים באמצעות תיאור כתוב של מצב במציאות כלשהי
  .לדמיין את עצמך במציאות המתוארת בתרחיש
 
  .י לענות על מספר שאלות/לאחר קריאת התרחיש תתבקש
 
י לבחור בתשובות שמתארות בצורה הטובה ביותר את מה /פשוט השתדל. י אין תשובות נכונות יותר או פחותחשוב לזכור כ, בענותך על השאלות
  .ת/נשאל/ ה ברגע בו את/ה מרגיש/שאת
 
  !כנותך חשובה והכרחית. י לעבוד באופן אינטואיטיבי ומהיר/נסה
 
  !ותך מובטחתי שאנונימי/דע. י בבקשה על מספר שאלות לגבי הרקע שלך/ענה, לפני שנתחיל
 
  .תודה רבה
 
 




  .לפניך מספר שאלות הקשורות ברקע שלך
  .על מנת לעבור לעמוד הבא "TXEN" י על מקש ה/בבקשה לחץ, בסיימך לענות על השאלות
  
  ?מהו מינך .1
   נקבה/ זכר 
 
  ?מהו גילך .2
  +03/03-12  / 12-81
 
  ?ת/ה לומד/מהו החוג בו את .3
 ספרות/לשון/ הסטוריה / אמנות / הנדסה / חינוך / מחשבים / כימיה / ביולוגיה /  מדעי ההתנהגות  /ארכיטקטורה/  מדעי המדינה  /חקלאות
   אחר/ מתמטיקה /  פיזיקה / 
 
  ?מה מצבך המשפחתי .4
   אלמנה/ אלמן /ה/גרוש / נשואה/נשוי / ה/רווק
 
  ?לדיםהאם יש לך י .5
    אין /יש
 
  ?האם שרתת בכוחות הבטחון .6
    לא /כן
 
 ? מהו הלאום שלך .7
אחר  / דרוזי / ערבי / יהודי 
 
  ?ה את עצמך/ה מחשיב/דתיה את/כמה דתי .8





 :)snoitcurtsni cificepS( 3 neercS
 
  ...עוד מספר הנחיות, ועכשיו
 
י על השאלות שיופיעו בהמשך בצורה /וענה, י למקם את עצמך במציאות המתוארת/בבקשה נסה. ת לקרוא מצב במציאות מסויימת/ה הולך/את
  .ה/ה יכול/האינטואיטיבית ביותר שאת
  
  )1 yduts ni ylno deraeppa txet gniwollof ehT(
 
י את שמו המלא של /בבקשה ציין. בו ביקרת בחודש האחרון "[*עירייה"" / קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]  ת לחשוב על/ה מתבקש/את, לפני שנתחיל
  "(:קניון הים האדום: "לדוגמא)המבנה במסגרת האדומה 
 





 fo level tnereffid a gninifed hcae ,soiranecs evitanretla owt erew erehT .oiranecs cificeps a fo noitpircseD( 4 neercS
 eht fo noitalsnart tcerid A .txetnoc lacitilop-larutluc ilearsI eht ot detpada erew soiranecs ehT .taerht msirorret
  :)noitairav eno ylno ot desopxe saw tnapicitrap hcaE .noitatressid eht ni detneserp saw txet werbeH
 
 
 )I noitairaV ,oiranecS(
 
 :מבזק חדשות עדכני
 !תשומת לבךל
 
זאת בשל מספר הפיגועים הרב שהיה , כוחות הבטחון ובראשם שר הבטחון הכריזו על כוננות הפיגועים הגבוהה ביותר שהיתה בארץ עד כה
  !!!שר הבטחון מתריע כי המדינה כולה תחת התראה בטחונית חריפה ביותר. לאחרונה במבנים ציבורים ברחבי הארץ
  .בחדשות ובעתונים גורמות לחשש כבד בכל בארץ, יומי במבזקים-ות המסוקרות באופן יוםהתקפות הטרור החוזרות ונישנ
 
י המשתתף "או עבור הניסוי הראשון את שם הבניין שהוקלד ע, "עירייה" / "קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]ה ב /ת להפגש עם חבר/ה חייב/את, היום
  .[*3במסך 
  
  )3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppa txet gniwollof ehT(
  
 .י על התמונה בענותך על השאלות הבאות/בבקשה הסתכל. ת/ה הולך/התמונה הבאה היא של הבניין אליו את
 
 





ין ישראל לכל שכנותיה שבאה בעקבות הסכמי השלום שנחתמו ב, בתום שנה שלמה של שלווה ורגיעה מוחלטת של פעילות הטרור בישראל
הכריזו היום רשמית ראש הממשלה ושר הבטחון על ביטול איום הטרור , ויחסי המסחר והתיירות הענפים שנרקמו בין ישראל לכל מדינות האזור
  .ל קביעה זו"המוסד והרמטכ, כ"בדוחות שהוגשו לוועדת החוץ והבטחון של הכנסת אישרו ראש השב. על ישראל
 
י המשתתף "או עבור הניסוי הראשון את שם הבניין שהוקלד ע, "עירייה" / "קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]ה ב /ת להפגש עם חבר/ה חייב/את, היום
  .[*3במסך 
 
  )3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppa txet gniwollof ehT(
  





 rep noitseuq eno stnapicitrap eht ot detneserp erew snoitseuq ehT .lairetam eriannoitseuq eht si gniwollof ehT
 hcae fo pot eht ta deraeppa snoitalupinam larutcetihcra eht dedulcni hcihw segami eht 3 dna 2 seiduts nI .neercs
  .noitseuq yreve evoba ,neercs
 
 
 :)seiduts eerht lla ni deraeppA(1 noitseuQ
 
  [*3י המשתתף במסך "או עבור הניסוי הראשון את שם הבניין שהוקלד ע, "עירייה" / "קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]יוון ת לכ/ה הולך/הניחי שאת/הנח
.  בהתקרבך לבניין נושאים שונים צצים במוחך--
.י כמה הוא מעסיק אותך/ם הבאים דרגעבור כל אחד מהנושאי
 
כלל לא מעסיק מעסיק מעסיקמעסיק מאוד  
 1 2 3 4 5הבניין( אסטטיקת)מראה . 1.1
 1 2 3 4 5ההתמצאות בתוך המבנה. 2.1
 1 2 3 4 5הביטחון מפני פשיעה. 3.1
 –כתי האם הבניין נראה ממל)המונומנטליות של המבנה . 4.1
(בעיצובו ובחומריו, בגודלו
 1 2 3 4 5




  :)seiduts eerht lla ni deraeppA( 2 noitseuQ
 
י או עבור הניסו, "עירייה" / "קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]ב כמה מסוכן ביקורך ,  ההתראה הבטחונית החמורה הקיימת בכל המדינה–בהתחשב בנסיבות 
 ? לפי דעתך[*3י המשתתף במסך "הראשון את שם הבניין שהוקלד ע
 
מאוד מסוכן מסוכן לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  א מסוכןל לל לא מסוכןכ




  :)seiduts eerht lla ni deraeppA(3 noitseuQ
 
 ? זה[*עירייה" / "קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]  י בכניסתך ל/כמה בטוח תרגיש
 
בטוח מאוד בטוח לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  לא בטוח בטוחמאוד לא 




 :)3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppA( 4 noitseuQ
  
  ?תך במקום זה/ה הסתייגות מפגישת חברך/ה חש/האם את
 
מאוד במידה מסויימת לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  כמעט ולא כלל לא




 3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppA( 5 noitseuQ
 
 ?י לבניין/מה הסבירות שתכנס
 
 סבירמאוד סביר לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  לא סביר כלל לא סביר





 3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppA( 6 noitseuQ
 
 ?תך במקום אחר/י לפגוש את חברך/האם תעדיף
 
מאוד, כן כן לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  לא כלל לא




 :)9791 ,kcenileM dna namhcieT dna ,0791 ,.la te regrebleipS :no desaB ;seiduts eerht lla ni deraeppA( 7 noitseuQ
 
או עבור הניסוי הראשון את שם הבניין שהוקלד , "עירייה" / "קניון: "הכנס סוג בניין*]ב ה קבעת /ה שעמו/ה עכשיו בדרכך לפגוש את החבר/את
  "[*.בזמן שהמדינה תחת כוננות פיגועים חמורה": עבור תרחיש בו סכנת פיגועים חמורה הכנס*], [*3 י המשתתף במסך"ע
 
י את האופציה המתאימה ביותר לתיאור /י כל משפט ובחר/קרא. להלן מספר משפטים שבהם משתמשים אנשים בדרך כלל כדי לתאר את עצמם
  .ברגע זה, כלומר, הרגשתך עכשיו
 
  .י את התשובה הנראית לך כמתארת בצורה הטובה ביותר את רגשותייך הנוכחיים/אלא תן,  מידי על משפט כלשהוי זמן רב/אל תתעכב
 
מאוד במידה בינונית במקצת כלל לא
 ה/ה שלו/אני מרגיש.1 4 3 2 1
 ה בטוחה/אני מרגיש.2 4 3 2 1
 ה/אני מתוח.3 4 3 2 1
 יש לי רגשי חרטה.4 4 3 2 1
 ה/אני מרגיש רגוע.5 4 3 2 1
 ת/אני מרגיש נרגז.6 4 3 2 1
ת כעת מאסונות שעללולים לקרות/אני חושש.7 4 3 2 1
 ה/ה נינוח/אני מרגיש.8 4 3 2 1
 ה/אני חרד.9 4 3 2 1
 ה בנוח/אני חש.01 4 3 2 1
יש לי הרגשה של בטחון עצמי.11 4 3 2 1
 ת/ה עצבני/אני מרגיש.21 4 3 2 1
 ת/אני נפחד.31 4 3 2 1
ת רבהה מתיחו/אני מרגיש.41 4 3 2 1
 ת ממתח/אני משוחחרר.51 4 3 2 1
 ה מרוצה/אני מרגיש.61 4 3 2 1
 ת/אני מודאג.71 4 3 2 1
ה התרגשות יתר ומבוכה/אני חש.81 4 3 2 1
 ה/אני שמח.91 4 3 2 1
יש לי הרגשה נעימה.   02 4 3 2 1






 )3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppA( 8 noitseuQ
 
  ? זהכמה מתוחכמת האבטחה בבניין
 
מאוד לא מתוחכמת לא מתוחכמת לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  מתוחכמת מאוד מתוחכמת




 )3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppA( 9 noitseuQ
 
  ?האם העיצוב של הבניין מעורר מחשבות על טרור
 
מאוד, כן כן לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  לא כלל לא




 )3 dna 2 seiduts ni ylno deraeppA( 01 noitseuQ
 
  ?כמה אפקטיבי העיצוב של הבניין בלהרתיע טרוריסטים
 
מאוד לא אפקטיבי לא אפקטיבי לא החלטי/ ניטרלי  אפקטיבי מאוד אפקטיבי
 5 4 3 2 1
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The Three Studies: Screenshots Example  
 
The three studies, which were administered in Texas and Israel, utilized a web-based 
computerized system that randomly assigned participant to the different manipulated 
scenarios. The basic layout was the same for all manipulated scenarios in all three 
studies.  
The following is an example of a specific manipulated scenario as appeared on 
the computer screen. The screenshots have been scaled down in order to fit the 
dissertation’s format and dimensions. 
The scenario that was used for the example of screenshots is from study 3, in 
which the level of terrorism was set to high across all conditions. The tested independent 
variables in this example are:  
- Building-use: Shopping mall 
- Façade design: All glass facade 
- Entrance design: Inconspicuous access control security measures that appear as 
























Question 7 continues from the previous page (scroll-down the screen): 
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Question 7 continues from the previous page (scroll-down the screen): 
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Question 7 continues from the previous page (scroll-down the screen): 
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Question 7 continues from the previous page (scroll-down the screen): 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                     
High  3.33 1.53 2.55 1.22 2.93 1.42  3.10 1.38 3.78 1.00 3.45 1.23  3.21 1.44 3.18 1.27 3.20 1.35 
Low  2.68 1.43 2.29 1.43 2.48 1.43  2.71 1.27 3.00 1.30 2.86 1.28  2.70 1.34 2.62 1.40 2.66 1.36 
Total  3.00 1.50 2.41 1.33 2.70 1.43  2.90 1.32 3.41 1.21 3.16 1.28  2.95 1.41 2.90 1.36 2.93 1.38 
                      
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 1.5 in the questionnaire (Appendix A). 
         
 
 











Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                     
High  2.55 0.93 2.48 0.87 2.51 0.89  2.59 0.92 3.13 0.76 2.88 0.87  2.57 0.91 2.81 0.87 2.70 0.89 
Low  1.89 0.84 1.75 0.78 1.82 0.81  2.43 0.84 2.57 0.83 2.50 0.83  2.15 0.88 2.13 0.89 2.14 0.88 
Total  2.21 0.94 2.10 0.89 2.15 0.91  2.51 0.87 2.86 0.83 2.69 0.86  2.36 0.91 2.47 0.94 2.42 0.93 
                      
Note. The overall sense of security for each participant was calculated using the average of the response to Question 2 and the reversed value of the response to Questions 3 in 
the questionnaire (questions are detailed in Appendix A). 
         
 
 











Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                     
High  45.33 12.58 38.09 12.57 41.63 12.95  41.81 11.31 42.61 11.39 42.23 11.22  43.57 11.95 40.40 12.06 41.93 12.04 
Low  30.86   7.54 31.17   7.57 30.50 7.48  32.81   8.47 41.71 11.99 37.26 11.20  31.81   7.97 35.56 11.37 33.73   9.98 
Total  37.93 12.54 33.96 10.91 35.88 11.83  37.31 10.87 42.18 11.55 39.80 11.42  37.62 11.68 37.98 11.90 37.81 11.76 
                      
Note. The values for the overall score of anxiety state were calculated based on Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene’s Manual of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (1970). The 
calculation is detailed in sub-section 4.2.3 Method.   















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  3.95 1.53 3.56 1.47 3.74 1.50  3.83 1.38 4.20 106 4.03 1.22  3.90 1.45 3.84 1.33 3.87 1.38 
 Low  2.29 1.00 1.96 1.26 2.13 1.14  2.05 1.43 2.95 1.43 2.53 1.49  2.19 1.20 2.43 1.42 2.31 1.31 
 Total  3.07 1.51 2.79 1.58 2.92 1.55  2.92 1.66 3.56 1.40 3.26 1.55  3.00 1.57 3.15 1.54 3.08 1.55 
                      
Solid  High  3.96 1.16 3.46 1.42 3.72 1.31  3.86 1.01 4.29 0.85 4.07 0.95  3.92 1.09 3.83 1.26 3.87 1.17 
 Low  2.00 1.19 2.35 1.23 2.17 1.21  2.55 1.57 2.40 1.10 2.48 1.35  2.24 1.38 2.37 1.16 2.30 1.27 
 Total  2.96 1.52 2.90 1.43 2.93 1.48  3.19 1.47 3.37 1.36 3.27 1.41  3.06 1.50 3.11 1.41 3.08 1.45 
                      
Total High  3.96 1.32 3.51 1.43 3.73 1.39  3.85 1.18 4.24 0.94 4.05 1.08  3.91 1.25 3.84 1.29 3.87 1.27 
 Low  2.13 1.10 2.16 1.25 2.15 1.17  2.32 1.51 2.68 1.29 2.50 1.41  2.22 1.29 2.40 1.29 2.31 1.29 
 Total 3.01 1.51 2.85 1.50 2.93 1.51  3.06 1.55 3.46 1.37 3.27 1.47  3.03 1.53 3.13 1.47 3.08 1.50 
                       
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 1.5 in the questionnaire (Appendix A) 

















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  3.33 0.84 2.76 0.94 3.02 0.93  3.19 0.75 3.55 0.81 3.38 0.79  3.27 0.79 3.11 0.96 3.18 0.88 
 Low  1.92 0.58 1.93 0.55 1.93 0.56  1.69 0.57 2.05 0.74 1.88 0.68  1.82 0.58 1.99 0.64 1.91 0.62 
 Total  2.58 1.01 2.36 0.87 2.47 0.94  2.44 1.01 2.78 1.08 2.62 1.05  2.52 1.00 2.56 0.99 2.54 0.99 
                      
Solid  High  2.93 0.95 2.75 0.80 2.84 0.88  2.83 0.66 3.57 0.66 3.20 0.75  2.89 0.83 3.12 0.84 3.00 0.84 
 Low  1.71 0.58 1.94 0.50 1.82 0.55  2.25 0.84 2.30 0.77 2.27 0.80  1.95 0.75 2.10 0.65 2.02 0.70 
 Total  2.31 0.99 2.35 0.78 2.33 0.89  2.53 0.80 2.95 0.95 2.74 0.90  2.41 0.91 2.61 0.91 2.51 0.91 
                      
Total High  3.10 0.92 2.75 0.86 2.92 0.90  3.00 0.72 3.56 0.73 3.29 0.77  3.06 0.83 3.11 0.90 3.09 0.86 
 Low  1.81 0.59 1.94 0.52 1.87 0.56  2.00 0.78 2.17 0.76 2.09 0.77  1.89 0.68 2.04 0.64 1.97 0.66 
 Total 2.43 1.00 2.36 0.82 2.39 0.91  2.49 0.90 2.87 1.02 2.68 0.97  2.46 0.95 2.59 0.95 2.52 0.95 
                       
Note. The overall sense of security for each participant was calculated using the average of the response to Question 2 and the reversed value of the response to Questions 3 in the 
questionnaire (questions are detailed in Appendix A). 















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  54.67 13.75 44.36 13.93 49.07 14.65  49.78 4.15 50.25 5.21 50.03 4.68  52.41 10.64 46.98 11.24 49.50 11.24 
 Low  33.83 10.08 31.57 7.82 32.72 9.02  45.68 4.76 46.38 4.36 46.05 4.51  39.07 10.04 38.64 9.81 38.85 9.87 
 Total  43.56 15.80 38.23 13.02 40.81 14.60  47.68 4.88 48.27 5.12 47.99 4.98  45.41 12.26 42.85 11.30 44.08 11.81 
                      
Solid  High  46.74 14.71 51.23 11.03 48.94 13.11  49.10 4.05 48.57 5.07 48.83 4.54  47.77 11.32 50.04 8.89 48.89 10.20 
 Low  31.86 10.83 36.31 8.63 34.00 10.00  46.59 5.55 46.30 3.16 46.45 4.52  38.34 11.51 40.65 8.41 39.45 10.16 
 Total  39.16 14.81 43.77 12.37 41.40 13.81  47.81 4.98 47.46 4.35 47.64 4.66  42.96 12.31 45.40 9.82 44.15 11.20 
                      
Total High  50.21 14.70 47.86 12.88 49.00 13.77  49.41 4.06 49.39 5.14 49.40 4.62  49.85 11.20 48.54 10.17 49.18 10.67 
 Low  32.77 10.44 34.08 8.52 33.41 9.53  46.17 5.16 46.34 3.78 46.26 4.49  38.68 10.80 39.67 9.13 39.16 10.00 
 Total 41.14 15.34 41.11 12.92 41.13 14.15  47.75 4.90 47.87 4.74 47.81 4.81  44.08 12.31 44.15 10.62 44.12 11.48 
                       
Note. The values for the overall score of anxiety state were calculated based on Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene’s Manual of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (1970). The 
calculation is detailed in sub-section 4.2.3 Method.   
















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  3.17 0.86 2.71 0.92 2.92 0.92  2.80 0.70 3.25 1.14 3.04 0.97  3.00 0.80 2.95 1.05 2.97 0.94 
 Low  2.15 0.85 1.97 0.62 2.06 0.74  2.04 0.68 1.84 0.79 1.93 0.74  2.10 0.78 1.90 0.70 2.00 0.74 
 Total  2.63 0.99 2.35 0.87 2.49 0.93  2.41 0.78 2.53 1.20 2.47 1.02  2.53 0.90 2.43 1.03 2.48 0.97 
                      
Solid  High  2.64 0.91 2.58 0.91 2.61 0.91  2.33 0.71 2.87 0.80 2.60 0.79  2.51 0.84 2.71 0.87 2.61 0.85 
 Low  2.14 0.82 2.10 0.71 2.12 0.76  2.00 0.77 1.92 0.79 1.96 0.77  2.08 0.79 2.02 0.75 2.05 0.77 
 Total  2.39 0.90 2.34 0.84 2.36 0.87  2.16 0.75 2.41 0.92 2.28 0.84  2.29 0.84 2.37 0.88 2.33 0.86 
                      
Total High  2.88 0.92 2.64 0.91 2.75 0.92  2.55 0.73 3.06 0.99 2.81 0.90  2.73 0.85 2.83 0.96 2.78 0.91 
 Low  2.15 0.83 2.04 0.67 2.10 0.75  2.02 0.72 1.88 0.78 1.95 0.75  2.09 0.78 1.97 0.72 2.03 0.75 
 Total 2.50 0.94 2.35 0.85 2.42 0.90  2.28 0.77 2.47 1.07 2.37 0.93  2.40 0.87 2.40 0.95 2.40 0.91 
                       
Note. The overall likelihood of entering the building for each participant was calculated using the average of responses to Question 4, Question 6 and the reversed value of the response to 
Questions 5 in the questionnaire (questions are detailed in Appendix A). 















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  3.05 1.11 2.68 0.80 2.85 0.97  2.56 0.92 3.20 0.83 2.89 0.92  2.82 1.05 2.91 0.85 2.87 0.94 
 Low  2.58 0.88 2.43 0.73 2.51 0.80  2.84 0.83 3.14 0.85 3.00 0.85  2.70 0.86 2.77 0.86 2.74 0.86 
 Total  2.80 1.01 2.56 0.77 2.68 0.90  2.70 0.88 3.17 0.83 2.95 0.88  2.76 0.95 2.84 0.85 2.80 0.90 
                      
Solid  High  2.85 0.95 2.73 0.87 2.79 0.91  2.71 0.90 3.29 1.01 3.00 0.99  2.79 0.92 2.98 0.97 2.88 0.94 
 Low  2.46 0.69 2.85 0.73 2.65 0.73  2.82 0.73 2.85 0.99 2.83 0.85  2.62 0.73 2.85 0.84 2.73 0.79 
 Total  2.65 0.84 2.79 0.80 2.72 0.82  2.77 0.81 3.07 1.01 2.92 0.92  2.70 0.83 2.91 0.91 2.81 0.87 
                      
Total High  2.94 1.02 2.71 0.83 2.82 0.93  2.64 0.90 3.24 0.92 2.95 0.95  2.80 0.98 2.95 0.91 2.88 0.94 
 Low  2.52 0.78 2.65 0.75 2.58 0.77  2.83 0.77 3.00 0.92 2.91 0.85  2.66 0.79 2.81 0.85 2.73 0.82 
 Total 2.72 0.92 2.68 0.79 2.70 0.86  2.74 0.84 3.12 0.92 2.93 0.90  2.73 0.88 2.88 0.88 2.80 0.88s 
                       
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 8 in the questionnaire (Appendix A) 

























Facade design .01 1 .01 .01 .919 
Level of terrorism threat 1.64 1 1.64 2.18 .141 
Society 4.36 1 4.36 5.80 .017 
Building-use 2.33 1 2.33 3.10 .079 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat .02 1 .02 .03 .866 
Façade design * Society .07 1 .07 .09 .765 
Level of terrorism threat * Society 1.08 1 1.08 1.43 .232 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society 1.39 1 1.39 1.85 .175 
Façade design * Building-use .26 1 .26 .35 .554 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .04 1 .04 .05 .826 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .01 1 .01 .01 .905 
Society * Building-use 4.53 1 4.53 6.03 .015 
Façade design * Society * Building-use 1.74 1 1.74 2.32 .129 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 3.59 1 3.59 4.77 .030 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use .32 1 .32 .43 .514 
Error 259.89 346 .75   
Total 3127.00 362    
a  R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .035) 

















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  2.90 1.30 2.84 1.18 2.87 1.22  2.44 1.15 2.25 1.21 2.34 1.17  2.69 1.24 2.58 1.22 2.63 1.22 
 Low  2.21 1.02 1.91 0.95 2.06 0.99  1.89 0.74 1.81 0.60 1.85 0.66  2.07 0.91 1.86 0.80 1.97 0.86 
 Total  2.53 1.20 2.40 1.16 2.46 1.18  2.16 0.99 2.02 0.96 2.09 0.97  2.37 1.12 2.22 1.09 2.29 1.10 
                      
Solid  High  2.63 0.97 2.85 1.16 2.74 1.06  2.67 1.11 2.14 0.91 2.40 1.04  2.65 1.02 2.53 1.10 2.59 1.06 
 Low  1.96 1.04 2.04 1.18 2.00 1.10  2.32 1.17 2.30 1.13 2.31 1.14  2.12 1.10 2.15 1.15 2.14 1.12 
 Total  2.29 1.05 2.44 1.23 2.36 1.14  2.49 1.14 2.22 1.01 2.36 1.08  2.38 1.09 2.34 1.14 2.36 1.11 
                      
Total High  2.75 1.12 2.84 1.16 2.80 1.13  2.56 1.12 2.20 1.05 2.37 1.10  2.67 1.12 2.55 1.15 2.61 1.13 
 Low  2.08 1.03 1.98 1.07 2.03 1.04  2.12 1.01 2.05 0.92 2.09 0.96  2.10 1.01 2.01 1.00 2.05 1.00 
 Total 2.40 1.12 2.42 1.19 2.41 1.15  2.34 1.08 2.12 0.99 2.23 1.04  2.37 1.10 2.29 1.11 2.33 1.10 
                       
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 9 in the questionnaire (Appendix A) 

























Facade design .57 1 .57 .50 .479 
Level of terrorism threat 25.46 1 25.46 22.36 .000 
Society 3.21 1 3.21 2.82 .094 
Building-use 1.10 1 1.10 0.97 .325 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat 1.25 1 1.25 1.10 .295 
Façade design * Society 2.79 1 2.79 2.45 .118 
Level of terrorism threat * Society 5.10 1 5.10 4.48 .035 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society .59 1 .59 .51 .474 
Façade design * Building-use .21 1 .21 .18 .668 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .08 1 .08 .07 .789 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .33 1 .33 .29 .593 
Society * Building-use .79 1 .79 .69 .406 
Façade design * Society * Building-use 1.16 1 1.16 1.02 .314 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 1.36 1 1.36 1.19 .276 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use .13 1 .13 .12 .734 
Error 393.99 346    
Total 2403.00 362    
a  R Squared = .104 (Adjusted R Squared = ..065) 

















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 
in the design 
of the  
facade 
Variation in 
the level of 
terrorism 
threat  
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Glass  High  3.57 0.93 3.28 0.94 3.41 0.93  3.61 0.92 3.80 0.89 3.71 0.90  3.59 0.91 3.51 0.94 3.55 0.92 
 Low  3.04 0.62 3.00 0.94 3.02 0.68  3.47 0.91 3.48 0.87 3.48 0.88  3.23 0.78 3.23 0.83 3.23 0.80 
 Total  3.29 0.82 3.15 0.85 3.22 0.83  3.54 0.90 3.63 0.89 3.59 0.89  3.40 0.86 3.37 0.90 3.39 0.88 
                      
Solid  High  3.07 0.68 2.88 0.82 2.98 0.75  3.00 0.95 3.19 0.98 3.10 0.96  3.04 0.80 3.02 0.90 3.03 0.84 
 Low  2.86 0.65 3.04 0.72 2.94 0.69  2.91 1.15 2.75 0.91 2.83 1.03  2.88 0.90 2.91 0.81 2.90 0.85 
 Total  2.96 0.67 2.96 0.77 2.96 0.71  2.95 1.05 2.98 0.96 2.96 1.00  2.96 0.85 2.97 0.85 2.96 0.85 
                      
Total High  3.29 0.83 3.08 0.89 3.18 0.86  3.28 0.97 3.49 0.98 3.39 0.97  3.29 0.89 3.26 0.95 3.27 0.92 
 Low  2.94 0.64 3.02 0.72 2.98 0.68  3.17 1.07 3.12 0.95 3.15 1.01  3.04 0.86 3.07 0.83 3.05 0.84 
 Total 3.11 0.72 3.05 0.81 3.08 0.78  3.23 1.02 3.30 0.98 3.27 0.97  3.16 0.88 3.16 0.90 3.16 0.89 
                       
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 10 in the questionnaire (Appendix A) 


























Facade design 17.53 1 17.53 24.04 .000 
Level of terrorism threat 4.84 1 4.84 6.64 .010 
Society 2.98 1 2.98 4.08 .044 
Building-use .02 1 .02 .03 .870 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat .64 1 .64 .87 .351 
Façade design * Society 3.02 1 3.02 4.14 .043 
Level of terrorism threat * Society .02 1 .02 .03 .869 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society .93 1 .93 1.27 .260 
Façade design * Building-use .04 1 .04 .05 .820 
Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .01 1 .01 .01 .907 
Facade design * Level of terrorism threat * Building-use .00 1 .00 .00 .954 
Society * Building-use .44 1 .44 .61 .437 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .33 1 .33 .45 .503 
Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use 1.86 1 1.86 2.55 .111 
Façade design * Level of terrorism threat * Society * Building-use .11 1 .11 .15 .695 
Error 252.30 346 .73   
Total 3905.00 362    
a  R Squared = .110 (Adjusted R Squared = .071) 



















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  3.16 1.41 2.48 1.38 2.83 1.42  3.65 1.14 3.91 1.28 3.79 1.21  3.38 1.30 3.20 1.50 3.29 1.40 
 Solid 3.19 1.39 3.23 1.26 3.21 1.30  3.74 1.24 3.63 1.46 3.68 1.34  3.41 1.33 3.38 1.34 3.40 1.33 
 Total 3.17 1.37 2.91 1.35 3.04 1.36  3.69 1.17 3.79 1.35 3.74 1.26  3.40 1.31 3.29 1.41 3.34 1.36 
                      
Temporary Glass  3.63 1.38 3.38 1.42 3.50 1.39  2.80 1.32 3.67 1.44 3.27 1.44  3.30 1.40 3.50 1.42 3.41 1.41 
 Solid 3.70 1.15 3.54 1.12 3.60 1.12  3.58 1.21 3.65 1.04 3.61 1.13  3.63 1.17 3.58 1.08 3.61 1.12 
 Total 3.66 1.27 3.46 1.27 3.55 1.27  3.24 1.30 3.66 1.26 3.44 1.29  3.46 1.30 3.54 1.26 3.50 1.28 
                      
Total Glass  3.42 1.40 3.02 1.46 3.21 1.44  3.22 1.29 3.79 1.35 3.53 1.35  3.34 1.35 3.37 1.46 3.35 1.40 
 Solid 3.42 1.28 3.39 1.19 3.41 1.22  3.64 1.21 3.64 1.25 3.64 1.22  3.53 1.25 3.49 1.21 3.50 1.22 
 Total 3.42 1.34 3.22 1.33 3.31 1.33  3.45 1.26 3.72 1.30 3.58 1.28  3.43 1.30 3.43 1.34 3.43 1.32 
                      
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 1.5 in the questionnaire (Appendix A) 

















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  3.02 1.02 2.78 0.90 2.91 0.96  2.93 0.69 3.02 0.68 2.98 0.68  2.98 0.88 2.90 0.80 2.94 0.84 
 Solid 2.76 0.79 2.73 0.94 2.74 0.86  2.97 0.79 3.29 0.82 3.13 0.81  2.85 0.79 2.94 0.93 2.90 0.86 
 Total 2.88 0.91 2.75 0.92 2.82 0.91  2.95 0.73 3.14 0.75 3.05 0.74  2.91 0.83 2.92 0.87 2.92 0.85 
                      
Temporary Glass  2.67 0.80 2.74 0.99 2.70 0.90  2.43 0.69 3.19 0.67 2.84 0.78  2.57 0.76 2.92 0.90 2.76 0.85 
 Solid 2.78 0.86 3.03 0.92 2.93 0.90  2.90 0.92 3.18 0.88 3.02 0.90  2.85 0.89 3.08 0.90 2.97 0.90 
 Total 2.72 0.82 2.88 0.96 2.81 0.91  2.70 0.85 3.18 0.76 2.93 0.84  2.71 0.83 3.00 0.90 2.86 0.88 
                      
Total Glass  2.83 0.91 2.75 0.95 2.79 0.93  2.68 0.73 3.11 0.68 2.91 0.73  2.76 0.84 2.91 0.85 2.84 0.85 
 Solid 2.77 0.82 2.89 0.94 2.84 0.88  2.93 0.86 3.23 0.84 3.07 0.86  2.85 0.83 3.01 0.91 2.94 0.88 
 Total 2.80 0.86 2.83 0.94 2.81 0.90  2.81 0.81 3.16 0.75 2.99 0.80  2.81 0.84 2.96 0.88 2.89 0.86 
                      
Note. The overall sense of security for each participant was calculated using the average of the response to Question 2 and the reversed value of the response to Questions 3 in the 
questionnaire (questions are detailed in Appendix A). 















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  47.68 18.10 46.74 14.85 47.23 16.46  48.40 4.47 48.09 5.91 48.23 5.23  48.00 13.70 47.41 11.19 47.70 12.43 
 Solid 44.07 12.23 50.03 13.21 47.26 13.44  47.79 4.49 48.79 4.61 48.29 4.52  45.61 10.61 49.56 10.72 47.67 10.80 
 Total 45.81 15.71 48.63 13.90 47.25 14.81  48.10 4.43 48.40 5.31 48.26 4.88  46.79 12.23 48.53 10.95 47.68 11.59 
                      
Temporary Glass  49.07 11.35 43.29 12.84 46.00 12.42  47.05 5.33 48.38 4.81 47.77 5.03  48.26 9.39 45.40 10.55 46.72 10.09 
 Solid 48.83 15.31 49.71 12.83 49.36 13.74  48.38 5.24 48.65 5.01 48.50 5.09  48.59 11.03 49.33 10.62 48.98 10.77 
 Total 48.96 13.08 46.55 13.14 47.60 13.12  47.80 5.26 48.50 4.84 48.14 5.05  48.42 10.19 47.31 10.72 47.83 10.46 
                      
Total Glass  48.44 14.68 44.68 13.66 46.53 14.23  47.73 4.90 48.23 5.32 48.00 5.11  48.14 11.57 46.29 10.83 47.17 11.20 
 Solid 46.26 14.28 49.86 12.91 48.31 13.57  48.13 4.89 48.72 4.76 48.40 4.81  47.15 10.88 49.44 10.62 48.35 10.78 
 Total 47.40 14.46 47.46 13.46 47.43 13.90  47.94 4.87 48.45 5.05 48.20 4.95  47.64 11.21 47.87 10.81 47.76 10.99 
                      
Note. The values for the overall score of anxiety state were calculated based on Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene’s Manual of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (1970). The 
calculation is detailed in sub-section 4.2.3 Method.   

















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  276 1.02 2.68 0.84 2.72 0.93  2.37 0.72 2.80 0.84 2.60 0.81  2.59 0.91 2.74 0.83 2.66 0.87 
 Solid 2.69 0.84 2.73 0.85 2.71 0.84  2.40 0.86 3.19 0.80 2.80 0.91  2.57 0.85 2.91 0.85 2.75 0.86 
 Total 2.72 0.92 2.71 0.84 2.72 0.88  2.38 0.79 2.98 0.83 2.69 0.86  2.58 0.88 2.83 0.84 2.71 0.87 
                      
Temporary Glass  2.60 0.69 2.50 0.78 2.55 0.74  2.00 0.5 2.63 0.82 2.34 0.80  2.36 0.73 2.55 0.79 2.46 0.77 
 Solid 2.78 0.80 2.99 0.81 2.91 0.80  2.54 0.86 2.65 0.93 2.59 0.88  2.65 0.84 2.87 0.86 2.77 0.85 
 Total 2.68 0.74 2.75 0.83 2.72 0.79  2.30 0.82 2.64 0.86 2.47 0.85  2.51 0.79 2.71 0.84 2.61 0.82 
                      
Total Glass  2.67 0.85 2.57 0.81 2.62 0.83  2.18 0.70 2.71 0.82 2.47 0.81  2.47 0.82 2.63 0.81 2.55 0.82 
 Solid 2.73 0.81 2.87 0.83 2.81 0.82  2.48 0.86 2.91 0.90 2.68 0.90  2.61 0.84 2.89 0.85 2.76 0.86 
 Total 2.70 0.83 2.73 0.83 2.72 0.83  2.34 0.80 2.80 0.86 2.57 0.86  2.54 0.83 2.76 0.84 2.66 0.84 
                      
Note. The overall likelihood of entering the building for each participant was calculated using the average of responses to Question 4, Question 6 and the reversed value of the response to 
Questions 5 in the questionnaire (questions are detailed in Appendix A). 















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  2.76 0.78 2.70 0.82 2.73 0.79  3.00 1.03 2.83 1.03 2.91 1.02  2.87 0.89 2.76 0.92 2.81 0.91 
 Solid 2.89 1.31 2.87 0.81 2.88 1.06  3.26 1.15 2.58 0.90 2.92 1.08  3.04 1.25 2.76 0.85 2.90 1.06 
 Total 2.83 1.08 2.80 0.81 2.81 0.95  3.13 1.08 2.71 0.97 2.91 1.04  2.96 1.08 2.76 0.88 2.86 0.99 
                      
Temporary Glass  2.43 0.77 2.94 1.10 2.70 0.99  2.85 0.93 3.25 1.07 3.07 1.02  2.60 0.86 3.07 1.09 2.85 1.01 
 Solid 3.13 1.22 2.91 1.01 3.00 1.09  3.12 0.99 3.10 0.97 3.11 0.97  3.12 1.09 2.98 0.99 3.05 1.04 
 Total 2.74 1.04 2.93 1.05 2.84 1.05  3.00 0.97 3.18 1.02 3.09 0.99  2.86 1.01 3.03 1.04 2.95 1.03 
                      
Total Glass  2.58 0.79 2.84 1.00 2.71 0.91  2.93 0.97 3.04 1.06 2.99 1.02  2.73 0.88 2.93 1.03 2.83 0.96 
 Solid 3.00 1.26 2.89 0.91 2.94 1.07  3.18 1.05 2.85 0.96 3.02 1.02  3.08 1.16 2.88 0.93 2.98 1.05 
 Total 2.78 1.06 2.87 0.95 2.83 1.00  3.06 1.02 2.95 1.02 3.01 1.02  2.91 1.05 2.90 0.98 2.90 1.01 
                      
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 8 in the questionnaire (Appendix A). 

























Entrance design 1.09 1 1.09 1.08 .299 
Facade design 1.84 1 1.84 1.82 .178 
Society 2.73 1 2.73 2.71 .100 
Building-use .11 1 .11 .10 .747 
Entrance design * Façade design  .33 1 .33 .32 .570 
Entrance design * Society .30 1 .30 .29 .588 
Facade design * Society 1.07 1 1.07 1.06 .304 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society .11 1 .11 .11 .745 
Entrance design * Building-use 3.92 1 3.92 3.90 .049 
Façade design * Building-use 3.86 1 3.86 3.83 .051 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use .69 1 .69 .68 .410 
Society * Building-use .70 1 .70 .70 .405 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use 1.13 1 1.13 1.13 .289 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .09 1 .09 .09 .762 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use 1.12 1 1.12 1.12 .291 
Error 385.31 383 1.01   
Total 3771.00 399    
a  R Squared = .047 (Adjusted R Squared = .010) 

















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  2.56 1.12 2.57 0.99 2.56 1.05  2.60 1.05 1.96 0.98 2.26 1.05  2.58 1.08 2.26 1.02 2.42 1.06 
 Solid 2.33 0.88 2.90 1.01 2.64 0.99  2.26 0.93 2.11 1.10 2.18 1.01  2.30 0.89 2.60 1.11 2.46 1.02 
 Total 2.44 1.00 2.76 1.01 2.60 1.01  2.44 1.00 2.02 1.02 2.22 1.03  2.44 0.99 2.44 1.07 2.44 1.03 
                      
Temporary Glass  2.87 0.90 2.85 1.28 2.86 1.11  2.15 0.88 1.96 0.99 2.05 0.94  2.58 0.95 2.48 1.25 2.53 1.12 
 Solid 2.35 0.98 2.77 1.09 2.60 1.06  2.00 0.85 2.30 0.98 2.13 0.91  2.16 0.92 2.60 1.07 2.39 1.02 
 Total 2.64 0.96 2.81 1.18 2.74 1.09  2.07 0.85 2.11 0.99 2.09 0.92  2.37 0.95 2.54 1.16 2.46 1.07 
                      
Total Glass  2.73 1.01 2.74 1.17 2.73 1.09  2.38 0.98 1.96 0.98 2.15 1.00  2.58 1.01 2.38 1.15 2.48 1.09 
 Solid 2.34 0.92 2.83 1.05 2.62 1.02  2.11 0.89 2.21 1.03 2.15 0.95  2.23 0.91 2.60 1.08 2.43 1.02 
 Total 2.54 0.98 2.79 1.10 2.68 1.05  2.24 0.93 2.07 1.00 2.15 0.97  2.41 0.97 2.49 1.12 2.45 1.05 
                      
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 9 in the questionnaire (Appendix A). 
























Entrance design .00 1 .00 .00 .962 
Facade design .35 1 .35 .34 .558 
Society 22.44 1 22.44 21.78 .000 
Building-use .13 1 .13 .12 .725 
Entrance design * Façade design  .17 1 .17 .16 .689 
Entrance design * Society 1.48 1 1.48 1.44 .231 
Facade design * Society .36 1 .36 .35 .553 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society 1.79 1 1.79 1.74 .189 
Entrance design * Building-use .83 1 .83 .81 .370 
Façade design * Building-use 5.88 1 5.88 5.71 .017 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use .02 1 .02 .02 .884 
Society * Building-use 4.23 1 4.23 4.10 .044 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use 1.73 1 1.73 1.68 .195 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .00 1 .00 .00 .976 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use .03 1 .03 .03 .872 
Error 394.58 383    
Total 2836.00 399    
a  R Squared = .101 (Adjusted R Squared = .066) 



















Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 




Both bldg. uses 
 
Variation 





in the design 
of the  
facade 
  M  SD   M  SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD    M  SD   M SD   M  SD 
                      
Designed Glass  3.48 0.92 3.30 0.82 3.40 0.87  3.40 0.94 3.57 0.99 3.49 0.96  3.44 0.92 3.43 0.91 3.44 0.91 
 Solid 3.26 0.76 2.97 0.84 3.10 0.81  3.42 0.90 3.00 1.05 3.21 0.99  3.33 0.82 2.98 0.92 3.15 0.88 
 Total 3.37 0.84 3.11 0.84 3.24 0.85  3.41 0.91 3.31 1.05 3.36 0.98  3.38 0.87 3.20 0.94 3.29 0.91 
                      
Temporary Glass  3.13 0.90 3.00 0.95 3.06 0.92  3.35 0.93 3.58 1.14 3.48 1.05  3.22 0.91 3.24 1.07 3.23 0.99 
 Solid 2.96 0.64 3.20 0.87 3.10 0.79  2.77 0.86 3.35 0.88 3.02 0.91  2.86 0.76 3.25 0.87 3.07 0.84 
 Total 3.06 0.80 3.10 0.91 3.08 0.86  3.02 0.93 3.48 1.02 3.24 1.00  3.04 0.86 3.25 0.97 3.15 0.92 
                      
Total Glass  3.29 0.92 3.12 0.91 3.21 0.91  3.38 0.93 3.57 1.06 3.48 1.00  3.33 0.92 3.33 1.00 3.33 0.96 
 Solid 3.12 0.72 3.09 0.85 3.10 0.80  3.04 0.93 3.18 0.97 3.11 0.94  3.08 0.82 3.12 0.90 3.11 0.86 
 Total 3.21 0.83 3.11 0.88 3.33 0.92  3.20 0.94 3.40 1.03 3.30 0.99  3.21 0.88 3.22 0.95 3.22 0.92 
                      
Note. Values are based on responses to Question 10 in the questionnaire (Appendix A). 

























Entrance design 1.67 1 1.67 2.05 .153 
Facade design 5.37 1 5.37 6.60 .011 
Society 1.94 1 1.94 2.39 .123 
Building-use .06 1 .06 .08 .785 
Entrance design * Façade design  .15 1 .15 .18 .674 
Entrance design * Society .23 1 .23 .28 .599 
Facade design * Society 1.02 1 1.02 1.25 .264 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society 1.09 1 1.09 1.33 .249 
Entrance design * Building-use 4.07 1 4.07 5.00 .026 
Façade design * Building-use .00 1 .00 .00 .976 
Entrance design * Façade design * Building-use 3.05 1 3.05 3.75 .054 
Society * Building-use 1.26 1 1.26 1.54 .215 
Entrance design * Society * Building-use .36 1 .36 .45 .504 
Façade design * Society * Building-use .38 1 .38 .46 .458 
Entrance design * Façade design * Society * 
Building-use .29 1 .29 .36 .550 
Error 311.92 383 .81   
Total 4459.00 399    
a  R Squared = .065 (Adjusted R Squared = .028) 
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